xt7kkw57dp6z https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7kkw57dp6z/data/mets.xml Van Horne, Thomas Budd, d. 1895. 1875  books b92e4932v25volume12009 English R. Clarke & Co. : Cincinnati, Ohio Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. United States. Army of the Cumberland --History. United States --History --Civil War, 1861-1865 --Regimental histories. History of the Army of the Cumberland; its organization, campaigns, and battles, written at the request of Major-General George H. Thomas chiefly from his private military journal and official and other documents furnished by him. Illustrated with campaign and battle maps, compiled by Edward Ruger. text History of the Army of the Cumberland; its organization, campaigns, and battles, written at the request of Major-General George H. Thomas chiefly from his private military journal and official and other documents furnished by him. Illustrated with campaign and battle maps, compiled by Edward Ruger. 1875 2009 true xt7kkw57dp6z section xt7kkw57dp6z 



Army of the Cumberland



















During a conversation with General George H. Thomas, at Nashville, Tennessee, in the summer of 1865, some remark was made relating to the achievements of his army, when he said to me, "I wish you to write a narrative history.of the Army of the Cumberland." Taking a moment for reflection, I replied, that if, upon trial, I should meet his expectations, I should be glad to produce such a work. He then said: " "Write nothing but the truth. You will contravene received opinions, and you must fortify yourself." These short but comprehensive sentences constituted my instructions, and taken in connection with the fact that the-materials for the work were mainly collected and supplied by General Thomas, gave him as close a relation to it as was possible without direct authorship.

It is not known when it first occurred to General Thomas to have the history of his army written, but had it been his purpose from the beginning of his connection with it, in the organization and command of its first brigade, he could not have been more exhaustive in collecting the materials upon which it is based. His " Military Journal," accurate in the mention of the operations of each day, was a safeguard against errors in chronology, gave brief notes of the more important facts and events, and was suggestive of lines of investigation, for which ample resources were provided in the copies of orders, telegrams, official reports, and other papers, unofficial,

   vj PREFACE.

but equally authoritative as the muniments of a truthful narrative, which in greatest profusion he placed in my hands. He gave especial attention to the collection of pertinent documents after the work had been projected, and received assistance from General W. D. "Whipple and Colonels A. L. Hough, S. C. Kellogg, and J. P. "Williard, members of his staff in nearest relation. From the time the composition of the history was begun until his death, I was in constant communication with him, and he knew fully its scope and the pivotal facts which would constitute its framework and determine its purview, and lived to examine and approve several completed chapters relating to campaigns and battles in which he was a prominent actor. The history and the maps which illustrate it, have been prepared through independent research, but from the same sources of knowledge, and under identical relations to General Thomas.

I am also greatly indebted to many of the corps, division, and brigade commanders, and other officers of the army, for suggestions and encouragement during the years spent in preparing this work.

It may not be irrelevant or inappropriate for me to state that, in investigation and description, I have followed the logical order, tracing operations from inception to issue, and interpreting them by their objects as well as their results.

The manuscript was completed in December, 1872. Upon my return to my post in January, 1873, I left it in the East, and did not see it again until I began to read the proof-sheets, in July, 1875.


September, 1875. 

Introduction.................................................................,.............. xi


Development of the Status of Kentucky.................................... 1


Internal Military Affairs of Kentucky..................................... 8


Organization of United States Troops in Kentucky.................... 14


Command of General Anderson.................................................... 20


Operations of General Thomas, in Kentucky, under General

Sherman................................................................................ 36


Operations of General Thomas, in Kentucky, under General

buell, including the battle of mlll sprinos..................... 46


Organization and Operations of the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,

and Sixth Divisions............................................................... 63




Operations of General Nelson, Colonel Garfield, and General

Carter in Eastern Kentucky................................................ 74


General View of the Situation in the Central Theater of War,

from the beginning to the Pall of Nashville...................... 80


Advance of the Army of the Ohio from Nashville to Savannah,

and the Battle of Shiloh.................................................. 97


Operations against Corinth...................................   ...................... 125


Operations of General O. M. Mitchell, General Neqley, General G. ~W. Morgan, and Colonel Duffield, and the Expedition - to Destroy Railroads in Georgia.......................................... 130


The Advance toward Chattanooga from Corinth, and the Retreat from Southern Tennessee to Louisville, Kentucky..... 139


Operations of Generals G. W. Morgan and "Wm. Nelson in Kentucky.................................................................................... 176


Campaign of Perryville, Kentucky............................................... 184


The Concentration of the Army of the Cumberland at Nashville, Tennessee, and Subordinate Contingent Operations..................................................................................... 207


