xt74tm71vn60 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt74tm71vn60/data/mets.xml Van Horne, Thomas Budd, d. 1895. 1875  books b92e4932v25volume22009 English R. Clarke & Co. : Cincinnati, Ohio Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. United States. Army of the Cumberland --History. United States --History --Civil War, 1861-1865 --Regimental histories. History of the Army of the Cumberland; its organization, campaigns, and battles, written at the request of Major-General George H. Thomas chiefly from his private military journal and official and other documents furnished by him. Illustrated with campaign and battle maps, compiled by Edward Ruger. text History of the Army of the Cumberland; its organization, campaigns, and battles, written at the request of Major-General George H. Thomas chiefly from his private military journal and official and other documents furnished by him. Illustrated with campaign and battle maps, compiled by Edward Ruger. 1875 2009 true xt74tm71vn60 section xt74tm71vn60 

Army of the Cumberland


written at the request of


chiefly from his private   military journal and official and other documents furnished by him




compiled by







Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875,

THOS. B. VAN HOKNE AND EDWAED KITGEK. In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at "Washington.

Stereotyped by Ogden, Campbell & Co., Cincinnati.



Campaign in East Tennessee, and Minor Operations in the Department of the Cumberland..................................................... 1

CHAPTER XXIV. General View of the Status of the Conflict at the Close of 1863. 8


Operations in the Department during January, February', and

March, 1864, and Preparations for Aggression.................... 13

CHAPTER XXVI. The Turning of Dalton.................................................................. 44

CHAPTER XXVII. Battle of Resaca.....................................................................      - 64



Advance to the Etowah River   TnE Turning of Alatoona   Battles near New Hope Church.......................................... 71


Operations near Kenesaw Mountain, including the Battle at Kulp's House, Assault of toe Mountain, and the Flank Movement...................................................................................... 86




Advance upon Atlanta   Battle of Peachtree Creek..................... 109

CHAPTER XXXI. Siege of Atlanta............................................................................ 123


The Elank Movements, culminating in the Battle op Jonesboro and

the Pall of Atlanta............................................................ 140


The March op the Opposing Armies to the North, and the Evolution or New Campaigns.......................................................... 155


The Resistance to General Hood's advance from the Tennessee

River, culminating in the Battle of Pranklin...................... 186

CHAPTER XXXV. Battle of Nashville, and Pursuit of the Routf.d Enemy............... 222


Minor Operations having Relation more or less intimate with

those of the Main Army during November and December..... 270


The March to the Sea. and the Capture of the City of Savannah, Georgia...................................................................................278


March through the Oarolinas, from Savannah to Goldsboro and

Raleigh   The Battles of Averysboro and Bentonville........ 300


General George Stoneman's Cavalry Operations in Tennessee and

North Carolina.................................................................. 337 



General .1. II. Wilson's Cavalry Operations in Alabama and

Georgia................................................................................ 347


Capture of the Confederate President....................................... 302


The Dissolution of the Army   Summary of its Achievements..... 369

CHAPTER XLIII. The Dead and their Disposition................................................... 377


Organization of Department of the Cumberland...................... 381

Organization of Department of the Ohio.................................... 385

List of Officers of Army of the Cumberland who were Killed

in Action or Died of Wounds or Disease during the War... 386 The Engineer Service in the Army of the Cumberland............ 439 

of the



campaign in east  tennessee and  minor  operations  in the department oe the cumberland.

General Burnside had been informed that he should have help as soon as practicable, when first it was known that General Longstreet had been sent against him. General Grant said to him that he could hardly conceive the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. But as the issue at Chattanooga, though glorious in its coming, had been delayed, it became imperative at once to make effort to raise the siege of Knoxville.

November 29th, General Howard marched from Parker's Gap to Cleveland, taking the lead in the movement upon Knoxville. He was followed immediately by General Sherman's three divisions, under General E. P. Blair, and General Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps. On the 30th, General Granger left Chattanooga with two divisions of the Eourth Corps for the same destination.

