xt70k649rw57 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt70k649rw57/data/mets.xml Washington United States. Works Progress Administration Lowe, Robert C.(Robert Chapin), 1907- Sherfey, Helen R. 1937 16 p.; 27 cm. UK holds archival copy for ASERL Collaborative Federal Depository Program libraries. Call Number Y 3.W 89/2:36/W 27 books English Washington DC: Works Progress Administration This digital resource may be freely searched and displayed in accordance with U. S. copyright laws. Washington Works Progress Administration Publications Public welfare -- Law and legislation -- Washington Social workers -- Legal status, laws, etc. -- Washington Constitutional law -- Washington Analysis of Constitutional Provisions Affecting Public Welfare in the State of Washington text Analysis of Constitutional Provisions Affecting Public Welfare in the State of Washington 1937 1937 2019 true xt70k649rw57 section xt70k649rw57 Q / W O R K S P R O G R E S S A D M | N I S T R A T I O N ' HARRY L. HOPKINS, ADMINISTRATOR CORRINGTON GILL, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR HOWARD B. MYERS, DIRECTOR DIVISION OF SOCIAL RESEARCH I \I 0 ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING PUBLIC WELFARE IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 9 O I . g I . 9 ’ v 9 , MAY 1, 1957 I O I 0 0 a o I i. PREPARED BY ROBERT C. LOWE AND HELEN R. SHERFEY LEGAL RESEARCH SECTION UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A. ROSS ECKLER, COORDINATOR OF SPECIAL INQUIRIES ‘ DIVISION OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 5 I .. O 9 o PREFACE This bulletin is one of a series presenting . State constitutional provisions affecting public wel— fare, prepared to supplement the State by State digests . of public welfare laws so as to provide in abstract form the basis for the public welfare services of the several States. The provisions quoted are those concerned directly with public welfare administration and such _ . others as may substantially affect a public welfare ‘ program, even though only indirectly related. It would be impossible to consider within the limits of this _ study every remotely connected constitutional provi— sion. The indirectly related provisions included, therefore, have been restricted to those concerning 9 finance, legislation, and the methods of constitutional . amendment. An attempt has been made, by a careful selec— tion of the most recent cases decided by the highest courts of the States, to indicate wherever possible how i 9 these provisions have been construed. These cases are included in footnotes appended to the constitutional provisions shown. ‘ It is hoped that these abstracts will be ‘ useful to those interested in public welfare questions 9 in indicating how State and local public welfare admin— istration may be affected by constitutional powers and limitations. 9 9 9 i o 0 CONTENTS 0 Page . Incidence of Responsibility for Welfare Program.................. 1 Financial Powers and Limitations................................. 2 Taxation and Assessments.................................... 2 Exemptions.................................................. 5 9 Borrowing and Use of Credit................................. 5 Other Income................................................ 10 . Appropriations and Expenditures............................. 10 Provisions Affecting Legislation................................. 11 o Constitutional Amendment or Revision............................. 15 9 9 9 Q 9 . . Washington 0 ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING PUBLIC WELFARE IN WASHINGTON1 . I. Incidence of Responsibility for Welfare Program A. Educational, reformatory and penal institutions; those for . the benefit of blind, deaf, dumb, or otherwise defective youth; for the insane and idiotic; and such other institutions as the public good may require, shall be fostered and supported by the state, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law.2 * * * B. The Legislature shall provide by law for the maintenance , of a Soldiers' Home for honorably discharged Union soldiers, sailors, marines and members of the state militia disabled while in the line of duty and who are bona fide citizens of the state.3 C. No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall ' hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to . or in aid of any individual, association, company or corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirzm,4 * * *. . D. It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample pro- vision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or 9 sex.5 1Constitution (1889), as published in the Washington Legislative Manual (1935), by authority; with all amendments to May 1, 1957. "The provisions of this constitution are mandatory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.II Art. I, Sec. 29. 2Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 1. 9 A statute provided that the expenses of indigent persons dangerously insane con- fined in the State hospital should be paid by the State, and that the expenses of those indigent persons not dangerously insane so confined should be paid by the coun- ties from which such persons were committed. The act was held constitutional on the ground, among others, that this section granted to the Legislature discretion to classify such persons and to declare the maintenance of the dangerously insane persons a concern of the State, and the treatment of the harmless insane a responsibility of . the community from wh1ch they were committed. State vs. Pierce County, 152 Wash. “ 155, 251 Fee. 801 (1925). 5Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 3. 4Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 7. When by statute the county commissioners are vested with the entire and exclusive superintendence of the poor within their respective counties, it is their absolute duty to provide for poor persons actually and in good faith in need of help regardless ‘ of whether or not they come under the classification of paupers. Sweet Clinic, In- ~ corporated vs. Lewis County, 154 Wash. 416, 282 Pac. 852 (1929). 5Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 1. O 1 9 o 2 Washington II. Financial Powers and Limitations 6 A. Taxation and Assessments (1) State (a) The power of taxation shall never be suspended, surrendered or contracted away. All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial limits of the authority levying O the tax and shall be levied and collected for public purposes only.6 The word "property" as used herein shall mean and include everything, . . . . . 0 whether tangible or intangible, subJect to ownership. All real estate shall constitute one class: Provided, That the legislature may tax mines and mineral resources and lands devoted to reforestation by either a yield tax or an ad valorem tax at such rate as it may fix, orby both.7 =‘r' * "r’ (b) Whenever the expenses of any fiscal year shall . . . . 6 exceed the income, the Leg1slature may prov1de for levying a tax for the ensuing fiscal year, sufficient, with other sources of income, to pay the deficiency, as well as the estimated expenses of the ensuing fiscal year.8 6Taxes levied for the relief of State—wide unemployment and poverty are for a public purpose within the meaning of this section. State ex rel. Hamilton vs. Martin, 173 . Wash. 249, 23 F. (2d) 1 (1933). The levy of a tax to retire bonds issued for the purpose of paying compensation to World War veterans was held to be for a public purpose. State ex rel. Hart vs. Clausen, 113 Wash. 570, 194 Pac. 793 (1921). 7Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1, adopted 1930. The proviso in this section lifts out of the single class of real estate all mines, mineral resources, and reforestation lands, and allows for their treatment as § a distinct subclass. It gives the Legislature the fullest power of taxation with reference to them. The Legislature may adopt either or both of two possible methods, which includes either a tax upon yield, or upon value, at such rate—expressed in . terms of valuatior or percentage—as it may fix. Thus, the Reforestation Act, levying an ad valorem tax on reforestation lands, and assessing for purposes of the tax all such lands lying west of the Cascade Mountains at the value of $1 per acre and all such lands lying east 61’ the Cascade Mountains at the value of 50 cents per acre, was held within the Legislature's power as limited by this section. State ex rel. Mason . County Logging Company vs. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 31 F. (2d) 539 (1934). Income, being "subject to ownership," is included within the definition of "prop- erty" in this section. An income tax is, therefore, a property tax, and a system of rates that become greater as the amount of taxable income increases violates the requirement of this section that "all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property." Culliton vs. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 F. (2d) 81 (1933). An inheritance tax is not a tax on property, but is a charge upon the right of transmission of property. It may be graduated and in an amount as large as the State 0 sees fit to impose. Culliton V8. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P. (2d) 81 (1933). A poll or capitation tax is not a tax upon property. Since the Constitution does not prohibit the levy of a poll tax, and as that instrument is not a grant of power but a limitation on the power inherent in the State, such a tax is a valid revenue measure. Nipges vs. Thornton, 119 Wash. 464, 206 Pac. 17 (1922). An occupation tax is not a property tax, but a tax upon the privilege of engaging in business within the State. It is not, therefore, subject to the uniformity rule of this section. State ex rel. Stiner vs. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402,25 P. (26) 91 (1933). 1 See City of Tacoma vs. Tax Commission, 177 Wash. 604, 33 P. (2d) 899 (1934). See p. 3, footnote 12. 8Constitution, Art. v11, Sec. 8. This section applies only to matters of State revenue and expenses and not to those of counties. Mason Vs. Purdy, 11 Wash. 591, 40 Pac. 130 (1895). . C . _ Washington 3 II. Financial Powers and Limitations—Continued o A. Taxation and Assessments—Continued (l) State—Continued (c) The rolling stock and other movable property be— longing to any railroad company or corporation in this state, shall be . considered personal property, and shall be liable to taxation ’3‘ * * in the same manner as the personal property of individuals9 * * ". o (d) No county, nor the inhabitants thereof, nor the property therein, shall be released or discharged from its or their pro— portionate share of taxes to be levied for state purposes, nor shall com— mutation for such taxes be authorized in any form whatever.10 (2) Counties and Other Local Units“ ' (a) The Le islature shall have no ower to im ose - P p taxes upon counties, cities, towns or other municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county, city, town, or other municipal purposes, but may, by general laws, vest in the corporate au— thorities thereof, the power to assess and collect taxes for such pur- e poses.12 . “QConstitution, Art. XII, Sec. 17. 