Stone River Campaign................................................................... 219 


CHAPTER XVIII. Operations during the Army's Encampment of Six Months at Mur-

freesbobo............................................................................. 287


TuLLAHOMA CAMPAIGN...................................................................... 302


The Movements of the Army over the Mountains and Tennessee

River, and Battle of Chickamauqa..............................._____. 310


Siege of Chattanooga..................................................................... 386


Battles near Chattanooga............................................................ 405 

The election, by the Republican party, of Abraham Lincoln, as President of the United States, on the 6th day of November, 1860, was the occasion for an attempt to compass the destruction of the Union. The men who made that attempt had for years meditated the establishment of a confederacy comprising all the slaveholding states. The antagonisms which culminated in the secession of eleven of these states may be traced to the remote past. They were revealed even in the Convention of 1787. John C. Calhoun gave logical consistency to the doctrines of state-rights, and in the effort to give them practical realization, in 1832, very nearly anticipated the struggle that has recently deluged the land with blood. Compromises, often repeated in our history, promising eternal harmony, had failed to give more than temporary quiet to the country. The near approach of each successive presidential election furnished the occasion for some new presentation of the old issues, and invited the renewal of the contest for sectional dominance. And thus every fourth year revealed, with greater plainness, the relentless character of the antagonism, between the free and slave states. Questions of political supremacy and material interests were mingled with the less dangerous discussion of abstract differences in the theory of government; and the sober, thoughtful, patriotic men of the country saw, with growing alarm, that every presidential canvass gave proof that political issues were becoming more positive, in correspondence with the increasing intensity of sectional animosity.

During the political campaign which preceded the presidential election of 1860, the Southern leaders of the school of Calhoun used all possible influences to commit the Southern people to secession, in the event of the success of the Republican party.   The specious assumption of inveterate



differences in the type of civilization, North and South; the vaunted assertion of superior manhood and transcendent chivalry; the declared certainty of hostile interference with slavery by the party electing Mr. Lincoln, and the appeal to passion and prejudice, gave these men the power to precipitate eleven of the slaveholding states into secession and rebellion. It may be safe to aver that the majority of the Southern people, if they had been allowed a free and forcible expression of their opinions and feelings, would have decided against secession. But the Union men of the South lacked organization, and, acting without concert, were unable to resist the large and ambitious minority, which, compassing great wealth and talent, with organization compact and firm, was controlled by men of reckless daring and acknowledged power.

On the first Monday in December, 18G0, the official announcement of the election of Mr. Lincoln was made in due form in the Senate chamber at Washington. On the 20th of the same month, a convention of the people of South Carolina passed an ordinance of secession. Six states, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, withdrew in quick succession from the sisterhood of states. Soon the bold announcement of a new nationality   the Confederate States of America   startled the country and the world. The actors in this, the greatest political crime in history, at once prepared for war   the usual consequent of the assumption of independent national existence   and threats of Northern invasion, in the event of war, were proclaimed as boldly as the existence of the new government.

Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas delayed secession for some months. The legislature of Virginia proposed an informal national convention, to devise measures to prevent the dismemberment of the Union, and consequent civil war. Tennessee decided, by a heavy majority, against calling a convention to consider the question of secession. North Carolina was also without a convention. The convention of Arkansas, after a somewhat protracted session, adjourned without taking definite action. These states thus awaited the consequences of the secession of the Gulf States.

Although the majority of the people of the United States did not admit that the right to secede was reserved to the individual states, and regarded the conduct of the Gulf States, if persistently continued, as the actual initiation of civil war, and although these states, beyond their act of secession, had committed open acts of war, some of which were even perpetrated before the passage of ordinances of secession, still the general government took no step looking to the suppression of the rebellion 


inaugurated by secession. War was so distasteful to the government and people, that the purpose was patent to avoid it if possible. Forts and arsenals had been seized, and portions of the national army had been surrendered to the insurgents, but still the nation hesitated to draw the sword.

During this period of hesitancy, there were indications of reaction in the seceded states, while the more northern slaveholding states grew more decided in the expression of their purpose to remain in the Union. Thus it became apparent to the leading insurgents that something startling must be done, or these states would be lost to the projected Southern Confederacy.

