12
sentence. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus for his release, which
being refused, he appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the
judgment. The Court said, through Judge Johnson:
    "The third and only remaining question is whether the prisoner is
entitled to be discharged in consequence of having been illegally
arrested in North Carolina, and brought into this State. The pur-
suit of the prisoner into North Carolina and his arrest there was
certainly a violation of the sovereignty of that State, and was an act
which can not be commended. But that was not the act of the State, but
of a few of its citizens, for which the Constitution of the United States
has provided a reparation.  It gives the Governor of that State the
right to demand them of the Governor of this, and imposes on the
latter the obligation to surrender them ; but until it is refused there
can be no cause of complaint. And supposing it otherwise, and that'
the outrage furnishes just cause of complaint, and that North Carolina
had declared war against us, how can the Court know that the restora-
tion of the prisoner would appease her" Or if it did by what pirocess
would the Court send him there       The case then is this:  A
felon convict flies into North Carolina to avoid the execution of his
sentence, and is pursued and brought back, and althougfh the manner
of doing it was illegal, the thing in itself was riqht, and exactly what
North Carolina was bound to do if it had been properly required."

                          BREWSTER'S CASE.
  In the case of the State vs. Brewster, determined by the Supreme
Court of Vermont in 1835 (7 Vt., 118), Judge Phelps for the Court
said:
   "It is a well-established principle of international law that a for-
eigner is bound to regard the criminal laws of the country in which he
may sojourn, and for any Offense there committed he is amenable to
those laws. In this case the offense, if committed at all, was com-
mitted within our jurisdiction and is punishable by our laws. The
respondent, though a foreigner, is, if gtilty, equally subject to our
jurisdiction with our citizens. His escape into Canada did not purge
the offense nor oust our jurisdiction; being retaken and brought ill fact
within our jurisdiction, it is not for us to inquire by what means, or in
what precise manner, he may have been brought ;within the reach of
justice.  It becomes then immaterial whether the prisoner was brought
out of Canada with the assent of the authorities of that country or not.
If there was anything improper in the transaction, it was not that
the prisoner was entitled to protection on his own account. The il-
leg-ality, if any, consisted in the violation of the sovereignty of an
independent nation. If that nation complain, it is a matter which
concerns the political relations of the two countries, and in that aspect
the subject is not within the constitutional powers of this Court.
Whether the authorities of Canada would have surrendered the prisoner
or not upon due application is a question of national comity resting in
discretion. Their power to do so will not be questioned. If they have