1OCbnstitution, Art. XI, Sec. 9. 11Art. XI, Sec. 4 of the Constitution relates to the establishment of county and town- . ship government and organization, and provides that the system of county government to be established by the Legislature shall be uniform, and that the mode of trans- acting and managing the affairs of same shall be prescribed by general laws. In the performance of its general duties and purposes, the State calls upon and utilizes its constituent political agencies and for such purposes confers upon them such powers and imposes such duties as it deems necessary. These local subdivisions . are created by the State, not only for the purpose of having them administer their own local and internal affairs, but also for the purpose of having them carry out . . the policies of the State at large, and assist in the accomplishment of the general ' purposes of the State. State ex rel. Board of County Commissioners, etc., vs. Clausen, 95 Wash. 214, 165 Pac. 74-4 (1917)- 1‘2Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 12. Power is given to any county to make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws. Art. XI, Sec. 11. County governing bodies must have express authority, either under the Consti- . tution or an act of the Legislature, to levy taxes. They have no right to levy . taxes for county purposes ata rate exceeding the limitation fixed by the Legislature, nor for purposes not allowed by the Constitution. State ex rel. School District 37, etc., vs. Clark County, 177 Wash. 314. 51 F. (2d) 897 (1934). Constitutional sections providing that the power to assess and collect taxes may be vested in the authorities of counties, municipal corporations, etc., do not grant to these political units the power of taxation. This power is derived only . from the State by legislative enactment and no implications are indulged in to expand 9 the power granted. State ex rel. Tacoma School District No. 10 vs. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 30 P. (2d) 638 (1934). See p. 4, par. (b). Delegation of the taxing power for local purposes to the counties and other municipal corporations is subject to the restriction that such taxes may be levied . only for public purposes. State ex rel. Tax Commission vs. Redd, 166 Wash. 152, 6 F. (2d) 619 (1932). 9 ‘ o : 4 Washington ‘ 0 II. Financial Powers and Limitations—Continued . . O A. Taxation and Assessments—Continued (2) Counties and Other Local Units—-—-Continued (b) The Legislature may vest the corporate authori— ties of cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special assessment, or by special taxation of property benefited.15 . For all corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes and such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body levy— ' inc; the same. 14 » It is a duty mandatory upon the county to provide for its indigent poor. A county, however, may not make a present tax levy to create a special fund for the ‘ purpose of anticipating future expenditures for indigent relief. The necessity for relief varies from time to time, and such care and support should be provided as emergencies arise. Palmquist vs. Taylor, 177 Wash. 306, 31 F. (2d) 894 (1954). i This sectiOn was held not violated by an act requiring that the expenses of indigent persons dangerously insane confined in the State hospital should be borne by the State, and that the expenses of those indigent persons not dangerously insane similarly confined should be paid by the several counties from which such persons were committed. State vs. Pierce County, 152 Wash. 155, 251 Pac. 801 (1925). The establishment and maintenance of public schools is not merely a county purpose, but rather a State purpose with local benefits accruing to the county; therefore, a statute imposing a tax upon the counties for such purpose does not vi- 0 olate this section of the Constitution. Newman vs. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147, 50 F. (2d) 36 (1955). A statute requiring the counties to levy a tax for a State purpose may vary in . rate between the counties. So lOng as the rate is uniform within each county levying the tax, the uniformity requirement is met. Newman vs. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147, 50 F- (2d) 36 (1935). See p. 2, par. (8). In view of this section, neither the Legislature nor its agency, the State Tax Commission, may assess or reassess the property within a county for county purposes. 0 State ex rel. Tax Commission vs. Redd, 166 Wash. 152, 6 F. (2d) 619 (1932). Where a city had levied a tax for local purposes in excess of the statutory authority, a later curative statute was held not to be the imposition of a tax by the Legislature in violation of this section, but merely a ratification of a levy already imposed by the city. Owings vs. City of Olympia, 88 Wash. 289, 152 Fee. 1019 (1915). 13This section does not prohibit the Legislature from creating other corporate author- . ities, such as a diking district, with power to make local improvements by special assessment upon the property benefited. Foster Vs. Commissioners of Cowlitz County, 100 Wash. 502, 171 Pac. 539 (1918). 14Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 9. Power is given to any city, town, or township to make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws. Art. XI, Sec. 11. _ This section has no application to counties. Bilger vs. State, 63 Wash. 457, . 116 Pac. 19 (1911). Municipalities may levy taxes for corporate purposes only. Maintenance and operating costs, and those objects which are germane to the welfare of the munici- pality are proper corporate purposes. Denman vs. City of Tacoma, 1'70 Wash. 406. 16 P. (2d) 596 (1932). Where a city was operating an electric light plant in competition with other companies, an ordinance prescribing an excise tax upon such companies but exempting the city from payment was held a reasonable classification of occupations and valid . under this section on the ground that the tax was levied in proportion to the pecul— iar privileges enjoyed by the companies, and the city's exemption from the tax was only an incident and not the purpose of the ordinance. Puget Sound Power a, Light Company vs. City of Seattle, 1'72 Wash. 668, 21 P. (2d) 727 (1955), affirmed 291 . U. S. 619, 54 Sup. Ct. 542, 78 L. Ed. 1025 (1954). O 0 Washington 5 II. Financial Powers and Limitations—Continued o B. Exemptions * * =-”- Such property as the legislature may by general laws provide shall be exempt from taxation.15 Property of the United States and of the state, counties, school districts and other municipal . corporations, and credits secured by property actually taxed in this state, not exceeding in value the value of such property, shall be exempt from taxation. The legislature shall have power, by appropriate legisla- ° tion, to exempt personal property to the amount of three hundred ($300.00) dollars for each head of a family liable to assessment and taxation under the provisions of the laws of this state of which the individual is the actual bona fide owner.16 C. Borrowing and Use of Credit 0 (1) State (a) The state may to meet casual deficits or failures in revenues, or for expenses not provided for, contract debts, but such debts, direct and contingent, singly or in the aggregate, shall not at _ . any time exceed four hundred thousand dollars ($400,000), and the moneys - arising from the loans creating such debts shall be applied to the purpose . for which they were obtained or to repay the debts so contracted, and to no other purpose whatever.” ' 15Under a statute exempting from taxation public schoolhouses "and the grounds at— . tached." county buildings "with the ground on which such buildings are erected,l and all Ihospitals for the care of the sick whether supported in whole or in part '_ by charity," it was held that the land adjoining a hospital and owned by it was subject to taxation, since it was not expressly exempted by the statute. The court stated that statutes exempting persons or property from taxation are to be strictly construed, and exemptions are not to be extended by judicial construction to property other than that which is expressly designated by law. Thurston County vs. Sisters of Charity of House of Providence, 14 Wash. 264, 44 Fee. 252 (1896). 9 16Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1. A statute imposing a tax upon the privilege of engaging in business in the State was held applicable to municipalities engaged in the operation of street railways, electric light plants, water systems, etc., on the ground that the act was an excise tax and not a tax upon the property of municipal corporations which the Constitution declares to be exempt; therefore, the act did not violate the exemption provision of this section relative to municipal property. City of Tacoma vs. Tax Commission, . 177 Wash. 604, 55 F. (2d) 899 (1934). Compare Puget Sound Power a, Light Company ' vs. City of Seattle, (p. 4, footnote i4). Irrigation districts are not "municipal corporations" within the meaning of this section providing that the property of "other municipal corporations" shall be exempt from taxation. Inland Empire Land Company vs. Douglas County. 149 Wash. 253, 270 P30. 812 (1928). The exemption from taxation of personal property permits the exemption of $300 only from the actual value of the property, not from the value placed on the property . for purposes of assessment. State ex rel. State Board of Tax Commissioners vs. ' Cameron, 90 Wash. 407, 156 Fee. 537 (1916)- 17Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1. A statute authorized a bond issue for the erection of State capitol buildings, the principal and interest on such bonds to be payable solely from revenues there- after receiVed from the lease and sale of lands granted by the Federal Government 0 o 6 Washington II. Financial Powers and Limitations—Continued . , C. Borrowing and Use of Credit—Continued (i) State—Continued (b) In addition to the above limited power to contract debts the state may contract debts to repel invasion, suppress insurrec— , tion,18 or to defend the state in war, but the money arising from the O contracting of such debts shall be applied to the purpose for which it was raised and to no other purpose whatever.19 o (c) Except the debt specified in sections one and two of this article Ep. 5, par. (a), and par. (b) above],‘no debt shall here— after be contracted by, or on behalf of this state, unless such debt shall be authorized by law for some single work or object to be distinctly specified therein, which law shall provide ways and means, exclusive of . . 