All the important forts on the coasts of the seceding states, except Pickens and Sumter, had been seized by the insurgents. The bombardment and fall of the latter constituted the second great act in the drama of rebellion. South Carolina had been the first to secede, and her assumed leadership in revolt and traditional disloyalty, alike required that her guns should inaugurate the war with emphasis and call the nation to arms. On the 12th day of April, 1801, in obedience to orders of Jefferson Davis, President of the so-called Confederate States, General Beauregard commenced the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The gallant Anderson and his equally gallant command resisted the tremendous cannonading for nearly two days. But being without food and ammunition, exhausted by constant exertion, and almost stifled by the heat and smoke of the burning outbuildings, the heroic garrison made such terms with the enemy as would best conserve their own honor and that of their country, and retired from the fort under their colors.

On the 14th day of April, the day after the capitulation, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, issued a proclamation, calling forth the militia of the several states of the Union, to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, to suppress the combinations in the seceded states, which were too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. Then Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, by conventions, or through the less legitimate action of legislatures, promptly seceded, and made common cause with the states already in open rebellion.

The four border slaveholding states   Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri   now filled the chasm between the two sections, which were hurrying their preparations for war on a gigantic scale. The situation of these states was critical, whatever might be their action. Their citizens were divided in political sentiment, and of all the states, North or South, 

they were most exposed to the perils of war. Their geographical position, their common interest in slavery with the revolted states, and their identity in other great interests with the Northern States, necessitated delay in action, and produced vacillation in choice of Northern or Southern alliance. Delaware and Maryland, however, soon declared their purpose of remaining in the Union. Kentucky and Missouri having more slaves and more attachment to the institution of slavery, could not so easily determine their status. The governors of these states were in sympathy with the Southern cause, while a large and influential party in each state favored the Northern. It is safe to assert, too, that in other respects the loyalists of Kentucky had more to embarrass them in the positive declaration of their attachment to the Union, than the citizens of the other states that declined secession.

As the first organized loyal regiments of Kentucky troops constituted the nucleus of the Army of the Cumberland, this history is commenced with a retrospect of the situation in that state during the first months of the war.





development oe the status op kentucky.

At the inception of our gigantic civil war, the leading types of political sentiment prevalent throughout the entire country were represented by large classes iu Kentucky. Bold unionists confronted arrant secessionists; timid loyalists and wavering rebels joined hands in an impracticable conservatism. As an expression of the reigning chaos of opinion, and by the consent of multitudes in direct antagonism, Kentucky assumed the position of neutrality. All her citizens not radically and unconditionally for the Union, protested against the march of armies for the suppression of the rebellion upon the soil of the State. It was the great blunder of Southern Union men, that they so early and so fully committed themselves against the coercion of the seceded states, or the maintenance of the Union by force, that when war was actual, they were driven into rebellion in no small degree by their previous false position. The loyal men of Kentucky barely escaped the common fate of the Union men in other Southern States. Several prominent men in Kentucky had, from the time of the election of Mr. Lincoln, been so bold in opposition to the secession of the state, and so open in their declaration of purpose to sustain the general government, that co- 


ercive measures were hailed with delight. But very many of those claiming to be Union men, while ostensibly opposing the secession of Kentucky, were reticent with regard to their action in the event of war. They were not in open sympathy with the secession movement, but clamorous in their demand for armed neutrality as the legitimate and only safe position for Kentucky. So prevalent was this opinion, and so bold its expression, that "armed neutrality" was the accredited status of the state before her legislature gave it the more formal pretense of legitimacy.

Governor B. Magoffin, in his message to the legislature convened in extra session January 17, 1861, recommended that the state militia should be put upon a war footing, in readiness for the forcible assumption of such position as the State might choose. He also recommended that a convention should be called, and plainly indicated his desire for the secession of the state.

The legislatures of the more Southern States were mainly composed of men elected upon other issues, but generally pledged to secession. Hence their readiness to call conventions, and even assume the prerogatives of conventions. But fortunately for Kentucky, the Union men in her legislature were too prudent and too patriotic to unite with the secessionists in calling a convention; and thus they prevented the usual initial step in secession. Neither did the legislature meet the governor's expectation in providing for the equipment of the state militia.

The history of Kentucky, during the period beginning with the presidential election and ending with the fall of Sumter, furnishes no facts of great moment beyond the steady resistance of the masses of her people and the majority of her legislature to every movement inclining to secession. There were, however, marked indications of divided sentiment and purpose. One instance may serve as the type of many. It was determined by the loyal citizens of Louisville that the national flag should be raised with suitable pomp upon the court-house on the 22d day of February. Hon. James Speed delivered a patriotic address on the occasion. The address elicited no disloyal demonstration; but when the flag was raised, Simon B. 


Buekner, iu chief command of the state guard as inspector-general of the state, gave no order to salute, as required by the published programme and patriotic duty. In manifest disloyalty to the flag, Buekner, and a large portion of his command, moved from the court-house yard. Major "Woodruff and his battalion, the " Marion Rifles," in emphatic contrast remained and saluted the national colors. The two officers, and those acting with them, represented not only the antagonistic sentiment of the state guard, but also of the citizens of the entire state.