Brigadier-General Elliot, who had recently been appointed chief of cavalry in the Department of the Cumberland, and who had concentrated the troops of his first division at Sparta, moved in conjunction with the infantry forces. Colonel vol. n   1 


Long's brigade moved to the head of the column, and on the 2d of December, the Fifteenth Pennsylvania and Tenth Ohio Cavalry left Chattanooga for Kingston. Colonel Spears' brigade, that had been previously stationed on the north bank of the Tennessee river above Chattanooga, also moved toward Knoxville. General Sherman's command embraced more than eight divisions of infantry, while five were left to garrison Chattanooga. Supplies for the troops in motion were sent up the river on the steamer Dunbar, but the main dependence was upon the country.

On the 30th, General Howard advanced from Cleveland to Charleston, on the Hiawassee river. As he approached the town, the enemy's cavalry retreated toward Athens. They had previously partially destroyed the railroad bridge, and had made effort to destroy the pontoons also. But a large number of the boats were saved, and during the following night the railroad bridge was repaired and planked over, so that in the morning the Eleventh Corps passed over, followed by the rear forces. The head of column reached Athens the next evening. The march of the infantry was resumed on the 2d and Colonel Long hurried on to Loudon to save the bridge, if possible. He, however, found the enemy in such force that he could not make a dash, as had been anticipated. The town was well fortified, and was held by infantry and artillery, under General Vaughan, and he could only skirmish until General Howard should get up. The latter reached the position on the 3d, but the enemy had evacuated it the night previous, having first destroyed the bridge, three locomotives, and from sixty to seventy-five cars containing commissary stores, clothing, and ammunition. The pontoon bridge had also been partially destroyed. Notwithstanding the immense destruction of supplies, three days' rations were found uninjured. From this point, Colonel Long was sent with picked men to communicate with General Burnside. On the 4th, Colonel Hecker's brigade crossed the river, skirmished with the cavalry, and took possession of four rifled cannon, which the enemy could remove, and captured a flag. Here General Howard found about thirty wagons partially destroyed, which he repaired for use in forming a temporary bridge, 

in anticipation of crossing the Little Tennessee river at Davis' ford. The route by this ford was not the one which had been    designated, but it was ascertained that time could be saved, and the march .shortened by advancing upon it rather than upon the road to Morgantown, and General Sherman permitted General Howard to use it.

Before leaving Loudon, General Howard received an order to command the left wing of the army, while the center and righ twere placed respectively under Generals Granger and Blair. These divisions of the army were to act independently, but to march to each other's support when called by the noise    of battle.

December 5th, General Howard crossed the Little Tennessee river, at Davis' ford, by means of an extemporized bridge formed of wagons and movable trestles, and reached Louisville at dark. At night, the three heads of column communicated at Marysville. Here information was received that Longstreet had raised the siege of Knoxville, and retreated eastward. He assaulted Fort Sanders, the key to the position, on the 29th, and was repulsed with heavy loss. Aware, subsequently, of the proximity of Sherman's army, he sought safety in timely retreat. All the forces were now ordered to halt, and the day following, General Sherman met General Burnside at Knoxville. It was then agreed that the Fourth Corps should remain and the other forces return to Chattanooga.

The countermarch was commenced on the 7th. A halt was made at Athens, with the various columns so disposed as to cover a movement of Colonel Long, who had gone toward North Carolina to cut off one of Longstreet's trains. Upon his return, the infantry forces marched to Chattanooga. Howard's corps and Davis' division resumed their old relations in the Army of the Cumberland, and Sherman'sdivisionsreturned to the West.

; Though the march to East Tennessee involved no serious fighting with Longstreet's command, which was lost to General Bragg in his emergency at Chattanooga, it nevertheless thoroughly accomplished its object, as it forced the former from Knoxville toward the East, in what proved to be per- 


petual separation from the Confederate Army of the Tennessee. It was a hard march, as the troops commenced it immediately after a series of engagements, and Sherman's forces after a long march from the "West. The latter had " stripped for the fight" at Bridgeport, and they, with many from other commands, were destitute of suitable clothing for a winter campaign. Besides, their supplies were drawn mainly from the country, and in a hurried movement this source is exceedingly precarious. Supplies were sent up the river in boats it is true, but the army was not always near the river; and, on the whole, the circumstances were such as none but veteran soldiers would easily overcome. The mills were seized in advance, and run night and day; and a broad belt of country in the march and countermarch paid exhaustive contributions. There were some excesses which were reprehensible, especially as the march was through a region whose inhabitants were mainly loyal. General Davis' division, by its order on the march and its restraint from pillage, elicited special praise from General Sherman. In this commendable and conspicuous bearing, this division represented the Army of the Cumberland, which, throughout its existence, was systematically restrained from pillage and irresponsible foraging.

