xt70rx937t9n_551 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt70rx937t9n/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt70rx937t9n/data/46m4.dao.xml unknown 13.63 Cubic Feet 34 boxes, 2 folders, 3 items In safe - drawer 3 archival material 46m4 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center.  Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Laura Clay papers Temperance. Women -- Political activity -- Kentucky. Women's rights -- Kentucky. Women's rights -- United States -- History. Women -- Suffrage -- Kentucky. Women -- Suffrage -- United States. Documents relating to various court cases text Documents relating to various court cases 2020 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt70rx937t9n/data/46m4/Box_21/Folder_7/Multipage27510.pdf 1819-1914 1914 1819-1914 section false xt70rx937t9n_551 xt70rx937t9n  




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 fflieir half of the profits was ......


.And leaving a balance in hand, at
the conclusion of the business, of $33,014.08

The original capital had been increased to
"this sum, and had the assets all been good,
‘there would have been a clear profit of $18,-
610.87. But the bad and uncollected debts be-
ing deducted, the profit is reduced to $13,149.-
31; one half of which. besides his or their origi-
nal capital, belonged to each party.
Gunnell’s capital was ..............

$6,627. 6
His half of the profits was ........ 6,5 5

7 .

Total amount due to‘Gunnell ...... $13,202.21

Bird and Hepburn’s capital was. . .. $7,775.65
Total amount due to Bird and Hep-
burn ............................ $14,350.31
308*] *There remains to be adjusted a question
of interest due to Bird and Hepburn for having

contributed more capital than Gunnell whilst :

the business was being carried 011. The audi‘
tor makes this interest $183.52, one half of
which should be deducted from the share of
Gunnell, and added to that of Bird and Hep‘
burn. This would reduce the former to $13,-
110.45, and raise the latter to $14,442.07.

Now the books show that Bird and Hepburn
drew and collected only $7,552.68. This left
a balance still due them of $6,889.39 to be ac-
counted for by Gunnell.

In this account neither party is charged with
"the bad and uncollected debts. They are sim-
ply deducted from the profits and the loss is
thus equally divided. It is claimed by the de-
fendant that Bird and Hepburn should be
charged with the whole of this loss because
they had the securities and failed to collect
'them, when, by the use of due diligence, they
might have done it. This fact does not appear
in the case except by the unsupported allega-
tion of the defendant, made in his answer to
'the bill of review. This portion of the answer
was entirely impertincnt to the bill, which was
strictly and purely a bill of review. No formal
replication was required to avoid its effect as
evidence in the cause.

The result is that the complainants are en-
titled to a decree against the defendant for the
sum of $6,889.39, with interest from the 1st
‘of May, 1849, and costs.

The decree of the District Court must be re«
versed, and a decree rendered for the complain-
ants accordingly.

TION OF NEW ORLEANS, Plfl'. in Err.,



HOTAIR IMBAU, Jordan F. Aycock and Josiah
Gitzenger, Composing the firm of Imbau, Ay-
cock & Co., Plfl's. in Err.,

110 WALL.




Plff. in Err.,


(See s. c. 10 Wall. 273-299.)

Supersedcas, when issued—effect of—writ of er-
ror to state court—injunction, 110w affected

This court has power to issue a supersedeas be-
fore the return day of the writ of error. where
the return has been made. '

A writ of error to a State Court cannot have

any greater elfect than if the judgment or decree
had been rendered or passed in a Circuit Court.
. Neither an injunction nor a decree dissolvingr an
injunction passed in a Circuit Court is reversed or
nullified by an appeal or writ of error before the
cause is heard in this court.

The only effect of the supersedeas is to prevent
all further proceedings in the subordinate court.
except such as are necessary to preserve the
rights of the parties.

[Nos 475, 476, 477, 479, 480.]
Argued Nov. 18, 1870. Decided Dec. 2, 1870.

W RIT of error to the Supreme Court of the
State of Alabama.

On motiOn for writs of supersedeas.

These cases arose in the State Courts of
Louisiana, and all involve the question of the
validity of a certain Statute of that State, giv-
ing to the Corporation named, the Crescent
City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House
00., certain exclusive privileges.

