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to the one to demand him, and makes it the duty of the other to give
him up
   But, again, if the forcible and unauthorized kidnaping of a fugi-
tive criminal in one country and his transportation against his will
into another with which it has an extradition treaty is no violation of
that treaty, how can it be claimed that a similar transaction between
the States of the Union is a violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States
   The Court goes further and says:
   " The question of how far this forcible seizure in another country,
and transfer by violence, force or fraud to this country could be made
available to resist trial in a State Court, for the offense now charged
upon him, is one which we do not feel called upon to decide, for in
that transaction we do not see that the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States guarantee him any protection."
   But a treaty, made under the authority of the United States, is
expressly declared by the Constitution to be a part of the supreme law
of the land, and certainly the Constitution and laws of Congress
guarantee to him the same protection it does to the prisoners at bar,
under similar circumstances, and certainly the circumstances are pre-
cisely similar. He was seized by force and taken, against his will,
back to the jurisdiction from which he had fled, and so were they.
How can this Court interpose for their relief, when the Supreme Court
of the United States could not for his
   But the Court goes still further and says:
   "There are authorities of the highest respectability which hold
that such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should
not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the Court which
has the right to try him for such an offense, and presents no valid ob-
jection to his trial in such Court"-and then cites the very cases to
which I have already called your Honor's attention.
   But this is not all. The Court proceeds to say:
   " However that may be, the decision of that question is as much
within the province of the State Court as a question of common law,
or the law of nations of which that court is bound to take notice, as
it is of the courts of the United States. And though we might or
might not differ with the Illinois court on that subject, it is one in
which we have no right to review their decision."
   And this, it seems to me, ought to be conclusive of this whole con-
troversy. If the Supreme Court of the United States had no right
to review the decision of the courts of Illinois upon the question of its
jurisdiction in Ker's case, how cam this Court oust the courts of Ken-
tucky of jurisdiction to determine the same question in this
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