The objects now were to hold all the territory which had been gained, to maintain and perfect communications, reinforce, recuperate, and reorganize the army, and accumulate supplies and material, all looking to offensive movements, as early as practicable. The enemy was in no condition for aggression on a grand scale, but great vigilance and skillful dispositions were necessary to maintain communications and prevent cavalry raids and guerrilla depredations.

Upon the withdrawal of the troops from Ringgold, General Hooker resumed the occupation of Lookout valley. General Cruft was directed, with his two brigades, to stop on the way and bury the national dead on the battle-field of Chicka-mauga,* and then to take position on the railroad between

* War's visage, despite the glory of heroism and victory, and all the gentle courtesies which enemies may extend at all times, except when the rage of battle brooks no restraint, is grim and forbidding; but when the ordinary usages of civilized and Christian nations in the conduct of 


Whitesides and Bridgeport. Colonel Watkins' brigade of the First division of cavalry was directed to take post at Ross-ville; and the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry was sent to Caperton's ferry, to guard and observe at that point. A pioneer brigade, composed of detachments from various regiments, Colonel G. P. Buell commanding, was employed in the construction of a double-track macadamized road over the nose of Lookout Mountain, to serve as a communication between Lookout valley and Chattanooga, without dependence upon pontoon bridges. Beyond this primary use, this road was essential to overland communications with Bridgeport. The repair of the railroad commanded immediate attention, but as two long and high bridges were to be built   one over the Tennessee river at Bridgeport, and the one over Falling "Water, near Whitesides   much time was required.

When the army returned from East Tennessee, the Eleventh Corps went into camp at Whitesides; two brigades of Davis'    division, east of Missionary Ridge, near Rossville; and the third at the mouth of the North Chickamauga. General Elliott was ordered to establish his headquarters at Athens, and post pickets at Calhoun, Columbus, and Tellico Plains.

During the months of November and December, there were    several brilliant contests in resisting the enemy's cavalry, repressing guerrillas, and scouting to the front to ascertain the strength and movements of the enemy. And in most cases the national troops were victorious.

November 2d, Brigadier-General R. S. Granger, command-war are ignored, then are its features forbidding in the extreme. The carnage and suffering are appalling when cool reflection and the kindly sympathies have play; but all strong terms are inadequate to express the wanton barbarities of war, either in cruelty to the living or dishonor to the dead, and on both counts the leaders of the rebellion must be convicted. Andersonville and other prisons, where starvation and want of room for captives entailed the intensest suffering and fearful mortality, and Chickamauga, with its hundreds of unburied dead, give proof of the most revolting inhumanity. General Bragg accepted an exchange of prisoners who were wounded, but he denied burial to multitudes of the slain. The national dead upon that part of the field occupied by General Long-street were buried; but very many on their right, where General Polk commanded, lay upon the ground for two months. 


ing at Nashville, sent a mixed command, under Lieutenant- of

Colonel Sculley, First Middle Tennessee Infantry, to look tvv after Hawkins, and other guerrilla chiefs, near Piner's fac- |j

tory.   Sculley met them, and having routed the party, pur- fif

sued to Centerville.   At this point, as he was crossing the a <

river, Hawkins attacked in turn, but was again routed, and G  

his partisans were dispersed.   His loss was from fifteen to th

twenty killed, and sixty-six prisoners. w

November 4th, Major Fitzgibbon, of the Fourteenth Mich- w:

igan Infantry, fought near Lawrenceburg the guerrilla banrh M

of Cooper, Kirk, Williams, and Scott. After a hand-to-hand lie contest, Fitzgibbon defeated them, killing eight, wounding

