REPELLING HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE.



  As fast as the Union troops arrived at Columbia, in their hurried retreat
from Pulaski, works were thrown up, covering the approaches from the south,
and the trains were sent across the river. But the line was found to be longer
than the small force could hold; and the river could easily be crossed, above
or below the town. Orders were given to withdraw to the north side on the
night of the 26th, but a heavy storm prevented. The next night the crossing
was made, the railroad bridge was burned, and the pontoon boats were scut-
tled. This was an all-night job, the last of the pickets crossing at 5 in the
morning. It was now the fifth day since the retreat from Pulaski began, and
the little army had been exposed day and night to all sorts of weather except
sunshine, and had been almost continually on the move. From deserters it
was learned that Hood's infantry numbered 40,000, and his cavalry, under
Forrest, 10,000 or 12,000. But the Union army was slowly increasing by con-
centration and the arrival of recruits. It now numbered at Columbia about
23,000 infantry and some 5000 cavalry - of whom only 3500 were mounted.
General James H. Wilson, who had been ordered by General Grant to report to
General Sherman,- and of whom General Grant wrote, " I believe he will add
fifty per cent. to the effectiveness of your cavalry,"- had taken command
personally of all General Thomas's cavalry, which was trying to hold the
fords east and west of Columbia. [See article by General Wilson, to follow.]
  In spite of every opposition, Forrest succeeded in placing one of his divi-
sions on the north side of Duck River before noon of the 28th, and forced back
the Union cavalry on roads leading toward Spring Hill and Franklin. At 1
o'clock on the morning of the 29th General Wilson became convinced that
the enemy's infantry would begin crossing at daylight, and advised General
Schofield to fall back to Franklin. At 3:30 the same morning General Thomas
sent him similar orders. Daylight revealed the correctness of Wilson's infor-
mation. Before sunrise Cheatham's corps, headed by Cleburne's division,-
a division unsurpassed for courage, energy, and endurance by any in the
Confederate army,- was making its way over Duck River at Davis's Ford,
about five miles east of Columbia. The weather had cleared, and it was a
bright autumn morning, the air full of invigorating life. General Hood
in person accompanied the advance.
  When General Schofield was informed that the Confederate infantry were
crossing, he sent a brigade, under Colonel P. Sidney Post, on a reconnoissance
along the river-bank, to learn if the report was true. He also ordered General
Stanley to march with two divisions, Wagner's and Kimball's, to Spring
Hill, taking the trains and all the reserve artillery. In less than half an hour
after receiving the order, Stanley was on the way. On reaching the point
where Rutherford Creek crosses the Franklin Pike, Kimball's division was
halted, by order of General Schofield, and faced to the east to cover the cross-
ing against a possible attack from that quarter. In this position Kimball
remained all day. Stanley, with the other division, pushed on to Spring
Hill. Just before noon, as the head of his column was approaching that
place, he met "a cavalry soldier who seemed to be badly scared," who
reported that Buford's division of Forrest's cavalry was approaching from



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