608

BATTLE OF STONE RIVER:

Our forces, greatly wearied and much reduced by heavy losses, were held ready to avail themselves of any change in the enemy's position; but it was deemed unadvisable to assail him as there established. The whole day, after these dispositions, was passed without an important movement on either side, and was consumed by us in gleaning the battle-field, burying the dead, and replenishing ammunition.

At daylight on Friday, the 2d, orders to feel the enemy and ascertain his position were repeated, with the same result. The cavalry brigades of Wheeler and Wharton had returned during the night, greatly exhausted from long-continued service, with but little rest or food for either man or horse. Both the commanders reported the indications from the enemy's movements the same. Allowing them only a few hours to feed and rest, and sending the two detached regiments back to Pegram's brigade, Wharton was ordered to the right bank across Stone River, immediately in Breckinridge's front. Reconnoissances by several staff-officers soon developed the fact that a division had quietly crossed unopposed and established themselves on and under cover of an eminence from whicli Lieutenant-General Polk's line was commanded and enfiladed. The dis-lodgment of this force or the withdrawal of Polk's line was an evident, necessity. The latter involved consequences not to be entertained. Orders were consequently given for the concentration of the whole of General Breckinridge's division in front of the position to be taken, the addition to his command of the ten Napoleon guns, twelve-pounders, under Captain F. II. Robertson, an able and accomplished artillery officer, and for the cavalry forces of Wharton and Pegram, about two thousand men, to join in his attack on the right. Major-General Breckinridge was sent for, and advised of the movement and its objects, the securing and holding the position which protected Polk's flank and gave us command of the enemy's, by which to enfilade him. He was informed of the disposition of the forces placed at his disposal, and instructed with them to drive the enemy back, crown the hill, intrench his artillery, and hold the position.

To distract their attention from our real object, a heavy fire was ordered to be opened from Polk's front at the exact hour at which the movement was to begin. At other points, throughout both lines, all was quiet. General Breckinridge, at three p.m., reported he would advance at four. Polk's batteries promptly opened fire, and were soon answered by the enemy. A heavy cannonade of some fifteen minutes was succeeded by the musketry, which soon became general. The contest was short and severe; the enemy was driven back, and the eminence gained; but the movement, as a whole, was a failure, and the position was again yielded. Our forces were moved, unfortunately, to the left so far as to throw a portion of them into and over Stone River, where they encountered heavy masses of the enemy, while those against whom they were intended to operate on our side of the river had a destructive enfilade on our whole line. Our reserved line was so close to the front as to receive the enemy's fire, and, returning it, took their friends in the rear. The cavalry force was left entirely out of the action.

Learning from my own staff-officers, sent to the scene, of the disorderly retreat being made by General Breckinridge's division, Brigadier-General Patton Anderson's fine brigade of Mississippians, the nearest body of troops, was promptly ordered to the relief. On reaching the field and moving forward, Anderson found himself in front of Breckinridge's infantry, and soon encountered the enemy's light troops close upon our artillery, which had been left without support. This noble brigade, under its cool and gallant chief, drove the enemy back, and saved all the guns not captured before its arrival. Captain F. H. Robertson, after the disabling wound received by Major Graves, General Breckinridge's gallant and efficient Chief of Artillery, took the entire charge of the artillery of the division, in addition to his own. To his gallantry, energy, and fearlessness is due the smallness of our loss sustained before the arrival of support,   only three guns. His report will show the important part he played in this attack and repulse. Befo.e the end of the whole movement, it was quite dark. Anderson's command held a position next the enemy, corresponding nearly with our original line, while Breckinridge's brigade