The several cases, which had been variously
decided in the courts where brought, were. up-
on appeal to the Supreme Court of the State,
all decided in favor of the Corporation named,
and various injunctions were sustained in fa-
vor of that Corporation. “lrits of error having
sued out in each of the cases, the plaintifl's in
error now move for writs of supersedeas to the
judgments of the courts below.

The case is further stated by the court.

Messrs. J. A. Campbell, P. Phillips and J.
Q. A. Fellows, for plaintiffs in error:

The 25th section of the Judiciary Act of
1789 authorizes the issue of the writ of error
in this cause, and the 23d section prescribes
that the writ shall be a supersedcas if allowed
within ten days of the judgment, and be served
on the defendant and a bond be given and be
filed in the same time.

The effect of the writ thus accompanied is
described in the decisions of this court.

Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, .6 Wall. 153, 18 L. ed.
762; R. R. Co. v. Harris (ante, 100).

A writ of error which is a supersedeas, re-
moves the cause from the court to which it is
addressed, and prevents the inferior court from
doing any act to carry that judgment into ef-
fect. It suspends its power and jurisdiction
over the cause, and whatever is done in the
cause subsequently, until its disposition in the
Supreme Court, is done under the order or al-
lowance of that court. The writ commands
the record and proceedings to be sent to the Su—





preme Court, and the Act of Congress declares The courts of the United States under the
that this writ shall be a superscdeas. Acts of Congress have adequate power to pro-
Cases above cited: Bac. Abr. Supersedeas, a; tcct its jurisdiction from interfering between.
Stockton v. Bishop, 2 How. 74; Hogan v. Ross, courts and parties, and to protect suitors before
11 How. 204; Hardeman v. Anderson, 4 How. . it from oppression. The final order of the.
640. iEighth Court on the motion to attach for a
The writ at common law was a supersedcas 1‘ contempt is a final execution, and the sheriff
by implication (Cro. Jae. 534). but was regu- { has seized and holds property under it. Any‘
lated afterwards by statute, the principle of ‘ court of record at common law will protect its
which (3 James. ch. 8) suggested the Act of . jurisdiction by the issue of writs of supersedeas
Congress of 1780. ‘ in a matter properly cognizable there. In the
In the present cause the final order was made E ease of Taylor V. Carryl, 20 How. 583, 15 L. ed.
in the Supreme Court of Louisiana, May 0, 1 1028, the cases are collected in which such pow—
1870. The writ of error was allowed, served, cr is exerted.
and the bond approved and filed before and on The 25th section of the Judiciary Act places
May 16, 1870. No execution had been issued. the State Courts in subordination to the S11—
Thesc Acts made the writ operative and entitle preme Court, within the range of the cases dc-
us to claim the supersedeas. The cause was scribed in it. The court may compel obedience
transferred from the Supreme Court of Louisi- to the writ of error.


arm to the Supreme Court of United States. ' U. S. V. Booth, 18 How. 476. 15 L. ed. 464.
l Har. &. J. 475; cases above cited; Bryan v. It may render and ’enforce the final judgment

Bates. 12 Allen, 202; 5 Taunt. 204; 1 Chit. in the cause arising under that section. The
241; 2 Tidd, Pr. 1145; 4 Conn. 365; 4 Sm. 8; M. case before the court is one of an aggravated

670. character. All that was required of the plain-
A certiorari would have operated in the same til'fs they have done to bring their cause hither.
manner. Bac. Abr. tit. Sup. B; 1 Str. 419; 3 D. 83 1C.
43 Pa. 377; Patchin V. The Mayor, 13 \Vend. 643; Tidd, Pr. 1145; Morris’ Cotton (ante,.
664. 481) ; Ex parte Milwaukee Co. 5 Wall. 188, 18 -

The cause in the Fifth District Court before L. ed. 676; R. R. Co. v. Bradleys, (ante. 274);
the Eighth Court had been created, was (le- Stockton v. Bishop, 2 How. 74; Hardcman v.
icrmined and was removed from that court by Anderson, 4 How. 640; 5 B. & Ald. 903; Bryan
a. suspensive appeal to the Supreme Court of v. Bates, 12 Allen, 202: Taswell v. Stone, 4
the State. The effect of the suspensive appeal Bur. 2454; 8 East, 416; Slocum v. Mayberry, 2
to the Supreme Court of the State, is to devcst Wheat. 1; Kershaw v. Thompson, 4 Johns. Ch.
the inferior court of jurisdiction of the cause. 609; 6 H. & J. 302.