But though political affairs in Kentucky were chaotic during the early mouths of 1861, the issues of the grand contest, whose sweep and power were soon to solve with inexorable defiuiteness all the problems engrossing the thought and sentiment of the whole country, were gradually assuming positive shape. Fort Sumter fell on the 14th day of April. On the day following, the President issued the proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand men, and assigning the quotas of all the states. In response, Governor Magoffin addressed the following message to the Secretary of War:

" Frankfort, April 15, 1861. "Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War:

" Your dispatch has been received. In answer, I say emphatically that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States.

"B. Magoffin, " Governor of Kentucky."

This bold presumptuous answer, though not prophetic, gave hope to the South that Kentucky would secede. Radical secessionists, as a class, were noisy, madly assertive, and in the realm of hypothesis, amazingly unprophetic; and Governor Magoffin, interpreting public sentiment by his own feelings, and mistaking secession clamor for the revealed purpose of Kentucky, defiantly ignored the constitutional subordination of the state to the general government. As yet Kentucky had taken no steps indicating secession as a probable contingency; neither had she made unequivocal assertion of loyalty ; and as in the past, so now in the crisis of the border 


slaveholding states, the official declaration of her governor was only the expression of individual opinion.

Kentucky, as a state, was not yet ready to furnish troops for the United States service, hut there were citizens in great numbers ready to commit themselves to the unconditional support of the general government. And while at this period, as previously, the Hag of revolt had been boldly unfurled throughout the state, and men had been openly recruited for the rebel army, there were many eager to take position under the flag of their country.

On the 6th day of May, the legislature of Kentucky convened in extra session, for the third time since the election of Mr. Lincoln. The message of Governor Magoffin evinced the expectation that the state would immediately secede. The legislature affirmed " armed neutrality " as the status of the state, and then by implication censured the governor for the language of his official announcement. Still, the fact was patent that Kentucky, as represented by her legislature, though advancing in loyal expression, was yet far from active loyalty. Neutrality, in such a contest, was itself, proof of a lack of fealty. During this extra session, another advance was made in the right direction. The militia law of the state was so amended as to compel the state guard to take the oath of allegiance, not only to Kentucky, but also to the United States. This act recognized the obligation of the state to the general government, but it did not reach active support.

While the politicians in the seceded states took the lead in all treasonable movements, and were far in advance of the people in intensity of disloyalty, those in Kentucky who were loyal, were in the main far behind the masses in loyal feeling, and were far more timid in open resistance to the formidable organized effort to precipitate the state into alliance with those in rebellion. As soon as the grand issue was fairly made by the bombardment of Port Sumter, undercurrents against the rebellion, compassing, for the most part, quiet citizens, set in with great power. During the extra legislative session of May, and while the old political leaders, though claiming to be loyal, were timid to the degree of moral cowardice, a few citizens of Louisville, unknown to the political 


arena, gave existence to an organization that doubtless determined the status of Kentucky. This organization was called the " Union Club."

Previous to the 17th of May, the Union men of Kentucky had no such organization as could determine their numerical strength and consolidate their power. The " Citizens and Working Men's Association " had triumphed in the election of J. M. Delph, as mayor of Louisville. This association claimed to be, par excellence, the Union party of Louisville. It demanded fidelity to the Union at the expense of former party affiliations, and on this simple issue, unaided by a single journal of the city, carried the municipal election. The administration of the city government, conducted under circumstances which demanded great prudence and firmness, demonstrated the wisdom of those whose votes placed Mr. Delph in office. This organization, however, had not sufficient compactness for a revolutionary period. The rebels in Kentucky and throughout the entire South were most thoroughly organized, in anticipation of the necessity of overriding majorities. The notorious Bickley, at the head of the " Knights of the Golden Circle," was at this period drilling squads in the streets of Louisville. Outspoken loyalists were threatened with assassination. Under the pressure of such circumstances, G. A. Hall, C. C. Hull, R. E. Hull, J. P. Hull, R. L. Post, C. Z. "Webster, II. G. S. Whipple, Thos. A. Morgan, W. B. Hegan, F. II. Hegan, Robert Ayars, and a few others, on the 17th day of May, 1861, organized this " Union Club." The members wore solemnly sworn to unconditional loyalty. The ritual was mainly compiled from the grand declarations of Washington, Webster, and Clay. It especially enforced the patriotic affirmation of the latter: " If Kentucky to-morrow unfurls the banner of resistance, I never will fight under that banner. I owe a paramount allegiance to the whole Union; a subordinate one to my own state." With such declarations, as expressive of its purpose and patriotism, this organization was meet for the times. Secret associations are the concomitants of modern revolutions, powerful for good or evil, in accordance with the principles they embody and the ends they subserve.   This one was potent, if not decisive, in saving Ken- 


