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    I need not enter here upon a labored discussion of any of the mul-
titude of definitions which courts and text-writers have attempted to
give to the well-worn and time-honored expression, " due process of
law." I fully appreciate the difficulty experienced by the Supreme
Court in the case of Davidson against New Orleans (96 U. S., 97) of
formulating any definition of the constitutional meaning and value of
the phrase which would be at once so perspicuous and comprehensive
as to embrace all classes of cases, and quite agree with that exalted
tribunal in the wisdom of ascertaining its true intent and application
according to well-ascertained principles, and as sound legal logic may
require, in each case as it may be presented for decision. And it is
quite sufficient in this case to say that if the principles I have already
stated are correct, there is no room for the question here; for if it be
true that a State Court having jurisdiction of a crime may lawfully
hold the alleged perpetrator of that crime to answer, without any
regard to any irregularity that may have been committed in bringing
his person within its jurisdiction, it follows as an inevitable conclusion
that his detention is under " due process of law." Under the com-
mion law, as well as under our Statutes, there are many cases, as
your Honor well knows, in which anybody, officer or private person,
may arrest an offender not only without a writ, or without any pre-
vious complaint or accusation by affidavit, information or indictment;
and, out of the thousands of such cases which have occurred in this
countrv and in England, not one can be found in which even a doubt
was suggested that the detention of the prisoner was "by due pro-
cess of law " when the facts justified it.
   But, to be somewhat more specific. It will be observed that the
exact language of the provision is-, that " No State shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law," and I
need not refer to the several decisions of the Supreme Court in which
it is held that this clause refers exclusively to acts done by the State
or under its authority, and not to the acts of unauthorized individuals.
At what point of time, then, and in what manner did the State act in
this transaction   It was not when these parties were forcibly seized
by Frank Phillips and others in the State of West Virginia.  The
State could not have given them authority to make the seizure as it
was done, and it is not pretended that the State ever attempted to
confer any such authority upon them. It is true that, in the preceding
September, Frank Phillips had been appointed as agent for the State by