0 loans, for the payment of the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal of such debt within twenty years from the time of the contracting thereof. No such law shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the people and have received a majority of all the votes cast for and against it at such election, and all moneys raised by authority of such law shall be 0 applied only to the specific object therein stated, or to the payment of . to the State for the purpose of erecting such buildings. The act was held not to create a State debt within the meaning of the Constitution since the general reve- nues and property of the State were not pledged to the payment of the bonds. State ex rel. State Capitol Committee vs. Clausen, 134 Wash. 196, 235 Pac. 364 (1925). . . See State ex rel. State Capitol Commission vs. Lister, 91 Wash. 9, 156 Pac. ' 858 (1916), D- '7, footnote 20. An act authorizing the issuance and sale of funding bonds, the proceeds of which were to be used to discharge outstanding indebtedness of the State, was held to be in conflict with this section on the ground that after the sale of the bonds and before the proceeds were applied to the purpose named, however brief the period intervening, the State indebtedness would be increased beyond the constitutional limit. State ex rel. Jones VS. McGraw, 12 Wash. 541, 41 Fee. 895 (1895). Compare V . Dearling vs. Funk, p. 9, footnote 25. See footnote 19, below. 18An emergency act authorizing the creation of a State debt and the issuance of bonds to the amount of $10,000,000, for the purpose of appropriating money to relieve State- wide poverty and unemployment, was held valid without the approval of the voters where it was found that "discontent, social unrest and incipient insurrectionflex— isted and acts of insurrection were occurring. The court declared that: "It is far better to cure insurrection or incipient insurrection by promoting prosperity ' ’ than by the use of bullets. * * * The greatest menace to the well-being and safety of the state is to have * * =0: citizens suffering with their families * >1: * because work is unobtainable. An appropriation * * * to relieve this suffering is no more a'charitable' appropriation than an appropriation made to sup— press an uprising, repel an invasion, or to combat a pestilence. * a: * It cannot be doubted that the indebtedness and tax appropriated to its payment, being for the relief of State—wide unemployment and poverty, are for a public purpose." State . ex rel. Hamilton vs. Martin, 173 Wash. 249, 23 F. (2d) 1 (1933). 19Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 2. There is no limitation imposed upon the amount of debt that may be contracted for the purposes contemplated by this section. State ex rel. Hart vs. Clausen, 117 Wash. 260, 201 Pac. 30 (1921). . a 0 Washington 7 II. Financial Powers and Limitations—Continued . . C. Borrowing and Use of‘ Credit—Continued (1) State—Continued the debt thereby created, and such law shall be published in at least one newspaper in each county, if one be published therein, throughout the .0 state, for three months next preceding the election at which it is sub- mitted to the people.20 . (d) The credit of the state shall not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or corporation.21 (e) The state shall not in any manner loan its credit, nor shall it subscribe to, or be interested in the stock of any company, . association or corporation.22 (2) Counties ‘ (a) No county, city, town or other municipal corpora— tion shall hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or . ZOConstitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5. ~ An act creating a veterans compensation rund,and providing for the issuance of . $11,000,000 or bonds and a general tax levy to retire same, without a vote or the people, the money to be used for making payments to veterans as compensation for services rendered, was held constitutional on the theory that if there is a moral and honorable claim on the public treasury of the State, though no obligation which could attain recognition in a court of law or equity, a basis for the exercise or . the taxing power is furnished. State ex rel. Hart vs. Clausen. 113 Wash. 570, 194 Fee. 793 (1921). _ In a later case involving the same act, the question presented was the validity or aproviso in the act authorizing the issuance of additional bonds, it the $11,000,000 initially authorized proved insufficient to provide adequately for the purposes or the act. The court stated that the act was valid in that it was for a public purpose; that Sec. 1 of Art. VIII had nothing to do with the question involved, (see p. 5, par. (a)); that the creation of the debt was valid under this section as being for . the defense or the State in time or war; and that the board created under the act to ascertain the deficiency and issue the additional needed bonds was not vested with legislative powers in contravention of Sec. 1 of Art. II (see p. 11. A, par. (1)). State ex rel. Hart vs. Clausen, 117 Wash. 260. 