xt7msb3wtd0h_38 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2.dao.xml unknown 166 Cubic Feet 381 document boxes, seven textile items, three map folders, one artwork archival material 72m2 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center.  Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Frederick Moore Vinson papers Economic stabilization. Elections -- United States -- Congresses. Judges -- Correspondence. Judges -- United States. Judicial opinions Judicial process -- United States Legislators -- Correspondence. New Deal, 1933-1939. World War, 1914-1918 -- Veterans. World War, 1939-1945. Lewis case (Chief Justice drafts) - United States vs. United Mine Workers - nos. 750-760, nos. 781-782, no. 811 text Lewis case (Chief Justice drafts) - United States vs. United Mine Workers - nos. 750-760, nos. 781-782, no. 811 2019 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2/Box_173/Folder_2_3/Multipage4566.pdf 1946 1946 1946 section false xt7msb3wtd0h_38 xt7msb3wtd0h SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 759, 760, 781, 782 AND Sll.——OC'I‘()BER TERM, 1946.

The United States of America,
759 v.
United Mine “Yorkers of America, an
Unincorpm'ated Association.

The United States of America,
760 v.
John L. Lewis. Iiulividually and as
President of the United Mine Work—
ers of America. .

United Aline \Vorlters of Ameriea. an
Unineorporated Association, Peti—

781 v.

The United States of America.

John L. Lewis. Individually and as
President of the United Mine “Cork—
ers of America, Petitioner,

782 v.

The United States of America.

United Mine lVoi'kers of Aineriea, an
U1linem'porated Assoeiation, an d
John L. Lewis. Individually and as
President of the United Aline lVoI‘k-
ers of America. Petitioners,

811 '11.

The United States of Ameriea.

[March ti. 1047.]




On Writs of Cer-
tiorari to the
United States
Court of Ap—
peals for the
District of Co—

Mn. (‘mur Jrs'rit'ia \‘ixsox delivered the opinion of

the Court.


 759, 760, 781, 782 &. 811

In October. 1946, the ['nited States was in possession of,
and operatinO‘, the major portion of the country’s bitumi—
nous coal mines.1 Terms and conditions of employment
were controlled “for the period of Government possession”
by an agreement 2 entered into on May 29, 1946. between
Secretary of Interior Krug. as Coal Mines Administrator,
and John L. Lewis, as President of the ['nited Mine \Vork—
ers of America." The Krug—Lewis agreement embodied

1 The United States had taken possession of the mines pursuant to
Executive Order 9723 of May 21, 1946, 11 F. R. 5593, in which the
President, after determining that labor disturbances were interrupting
the production of bituminous coal necessary for the operation of the
national economy during the transition from war to peace, directed
the. Secretary of Interior to take possession of and operate the mines
and to negotiate with representatives of the miners concerning the
terms and conditions of employment.

The President's action was taken under the Constitution, as Presi-
dent of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy, and by virtue of the authority conferred upon him by the War
Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163, :30 U. S. C. App. §§ 1501—1511.
lQection 2} of the Act authorizes the seizure of facilities necessary
for the war effort it and when the President finds and proclaims that
strikes or other labor disturbances are interrupting the operation of
such facilities.

Section 3 directs that the authority under that section to take
possession of the specified facilities will terminate with the ending
of hostilities and that the authority under that section to operate
facilities seized will terminate six months after the ending of hostilities.
The President on December 31, 1916, proclaimed that hostilities were
terminated on that day. 12F. lt. l.

3 The initial paragraph ol‘ the contract provided: ,

“This agreement between the Secretary of the Interior, acting as
Coal Mines Administrator under th . authority of Executive Order No.
9728' (dated May 2], 19413, 11 F. lt. 5593), and the United Mine,
\Vorkers of America. covers for the period of Government possession
the terms and conditions of employment in respect to all mines in
Government possession which were as of March 31, 1916, subject to
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, dated April 11,

3111 compliance with Executive Order No. 9728 and § 5 of the \ 7ar
Labor Disputes Act, the agreement had been submitted to and apn
proved by the National Wage b‘tabilization Board.


 759, 700, 731, 782 & 811

far reaehina‘ ehane‘ee favorahle to the miners: " and. ex—

cept it? amended and supplemented therein. the aaree—
inept eerried forward the terms and eonditiona of the
National Bituminous Coal ll'age Agreement of April 11,

On Or-tolier 2‘1. mm. the defendant Lewis diree‘ved a let—
ter to geeretarv Krug‘ and presented issue,q whieh led
direetlv to the present eontroverev. Aeeording‘ to the
defendant lewie. the Krua—l ewia agreement earried for—
ward $ 1.3 of the National Bituminous ("oal lVae‘e Agree—
ment of \pril ll. 1.943. lvmler that eeetion either party to
the eontraet wag privileged to give ten dava’ notiee in
writing: of a desire for a neaotiatina eonferenee whieh the
other party was required to attend: fifteen days after the
beginning: of the eonferenee either party might give notiee
in writingr of the termination of the agreement, effective
five dav.q after reeeipt of sueh notiee. .-\_ and the various Coal Asset-iatiz'ins and Coal
(‘ompanies (l aserl upon the aforesaid ltasie au‘reementl as the)" exieted
on Mareh 3’, . 107151. and the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agree—
ment. dated April ll, 191.3.”