The fact that the appeal is suspensive being The Act of Congress of 1789, in relation to-
ascertained, all other questions are to be set- the revisory powers of the Supreme Court over
tlcd in the Supreme Court. State Courts, referred alone to the process and

Code Pr. 564: La. v. Judge, etc., 19 La. 168, mode of proceedings at common law, and adopt-
and the cases cited; S. C. 20 La. Ann. 529; S. ed them—writs of error and their effect. The
C. 21 La. Ann. 43; 1 Bioche Die. (1. pro, tit. supersedeas, whether by implicatiOn or writ of
Appel, No. 470; Talainder a l’appel. 347. error, was adopted in toto. In reference to

The injunction granted in the Fifth District state adjudications, it has not been changed.
Court upon the petition ex parte, was operative The Act of 1803 adopts the appeal in equity
until the judgment rendered in the cause in that and admiralty cases, but under the same reg-
eourt. The judgment in that court converted ulations and restrictions. Upon this discussion
it from a temporary into a perpetual injunction, some light may be thrown by considering the
and the allowance Of that perpetual injunction question before us with reference to the chan-
was the judgment appealed from. cery law. The effect of an appeal will be found

By the, suspensive appeal, its operation was in the Louisiana decisions, and the French work
suspended until the judgment in the Supreme on practice we have cited,

(‘ourt of the State, which affirmed that of the The appeal transfers the record; devests ju-
Fifth Court. But before the execution of that risdiction of the subordinate court; invests the
judgment. the confirmatory judgment was itself superior court with full jurisdiction, and the
suspended by the writ of error of the Supreme appellate court generally decides de novo. The
Court. admiralty appeal is the purest form in which

If there had been no writ of error to the Su- this writ is used. So it was in chancery. In
preme Court of the United States, the judgment Great Britain, this was found inconvenient
of the Supreme Court of the State might have from the sloWness of the proceedings.
been carried to the Fifth Court and spread on Notwithstanding an appeal, the subordinate
its T900111, and by 1110131011 in 013011 court, would court may go on with the cause. This was set—
have been made executory. But until all this tled by rule of the House of Lords in 1807,
had been done. the Fifth Court could not have The rule is to be found in Huguenin v. Baseley.
issued the final writ of execution (a perpetual 15 Ves. 182. ‘
injunction) for the writ of injunction is at one The appellant might then apply to the House
stage of proceeding an administrative writ, and of Lords for stay of proceedings after appeal.
at another, a judicial writ—final process. This Macnachten v. Boehm, 1 J. &. W. 48; Gwyne
will appear from R. R. Co. v. Bradleys (ante, v. Lethbridge, 14 Ves. 585,


274). Louisiana cases above cited. The history is told (Hart v. The Mayor of Al-
And for the practice in regard to making bany, 3 Paige, Ch. 381), and the New York al-
judgments executory. teration of the English rule stated (Green v. ..

'lngraham v. Dawson, 20 How. 486, 15 L. ed. \Vinter, 1 Johns. Ch. 80), and the present En-
984. glish practice is stated.

916 _ 77 U. S..


Barrs v. Fewkes, L. R. 1 Eq. 395; Gibbs v.
Daniel, 4 Gifl'. 1.
The change in the English rule was adopted

after 1789, and the Judiciary Act of 1789 was .

the rule of the English courts at that date,
both at law and in chancery. The writ of er-
ror with bond, and the appeal with or without
bond, removed the suit to the appellate court
entirely and absolutely.

The American Statute provided against vexa-
tious delays by prescribing that no appeal or
writ of error should issue, except on a final
judgment. 4 Bibb, 221.

Messrs. T. J. Durant, J. S. Black, Matt.
H. Carpenter and Charles Allen, for defend-
ants in error:

The general doctrine applicable to writs of
error at common law is stated in Tidd, Pr. late
ed., quite fully.