tucky from secession. It soon diffused itself throughout the state, reaching the legislature with its influence, and on the 1st of July, the day for a special congressional election, it gave a hundred thousand loyal votes. During the months of July and August the development and expression of loyalty was so marked, that the secessionists despaired of the withdrawal of the state, except through an appeal to arms. The election held early in August demonstrated that a large majority of the people of Kentucky were opposed to secession. This fact did not deter John C. Breckinridge and his compeers in treason from efforts to force the state from the Union. Not being-ready for the execution of the war measures which they were planning, they called themselves the Peace party. Though they held the doctrine of state-rights, they declined acquiescence in the declared purpose of the state to remain in the Union, and while clamoring for peace, they secretly arranged with the so-called Confederate government to supply them with arms, and extend its military jurisdiction over the state.    -There was no thought of submission to the overwhelming public sentiment which had been repeatedly expressed through the previous elections. These traitors assumed that the National government was broken up ; that the Confederate government had attained lawful existence, and that Kentucky, whether the majority of her people were willing or unwilling, belonged to the Confederate government.

"Washington, April 15, 1861.

To his Excellency, Beriah Magoffin :

Call made on you by to-night's mail for four regiments of militia for immediate service.


Secretary of War.

Executive Office, Frankfort, April 15, 1861. To Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington City :

Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say emphatically, that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States.


Governor of Kentucky. 



Recent events are of so startling a character as to render it imperatively necessary, that the legislature of Kentucky be again convened in extraordinary session. It is now apparent that the most energetic measures are being resorted to by the government at Washington to prosecute a war upon an extended scale with the seceded states. Already large sums of money and supplies of men are being raised in the Northern States for that purpose. The tread of armies is the response which is being made to the measures of pacification which are being discussed before our people; whilst up to this moment we are comparatively in a defenseless attitude.

Whatever else should be done, it is, in my judgment, the duty of Kentucky, without delay, to place herself in a complete position for defense. The causes for apprehension are now certainly grave enough to impel every Kentuckian to demand that this be done, and to require of the legislature of the state such additional action as may be necessary for the general welfare. To this end I now call upon the members of the General Assembly to convene at the capitol in Frankfort, on the 6th day of May, 1861.

In testimony whereof, I, Beriah Magoffin, governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, have hereunto subscribed my name, and caused the seal of the commonwealth to be affixed. Done at the city of Frankfort, the 24th day of April, 1861, and in the sixty-ninth year of the commonwealth.

By the Governor : B. MAGOFFIN.

Thos. B. Monboe, Secretary of State.

By Jas. W. Tate, Assistant Secretary.


Considering the deplorable condition of the country, and for which the State of Kentucky is in no way responsible, and looking to the best means of preserving the internal peace, and securing the lives, liberty, and property of the citizens of the state, therefore      

1. Resolved, by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, That this state, and the citizens thereof, should take no part in the civil war now waged, except as mediators and friends to the belligerent parties ; and that Kentucky should, during the contest, occupy the position of strict neutrality.

Resolved further, That the act of the governor in refusing to furnish troops or military force, upon the call of the executive authority of the United States, under existing circumstances, is approved. 

internal military affairs of kentucky.

The history of military affairs in Kentucky during the year 1861 can not be complete, even in outline, without adecpiate mention of the " State Guard" and " Home Guard."

The prominent disuuionists in Kentucky doubtless knew, long before it occurred, that the presidential election of 1860 would either give national sway to their radical views of state sovereignty, or furnish the pretext for the dissolution of the Union. Men of the state-rights school in the Gulf States could not entertain strong assurance of their independence without the co-operation of the border slave-holding states. Their alliance in the event of war, and their support in the event of peaceable secession, were regarded as conditions of success. And as the latter states would be the first to suffer the consequences of secession, if secession should result in war, it was a matter of great moment to the secessionists in Kentucky, as well as those farther south, that there should be a military force on the border, ready for war. For this purpose, doubtless, the organization of the militia of Kentucky was effected. This object was so disguised that men the farthest removed from disloyalty co-operated in the passage of a law authorizing an army in Kentucky of compactness and numbers equal to some of the standing armies of Europe.

The act of the legislature which gave existence to the " State Guard," becam