seven, and capturing twenty-four men.   Among the captured al

were a captain and two lieutenants.   The victor had three at

men slightly wounded, and eight horses killed. m

On the 13th, Captain Cutler, with one company of mounted N

infantry from the garrison at Clarksville, and a section of re

"Whitmore's battery, had a contest with Captain Gray's com- vi pany of guerrillas, near Palmyra.   He killed two, wounded

five, and captured one.   The same day, fifteen prisoners were m

captured near Lebanon, and forty by Missener, near Columbia. ti

On the 16th, General Payne sent parties from Gallatin and C La Vergne.   Five guerrillas were killed, and twenty-six were

captured, also horses, cattle, sheep, and hogs, which had been cc

collected for the Confederate army. ir.

The next day, Colonel Coburn sent an expedition from 1 tl Murfreesboro against the enemy's irregular cavalry.   A de-

tachment of the Fourth Tennessee Cavalry captured nineteen t  

guerrillas and twenty horses, without loss. a

On the 21st, an expedition was sent down the Tennessee 1 c   river, which destroyed nine boats for local use, some of them ' a:

being sixty feet long.   They were wrested from the enemy. ti

On the 26th, the First Tennessee Cavalry and Ninth Penn-sylvania Cavalry, under Colonel Brownlow, attacked Colonel Murray, at Sparta. He killed one man, wounded two, and captured ten. Extensive salt-works were destroyed, and some horses and ammunition were taken.

The same day, Captain Brixie's scouts encountered a party 

of guerrillas near Bathsheba Springs, capturing fifteen or twenty, and dispersing the remainder.

December 12th, Colonel Watkins, with two hundred and fifty men, from the Fourth and Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, made a dash upon Lafayette, Georgia, and captured a colonel of the Georgia home guard, six officers of the signal corps, and thirty horses and mules, and returned to his camp at Rossville, without loss. On the 27th, the colonel sent Major Willing, with one hundred and fifty men from the same regiments, to McLemore's Cove and Lafayette. The major captured one lieutenant, sixteen men, and thirty-eight horses and mules.

On the 15th, General Dodge captured a small party of cavalry, under command of Major Joe Fontaine, General Roddy's adjutant, not far from Pulaski, Tennessee. This party had made a reconnoissance on the Nashville and Chattanooga and Nashville and Decatur railroads, which doubtless had some relation to projected movements or raids. It suggested greater vigilance along these important roads.

December 27th, General Wheeler, with fifteen hundred men, appeared at Calhoun, Tennessee, with evident expectation of capturing a train under escort of Laiboldt's brigade. Colonel Laiboldt charged this force, and routed it speedily, and Colonel Long, with one hundred and fifty men, having come from the opposite side of the river, in support, moved in pursuit, believing that a small force had been cut off from the main body. By a saber charge, this force was scattered in all directions. One hundred and thirty-one prisoners were taken, including five officers, one a division inspector and one a surgeon. The number of killed and wounded was not ascertained. Colonel Long lost two killed, twelve wounded, and one missing. Wheeler commanded in person, and anticipated rich booty with slight trouble, but failed in his object, with heavy loss. 

general view of the status of the conflict at the close

of 1863.

The year 1863 was crowded with disaster to the insurgents. They were victorious in some of the great battles in Virginia, but lost fearfully in the battle of Gettysburg. So that, at the East, where only they had been at all successful, their strength was relatively less than at the beginning of the year. In the "West, their losses in men, material of war, and territory were immense. In their effort to maintain their hold upon the Mississippi river, they lost two armies, and when subsequently the " Eather of Waters " flowed " unvexed to the sea," and the supremacy of the national navy upon this great river and its tributaries was unquestioned, all contiguous portions of the insurgent states were at the mercy of the national armies. At the close of the year the central offensive line was resting upon the northern limits of Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina. The loss of so much territory, the complete division of what remained by the navy moving at pleasure upon the Mississippi river, and the immense diminution of men and means, gave new conditions to the campaigns of the next year.

Besides the effect of numerous defeats during the year, two proclamations of the President of the United States greatly alarmed the insurgents. On the 1st day of January, 1863, he proclaimed freedom to all the slaves in the revolted states, and in the last month he promised pardon to all below a given grade, in the insurgent armies.