But writs of error, to reverse judgments at
law, rest on a different basis from writs of er-
ror brought for the purpose of obtaining a re-
vision of a case by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Supersedeas is a law term, and
has no application to a chancery proceeding.

Second. In the English chancery practice, the
question whether an appeal shall stay proceed-
ings, rests very much in the discretion of the
tribunal from'which the appeal is taken; and
it‘ is common to make special application to
that tribunal, either to stay further proceed-
ings, or to pass an order that proceedings shall
not be stayed.

2 Sm. Ch. Pr. 68.

Such was the course in the recent English
case, Barrs v. Fewkes, L. R. 1 Eq. 392.

The application was made to the court ap-
pealed from. See, also, Harrington v. Har-
rington, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 564.

The general rule is, that an appeal will not
stay proceedings.

_ See, General Order in House of Lords in

1807, copied in 15 Ves. 184; Gwynn v. Leth-
bridge, 14 Ves. 585; VVillan v. VVillan, 16 Ves.
216; 9 Ves. 316; “7aldo v. Caley, 16 Ves. 209;
4 Ves. 316; 2 Ves. 563; Hart V. Mayor, etc. 3
Paige, Ch. 381, where there is some account of
the English practice; also in 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.
under the head of “Re-hearings and Appeals,”
there is a general statement of the doctrine;
see, also, VValburn v. Ingilby, 1 Myl. & K. 161;
6 Eng. Ch. Gas. 498.

Third. Under the practice by which causes
are removed from State Courts to the United
States Supreme Court on writs of error, the re-
moval is in the nature of an appeal. It is a
continuation of the same litigation, and not a
mere suit as a writ of error at common law.
The mode of removal is only a matter of form.
The substance of the matter is, that the cause
is brought before a supervising tribunal for re-
vision; and the jurisdiction of the United States
Courts is in its nature appellate. This doctrine
has been consantly stated.

Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 349; Cohens v.
Va. 6 Wheat. 410; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How.
204, 16 L. ed. 631; Bryan v. Bates, 12 Allen, 213.

The writ of error, therefore, only inaugu-
rates a new stage in the same cause; and ac-
cordingly an injunction should, of course, con-
tinue in force until the determination upon the
writ of error, which is the ultimate determina—
tion of the original suit.

10 WALL.



Fourth. The doctrine we contend for will be-
found in the following-cases: Hart v. Mayor,
etc., 3 Paige, 381; Graves v. Maguire, 6 Paige,
381; Stone v. Carlan, 2 Sandf. 738; Mining Co.
v. Fremont, 7 Cal. 131; Spring V. Ins. Co. 6'
“’heat. 519; Thompson V. McKim, 6 Ear. & J...
302; \Villiamson v. Carnan, 1 Gill & J. 184;
Boren v. Chisholm, 3 Ala. 513; Garrow v. Car-
penter, 4 Stew. & P. 336; Colman v. Bridge Co.
5 Blatchf. 58.

Fifth. It is impossible to suppose that there-
l should not be authority in a court of equity, by
a decree, to hold matters in a certain fixed po-
[sition until the ultimate determination of the
.cause. This is apparent by considering the-
[nature of the relief which may be granted by
{means of an injunction, in many cases where,
if the injunction is suspended while the appeal
or writ of error is pending, all the mischief will.
be done which is sought to be prevented. '

For instance:

If an injunction to stay waste by cutting
down trees is suspended, the trees will be cut.

Disease and death will prevail if an injunc-
tion to restrain a nuisance affecting health, to:
abate and suppress a source of diseases, is sus-

If an injunction to restrain the marriage of a
ward in chancery is suspended, an irretrievable-
mischief may occur at once.

2 Seton,‘F0rms of Decrees, 3d Lond. ed. 727,.
for a form of such a decree.

Sixth. So in cases at law. Suppose articles-
have been seized on a search-warrant—stolen.
goods, obscene books or pictures, lottery tick—
ets or gambling materials, counterfeit coins,
forged bank notes, implements for counterfeit-
ing or any other article deemed dangerous or
obnoxious—which state laws may authorize;
to be seized, and held for condemnation and
forfeiture; and a restoration to the owner (in
case of stolen goods), or a condemnation and
forfeiture and destruction of them have been;
decreed. If a writ of error is sued out, that
supersedes the final order of restoration to
the owner, or condemnation; but shall the ar-
ticles, therefore, be given up to the person who:
had the guilty possession of them, or shall they"
still be held in the custody of the law?