201 Pac. :30 (1921). See p. 6, par. (b), for the section relating to debts for the defense or the State in time of war. An act authorized the issuance or bonds for the erection of State capitol build— ings, the principal of the debt to be paid from revenues thereafter received from . the lease and sale of lands granted by the Federal Government to the State for such , purposes, and the interest on such bonds to be paid by an annual State tax levied in f the same manner as other taxes were levied. It was held, without reference to the ' principal of the debt, that the State pledged itself to the payment or the interest I on the bonds, and the act, not having been submitted to a vote or the people, was unconstitutional under this section. State ex rel. State Capitol Commission vs. I Lister, 91 Wash. 9, 156 Fee. 858 (1916). See p. 5, footnote 17. 21Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5. ' See footnote 20, above. Bonds issued by a county for the purpose or building a courthouse and sold to the State were held valid. State ex rel. Clallam County vs. Clausen. 82 Wash. 157. 145 Fee. 876 (1914). . 22Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 9. o . o 8 Washington II. Financial Powers and Limitations—Continued o C. Borrowing and Use of Credit—Continued (2) Counties—Continued credit to or in aid of any individual, association, company or corpora-' tion, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become . directly or indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any associa- tion, company or corporation.23 . (b) No county, city, town, school district or other municipal corporation, shall for any purpose become indebted in any manner to an amount exceeding one and one—half per centum of the taxable prop- erty in such county, city, town, school district or other municipal cor— poration, without the assent of‘ three-fifths of' the voters therein, voting 0 at an election to be held for that purpose,24 nor in cases requiring such assent shall the total indebtedness at any time exceed five per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for state, and county purposes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness; * ’3 * Provided, That no part of the indebtedness . allowed in this section, shall be incurred for any purpose other than 25 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. '7. An act authorizing any county to construct a bridge, and issue bonds therefor, Jointly with an adjoining county in another State was upheld over the contention that the act amounted to a giving of county money “to or in aid of a corporation" 0 in violation of this section. The court stated that this section allows financial aid to enterprises whose functions are wholly public, such as the Federal or State Governments or some branch thereof, and prohibits only such aid to purely private or quasi-public enterprises. But the ground upon which the decision rested was that the county was not aiding another county to construct a bridge, but that it was ‘ Jointly involved in the-undertaking and that the county would retain an interest in the bridge proportionate to its contribution thereto. Rands vs. Clarke County, '79 Wash. 152. 139 Pac. 1090 (1914). o A'district, incorporated for the purpose of constructing a diking improvement, exercises a purely public function, and therefore a county was held authorized to lend its aid to such a corporation without violating this section. F‘oster vs. Com— missioners of Cowlitz County, 100 Wash. 502, 171 Pac. 539 (1918). An act authorizing appropriations by any county to pay for the expenses and prizes awarded by an agricultural fair association, incorporated for the purpose of ‘ holding an exhibition of livestock, cereals, and agricultural and dairy products pro- duced in such county, was held unconstitutional under this section as a gift to a 0 private corporation,notwithstanding its worthy educational purposes. Johns vs. , Wadsworth, so Wash. 552, 141 Fee. 892 (1914). 1 See p. 1, par. C, and footnote 4. 24Under this section the Legislature may not fix the number of votes necessary to val- , idate a bond issue at less than a three-fifths majority, but may require a greater majority. Robb vs. City of Tacoma, 1'75 Wash. 580, 28 P. (2d) 327 (1935). ‘ Similarly, the Legislature may require the assent of the voters to the creation . of an indebtedness even within the limit of 1.5 percent of the taxable property. The right of the Legislature to grant the power to incur indebtedness for a specific purpose carries with it the right to prescribe how the power may be exercised for that specific purpose, provided it does not exceed the limit set by this section. State ex rel. Craig vs. Town of Newport. '70 Wash. 286, 126 Fee. 637 (1912). . o Q ) Washington 9 II. Financial Powers and Limitations——Continued . C. Borrowing and Use of Credit——Continued (2) Counties—~Continued strictly county, city, town, school district, or other municipal pur- poses.25 * * * . (3) Other Local Units ' See page 7, paragraph (a); page 8, paragraph (b) and . footnotes 23 and 24; and footnote 25, below. 25Constitutio 11, Art. VIII, Sec. 6. This section further permits cities and towns to create a larger indebtedness, upon the assent of the voters, for the supplying of municipally owned water, arti- ficial light, and sewer works. This section creates two separate classes of limitations: the first prohibits the city authorities from incurring indebtedness, without the assent of the voters, . in excess of 1.5 percent, of the city's taxable property; the second prohibits the city authorities with the assent of the voters from exceeding the 5-percent limi— tation. Where the City undertakes to incur a debt within the class requiring the approval of the three—fifths popular vote, and it can be shown that the intent of