As a sequence of the freedom of the slaves, and as a war measure of great moment, arms were soon put in their hands. (8) 


At first, however, the enrollment of the freedmen as soldiers was only occasionally undertaken by individual department commanders in absence of any general plan or explicit authority from Washington. Though slavery directly and indirectly was the dominant cause of the war, there was manifest reluctance for nearly three years to lay hands upon it, and after its abolition was decreed, the national authorities hesitated to make soldiers of those whose bondage they had broken. The slaves had aided the enemy not only by their productive labor, but also by the construction of defenses, and contributed to the strength of the rebellion in greater measure, than they had previously given political weight to the Southern States, in Congress. The more moderate and far-seeing men of the South anticipated, from the first, that sooner or later the African race would be involved in the war. And later than many of this class anticipated, and a growing party in the North demanded, the President pronounced the freedom of the negroes in the seceded states. Their enlistment as soldiers was so plainly a legitimate consequent that it was not long delayed. Both measures were repugnant to the traditional and inveterate prejudices of the Southern people, and of many in the North as well. In the official utterances of the Confederate President, the reprehension of the civilized world was invoked upon those who proposed these measures, and the total destruction of the Africans in America was predicted. But the argument in their support was so simple and forcible that serious opposition to either soon ceased in the North. As the slaves were a source of strength to the rebellion, the logic of war first declared them contraband, and then demanded their employment as soldiers. The fact that their freedom was contingent upon the overthrow of the Southern Confederacy, not only justified their grasp of the musket, but enforced its obligation. And the results vindicated the policy, as colored regiments greatly augmented the national armies for the campaigns of 1864.

The President's offer of pardon to the masses in the Confederate armies, had marked effect. It gave assurance that peace could ensue without the entailment of penal criminality upon those in arms against the government below the rank of 


brigadier-general, and hence removed the necessity that mere despei-ation should keep them under the standards of treason. And as this promise of amnesty involved no hard conditions, and was made at a time of general despondency in the South, and when such was the depreciation of Confederate money, that no poor man could give even partial support to a family from his pay as a soldier, it prompted numerous desertions. Desertion being added to the drain of active campaigns, the diminution of the insurgent armies became alarming to the leaders. But they still claimed that the independence of the Southern States was assured, and on this ground, in part justified a conscription of widest compass. The people did not bear this patiently. Murmurs of discontent became general. Occasionally there was open protest and severest criticism. But as nothing but counter-revolution could remedy the evil, and as this step plainly led through anarchy to submission to the general government, the relentless conscription of young and old, and the sweeping appropriation of private property was endured. As a result, sullenness and discouragement took the place of cheer and hope in their armies, and outward restraint rather than moral force kept multitudes in the ranks; while the certainty of pardon, in the event of the failure of the rebellion, induced those not ready to desert to weigh the cost of protracting a contest when success was extremely doubtful. But the leaders, after a year of gigantic reverses, standing upon the threshhold of new campaigns with diminished armies, as boldly as ever declared that subjugation was impossible. President Davis, in his annual message to his congress, announced that " grave reverses had befallen the Confederate armies," and that the hope of a speedy termination of the war, entertained at the beginning of the year, had not been realized, and yet asserted that peace could only come with the acknowledgment of the independence of the Confederate States. Even after General Lee's defeat at Gettysburg, the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and the retreat of General Bragg's army over Cumberland Mountains, M. T. Maury assured the world, in a paper published in the " London Times," that the prospect of success to the South was brighter than at any former period of the war. Whether 


this assurance was real or assumed, on the part of the leaders, and whether they had to any great extent the sympathy of the masses in their avowed hopes, such was the power of the Confederate government and the momentum of the rebellion, that armies of fair defensive proportions were maintained, and some of the Southern generals even entertained projects of aggression.

The events of the year as affecting the national cause, viewed from a military or political stand-point, were cheering in the extreme. The victories of the national armies and the support of war measures as evinced by the elections, equally indicated that the crisis of the nation's destiny had been safely passed. The strength of the rebellion had culminated, and the general situation gave encouragement to the government and those who supported it, to strike blow after blow until the final one should be given. The elections declared the nation's approval of the President's proclamation of freedom to the slaves, and the policy of making them soldiers, and universal freedom was now as firmly established as a condition of peace as the surrender of the Confederate armies.