Seventh. It must be the case that there is
power in a court of equity, and also when nec—
essary.in a court of law, to pass orders which
shall have the effect to hold things as they are;
and prevent any subsequent change in the situ—
ation of things, which shall be disastrous to the
plaintiff or to the public, and fatal to the relief
which is sought. .

The law of Louisiana is very explicit in this.

See, La. Cr. art. 307; De La Croix v. Villere,.
11 La. Ann. 39; White v. Cazenave, 14 La. Ann.
57; Knabe v. Fernot, 14 La. Ann. 860.

Eighth. What power then has the Supreme
Court of the United States in the premises?

Take the illustration put by the counsel for
the plaintiff in error. A prisoner under sen—
tence of death sues out a writ of error. The
counsel says: “Shall he hung while his writ of'
error is pending?”

It is not necessary to say “yes;” because it
may well be that this court has power to issue
3 a writ for the purpose of holding things as they
1 are; of preventing execution of the final judg-









:shall go at large?

But does it follow that the prisoner

It is perfectly plain, in the case supposed,
that this court cannot order the discharge of

:the prisoner while the writ of error is pending.

“Why not? Is he not held on final sen-

‘tence ‘3”

The answer is, that the supersedeas attaches
to so much of the final sentence as determines
the ultimate rights of the party.

In Bryan v. Bates, 12 Allen, 213, a case in
Massachusetts, much considered and well-rea-

soned out; one who had been convicted of a

misdemeanor and sentenced to imprisonment
thereon, and committed to jail in pursuance of
that sentence, sued out a writ of error in a
United States Court, and then applied for his
discharge'of habeas corpus on the ground that
the writ of error was a supersedeas. The court

decided that although the writ of error was a

supersedeas, yet they had authority to hold
him until he should give bail.

See. also, Nauer v. Thomas, 13 Allen. 574:
Fleming v. Clark, 12 Allen. 191, in the latter of

‘which cases the same question was argued, but
‘not decided.

Ninth. It is constantly held that only final

judgment and decrees can be re-examined and

reversed on writs of error. The cases are nu-
merous where this court has refused to enter-
tain any application to deal with preliminary

A striking case, in some respects analogous
to the present, was that of. Gibbons v. Ogden,
6 Wheat. 448. There a bill was filed in the
State Court, to restrain the defendant from
navigating steamboats upon certain waters, up-
on which the Legislature had granted to Liv-
ingston and Fulton, the exclusive right to nav-
igate steamboats. On filing the bill, a prelim-
inary injunction was granted. The defendant
set up a right under the laws of the United
States and moved to dissolve the injunction.
This motion was denied. An appeal was taken
to the highest court of the State, and that
court also refused to dissolve the injunction.
The defendant then appealed to the Supreme



Court of the United States, on the ground that .

a question under United States laws was in-

volved; but as no final decree had been made in 3
the State Court, the appeal was dismissed for"

want of jurisdiction.

So the preliminary injunction stood, and was .

not interfered with.
See, also, Verden v. Coleman, 18 How. 86,
15 L. ed. 272; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. (556, et

seq. and numerous other cases.

Tenth. The United States Circuit of 1789,
section 23, recognizes that preliminary injunc-
tions shall stand. The statute provides that a
writ of error shall be “a supersede-as and stay
of execution in case,” etc. Executions are not
to issue; that is, precepts to enforce the final

judgment of the state courts are not to issue..

It is only the final and ultimate rights, and
not the incidental rights of parties, that writs
of error are designed to vindicate.

Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of
the court:

All persons and corporations, except the Cres-
cent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter
House Company, are prohibited, by an Act




passed by the Legislature of the State of
*Louisiana, to land, keep or slaughter any [*285
cattle, Deeves, calves, sheep, swine or other ani-
mals, or to have, keep or establish any stock
landings, yards, pens, slaughter houses or abat-
toirs at any point or place within the City of
New Orleans or the Parishes of Orleans. Jeffer-
son and St. Bernard, or at any place 011 the east
bank of the river within the corporate limits of
the city, or at any point on the west bank of
the same above the railroad depot 'therein

' mentioned and designated.

