AUTUMIN OF 1863



and the railway from Charlot-esville to Lynch-
burg and the South-west. All of these operations
held direct relation with the Riclimond campaign,,
and eventually all contributed their full share to
its successful termination. For in the end Rich-
inond fell because its lines of communication
with the region which supplied Lee's armn  were
destroyed.
  Grant, resolved on his policy of "persistent
hammering" (a phrase coined by him after the
events which proved its effectiiveness), and, as-
sured of vast levies and of a free hand, to carry
out his plan on his own line no matter what the
cost, crossed the Rapidan on the night of the 3d
of MXfay, 1864. Marching by Ely and Germana
Fords, as Lee had predicted lhe would, he com-
mitted himself boldly to the tangled forest of the
Wilderness, where one year before Hooker had
met such signal defeat. His army numbered over
140,000 men of all arms-mole than double the
number that Lee now commanded-and he had
318 field guns. His equipment was possibly the
best that any army could boast that ever took
the field. His baggage train would, as he states,
have stretched in line to Richmond, sixty-odd
miles away. Lee had, with which to oppose him,
  "The Shenandoah Vmalley in 1864,-' George E. lond, p. 5.
                      487