The maintenance of the full strength of the national armies was now the grand problem. The term of enlistment of very many regiments would expire early in 1864. Their retirement during active operations would endanger the success of all plans of aggression which might be formed. In fact, the speedy suppression of the rebellion turned upon their retention in the service, and yet there was no law to hold them. Fortunately for the country her citizen soldiers were equal to the emergency, and their voluntary re-enlistment, more stringent drafting, and the enrollment of the freedmen, gave promise of adequate armies.

It was evident at the close of the year that the Army of the Cumberland was again to confront its old enemy, the Army of the Tennessee. After its defeat at Chattanooga, this army took position at Dalton, with a heavy detachment at Buzzard's Roost, and forces also at the strong positions between Dalton and Atlanta. The Western and Atlantic railroad courses through the hills and mountains of Northern Georgia, which give marked advantage to an army acting on the defensive, against another 

dependent upon the railroad for supplies. And before the exact character of the next central campaign could be determined, the Confederate generals exerted themselves to give additional strength to the fortresses which nature had provided. Whether they should be able to take the offensive or not, their past experience suggested the propriety of making provision for defense as far to the rear as practicable, while maintaining a strong defensive front. 

operations in  the   department  during january, february, and march, 1864, and preparations for aggression.

At the beginning of the year 1864, and during the first months of the year, the troops of the Army of the Cumberland were disposed from Knoxville to Bridgeport, and on the railroad from the latter place to Louisville, Kentucky. The attitude of the army was mainly defensive. In fact, it was in no condition for aggression. At least ten thousand animals had died during the siege of Chattanooga, and those which survived were so reduced in strength as to be unfit for service. The army, too, was temporarily weakened by the absence of numerous regiments that had been granted furloughs upon re-enlistment ; and previous to the completion of the railroad between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, it was hardly possible to supply the troops at rest on the defensive line, including the Army of the Ohio in East Tennessee. Thus restrained from active operations, its chief duty was preparation for future aggression.

As the primary step, it was imperative to make Chattanooga a reliable proximate base of supplies for an army advancing toward Atlanta. The Confederate army being in winter-quarters in Northern Georgia, could destroy all the productions of that region which it did not consume or transport. So that the accumulation of supplies at Chattanooga, and the continued maintenance of railroad communications with Nashville and Louisville, were conditions of a southward advance; and the practicability of making Chattanooga a base for offensive operations, hinged upon the capacity of a single railroad.

Two railroads from Nashville meet at Stevenson, Alabama, but from their junction to Bridgeport, and thence to Chat-


tanooga, there is only a single track.' As the bridges at Bridgeport and Falling Waters were not completed until the 14th of January, half the winter was gone before there was the slightest accumulation of supplies; and though subsequently this single railroad was pressed to its utmost capacity, such were the immediate wants of the armies, and so numerous were the veteran regiments passing over the road, that the large storehouses which had been built at Chattanooga were very slowly filled.

During the first half of January, the enemy was not active. General Thomas sent scouting parties in all directions, but no indications of aggression were discerned. Apart from the exhaustion which the preceding campaigns had produced, a    change of commanders was doubtless one cause of inaction. Soon after his defeat before Chattanooga, General Bragg had been removed from command in Georgia, and General Joseph E. Johnston, while charged with the administration of a military division corresponding in extent to the one which had been created for General Grant, assumed personal command of the foi'ces immediately south of Chattanooga. His presence at Dalton indicated his appreciation of the importance of the center of his line, either to regain what had been so recently lost, or to neutralize Chattanooga, as far as possible, as a base for aggressive operations.

By this time, the foreshadows of the campaign which General Grant had projected began to appear. Mobile was his next objective, with Atlanta and Mongomery as important intermediate points.* Not being ready to advance upon the direct line to his objective, he proposed a movement from his right flank by General Sherman, while General Thomas should make effort to hold Johnston's forces at Dalton, and General Foster, commanding in East Tennessee in room of General Burnside, should neutralize Longstreet's army. The objects proposed for General Sherman were the destruction of the railroads from Vicksburg to