Said Act was passed on the 8th day of March.
1869, and is entitled “An Act to Protect the
Health of the City of New Orleans. to Locate
the Stock Landings and'Slaughter Houses, and
to Incorporate ‘the Crescent City Live Stock
Landing and Slaughter House Company.’ ”
Though approved on the day mentioned, still
the Act did not go into operation till the first
day of June following but it appearing that the
Company created an organized under the Act
intended to enforce the prohibition, the plain—
tiffs in the suit first mentioned, on the 26th of
May of that year, filed a petition or bill of com-
plaint in the Sixth District Court of New Or-
leans against that Company, alleging that for
more than thirty years past there had existed
in the Parish of Orleans and the adjacent par-
ishes the lawful trade of butchering domestic
animals to supply with meat the markets of
the city and the adjacent parishes, and that
the regular pursuit of that trade involved the
necessity of collecting, feeding and sheltering
such animals before they were slaughtered, and
of preparing and preserving their meat for use
or sale for food, and their hides, tallow and
other valuable parts of the animals for the
market; that a thousand persons throughout
that period have been engaged in that trade
without interruption and unmolested prior to
the organization of that Company by any ordi«
nance, regulation or enactment from any public
authority; that they, the petitioners, are duly
incorporated under a law of the State. and that
for more than two years they have been and
are in the lawful exercise of that trade and em-
ployment. and that they have constructed and
erected for that purpose *and now hold, [*286
within those parishes, places for landing cattle
and for sheltering the same, and slaughter
houses f3: butchering the animals for market,
and have secured stalls and such other privi-
leges in the market places as are necessary and
convenient to the prosecution of the business;
that the respondents, though they must well
know that the Act is in violation of the Consti—
tution of the United States, openly declare that
it is their intention to execute its provisions
and to compel the complainants to abandon the
objects of their incorporation, and to destroy
the value of their investments, and render it
necessary for them to relinquish their lawful
pursuit, and the prosecution of their legitmate

“Therefore they pray that the respondents
may be enjoined from any such interference
with the petitioners, and from interfering, di-
rectly or indirectly, by suit or otherwise, with
their customers in purchasing, slaughtering or
butchering animals of any kind used for meat,
during the pendency of the suit, and also for
process; and that they, the complainants, may

77 U. S.


‘I‘have judgment against the respondents in dam-
.:ages for the sum of $10,000.
On the same day the respondents in that suit
{instituted in the Fifth District Court of New
Orleans a counter suit against the complainants
in the suit commenced against them in the
Sixth District Court of the same municipality.
' They allege in their petition that “The sole and
exclusive privilege of conducting and carrying
.on the live stock landing and slaughter house
business in that city and its environs is vested
in their Company, as is fully set forth in the
Act of their incorporation; that the Corpora-
tion named in their petition, as respondents, are
about to land, shelter and protect cattle, etc.,
intended for slaughter, and to conduct and
carry on the live stock landing and slaughter
house business within the limits of the city as
prohibited by law and in violation of their ex-
clusive rights and privileges. \Vherefore they
pray that the respondents, the complainants in
the suit pending in the Sixth District Court,
may be enjoined and prohibited from landing,
287*] stabling and sheltering cattle, ""etc., and
‘other animals destined for sale and slaughter in
that city, and from conducting and carrying on
‘the live stock landing and slaughter house
business within the limits of the parishes de-
~scribed in their charter, and from molesting and
interfering with the petitioners in the exercise
.and enjoyment of their exclusive rights and
privileges; and they also claim damages in the
.sum of $4,000, and for general relief.”
Judgment in the first suit was rendered for
'the petitioners, and it was ordered that the in-
junction previously issued in the case against
the respondents should be made perpetual.
Pursuant to the suggestion of the respondents
in that case, that there was error to their pre-
,judice in the final judgment of the Sixth Dis-
trict Court, it was ordered “that a suspensive
.appeal be granted herein to the defendants, re-
rturnable to the Supreme Court of the State.”
Hearing was also had in the suit commenced
in the Fifth District Court by the Crescent City
Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Com-
pany against the’ Butchers’ Benevolent Associ-
ation of New Orleans, and it was ordered, ad-
judged and decreed in that case that there be
judgment in favor of the petitioners, and that
the Corporation respondents, their president
.and members, be forever enjoined and prohib-
ited, as prayed in the petition.
Exceptions having been filed to certain rul-

. . . . I
‘ings of the court, it was also ordered, 011 motion

of the respondents, that they, the respondents,
be allowed a suspensive appeal, to the Supreme
'Court of the State, as in the preceding case.

Separate suits were also commenced in the
Seventh District Court of the city against the
'Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter
House Company by I-lotair Imbau et al., and
"by the Live Stock Dealers’ and Butchers’ As-
sociation of New Orleans, as appears by the
transcripts filed here in those cases. Injunctions
were prayed and granted against the respond-
ents in both of those cases, and they, the re-
spondents, were allowed suspensive appeals to
the Supreme Court of the State from the re-
spective judgments. ~

Suit was also commenced in behalf of the
288*] State by the *Attorm‘ay-General against
IPaul Esteben ct al., in which it is alleged that
-10 WALL.




they have, without authority of law, formed
themselves into a Corporation by the name of
the Live Stock Dealers’ and Butchers’ Associa-
tion of New Orleans,- that they, as such Corpo-
ration, are about to lease or purchase a certain
tract of land partly in the city and partly in
the Parish of St. Bernard, and that they are
about to commence the erection of buildings
and structures thereon for the purpose of col-
lecting, landing and sheltering beef cattle de‘
signed for food, to be sold in the Parishes of
Orleans, Jefferson and St. Bernard, contrary to
the Act of the General Assembly of the State.
“Therefore the petitioner prays that a writ of
injunction may issue restraining and enjoining
the respondents from using that tract of land
for the purpose set forth in the petition and
from slaughtering any beef cattle or any other
animals intended to be sold for food in those
parishes. Final judgment in the case was ren-
dered in favor of the State, and it was also
ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the re-
spondents be forever enjoined and restrained, as
prayed by the petition. Attempt was made by
the respondents to secure a re-hearing, but the
motion was denied, and on their petition it was
ordered that they be allowed a suspensive ap-
peal to the Supreme Court of the State, as in
the preceding cases.

These several appeals, together with one oth—
er which it is unnecessary to describe, were
dulyr entered in the Supreme Court of the State,
and were, by the written agreement of the
parties, submitted for dec1sion at the same time.
They were'submitted on the 28th of January,
1870, and the opinion of the appellate court was
delivered on the 11th of April following. Pursu-
ant to that opinion, the judgment of the Sixth
District Court, as rendered in the first case,
was reversed, and the directions of the Supreme
Court of the State were, that the injunction
granted by the subordinate court should be dis—
solved, and that the demand of the petitioners
should be rejected, with costs in both courts.
They also rendered a judgment of reversal in
the same form and with the same directions in
the third and *fourth cases, being the [*289
two appeals from the judgments rendered in
the Seventh District Court. Judgments of af-
firmance were also rendered 011 the same day in
the second and fifth cases,- in the order herein
adopted, with costs of appeal. '

Where the decision in the court below sus- ‘
taincd the pretentious of the Crescent City Live
Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company
the judgment of the subordinate court was af-
firmed, but the judgment of the subordinate
court was reversed in each case where the de-
cision of the subordinate court was adverse to
those pretentious, and the injunctions in those
cases were dissolved.

Petitions for re—hearing were filed by the los-
ing parties, on the 26th of April, 1870, and on
I the 9th of May following an entry was made in
each case, that the petition for re-hearing was
refused. \Vrits of error to the State Court were
subsequently prayed by the same parties, and
on the 13th of May last the writs of error were
allowed by the Associate Justice of this court
allotted to that circuit, and they were duly filed
on the 10th day of the same month, as appears
of record.

Filed, as the writs of error were, within ten






days from the date of the entry refusing the pe-
tition for rc—heariug. it is claimed by the plain