6 The letter also t‘l]:tI'Q‘1'.’l eertain hrear‘he.2 0f eontraet hy the Govern-
ment and asserted signifieant change: in Govermnent wage policy.


 759, 760, 781, 782 &. 811

agreement was denied.T In the opinion of the Govern—
ment. § 1.") of the 1045 agreement had not been preserved
by the King—Lewis agreement; indeed. ,3 15 had been ex—
pressly nullified by the clause of the latter contract pro-
viding that the terms contained therein were to cover the
period of Government possession. Although suggesting
that any negotiations looking toward a new agreement
be 'arried on with the mine owners, the Government
expressed willingness to discuss matters affecting the
Operation of the mines under the terms of the Krug—Lcwis

Conferences were scheduled and began in “Vashineton
on November 1, both the union and the Government ad—
hering to their opposing views regarding the right of either
party to terminate the eontractf At the fifth meeting,
held on November 11. the union for the first time otter-ed
speeitie proposals for changes in wages and other conditions
of employment. On November 13 Secretary Krug re—
quested the union to negotiate with the mine owners.
This suggestion was rejected.” On November 15 the
union. by John L. Lewis. notified Secretary Krug that
“Fifteen days having now elapsed since the beginning of
said ('out'menee. the United Mine Workers of America,
exercising its option hereby terminates said Krug—Lewis
Agreement as of 12:00 o'eloek P. 31., Midnight,
\‘i'ednemla‘v. November ‘20, 19-10.”

Secretary Krug again notified the defendant Lewis that

he had no power under the Krug—liewis agreement or under
the law to terminate the contract by unilateral declara-

7('a}-l:1in (‘ollisson also specifically denied breaches of contract
on the part ot theHovernment.

St'out't-rein'es were earried on without prejudice to the claims of
either pat tv in this respeet.

" Swretarv Krug and detetulant Lewis met privately on November
15) and again on November 11.


 759, 760, 781, 782' & 8H

t‘ion.” The President of the I'nited States announced
his strong support of the Government’s position and re—
quested reeonsideration by the union in order to avoid a
national erisis. Uoweven the defendant Lewis, as union
president. eireulated to the mine workers eopies of the
November 1.") letter to Seeretary Krug. This communi—
cation was for the “oflieial information” of union

The l'nited States on November 19 filed a complaint
in the Distriet (‘ourt for the Distriet of Columbia against
the l'nited Mine “Yorkers of .»\meriea and John L. Lewis.
individually and as president of the union. The suit was
brmlght under the Deelaratory Judgment Act ‘1 and
sought judgment to the effect that the defendants had no
power unilaterally to terminate the Krug-Lewis agree-
ment. And. alleging that the November 15 notiee was in
reality a strike notice. the l'nited States. pending the final
determination of the eause. requested a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief.

The eourt. immediately and without notiee t0 the de—
fendants. issued a temporary order ‘2 restraining the

1" Reeretary Krug had been advised by the Attorney General, whose
opinion had been sought, that § 15 of the 1945 agreement was no longer
in foree.

1‘ .lutlieial (Node, § QT-Id. 29 ll. 9. (l. § 400.

13 The pertinent part of the order was as follows:

“Now, Therefore, IT is BY THE Col'n'r this 18th day of November,

“(lam-11am. that the defendants and eaeh of them and their agents,
servants. employees and attorneys. and all persons in aetive eoneert
or partieipation with them. be and they are hereby restrained pending
further order of this (Hurt from permitting to eontinue in effeet the
notiee heretofore given by the defendant, John L. Lewis, to the Secre-
tary of lnterior dated November l5, lth'); and from issuing or other—
wise giving pnblieity to any notiee that or to the effeet that the Krug—
Len'is .r\greenient has been, is, or will at some future date he termi—
nated. or that said agreement is or shall at some future date he
nugatory or void at any time during lovernment possession of the
bituminous coal mines; and from breaching any of their obligations


 759, 760, 781, 782 & 811

defendants from continuing in effect the notice of Novem—
ber 15. from encouraging the mine workers to interfere
with the operation of the mines by strike or cessation of'
work. and from taking anyiaction which would interfere
with the court’s jurisdiction and its determination of the
case. The order by its terms was to expire at 3:00 p. m.
on November 27 unless extended for good cause shown. A-
hearing on the preliminary injunction was set for 10:00
a. m. on the same date. The order and complaint were
served on the defendants on November 18.

A gradual walkoutby the miners commenced on Novem—
ber 18. and. by midnight of November 20. consistent with
the miners’ “no contract. no work” policy, a full-blown
strike was in progress. Mines furnishing the major part
of the nation’s bituminous coal production were idle.

On November 131 the United States filed a petition for
a rule to show cause why the defendants should not be
punished as and for contempt, alleging a willful Violation

of the restraining order. The rule issued, setting Novem—

under said Krug—Lewis Agreement: and from coercing, instigating,

inducing, or encouraging the mine workers at the bituminous coal‘
mines in the Government's possession, or any of them, or any person, '
to interfere by strike, slow down, walkout, cessation of work, or other-v
wise, with the operation of said mines by continuing in effect the‘
aforesaid notice or by issuing any notice of termination of agreement"
or through any other means or device; and from interfering with or‘
obstructing the exercise by the Secretary of the Interior of his func—

tions under ICxecutiye (lrder 0728; and from takingr any action which

would interfere with this Court's jurisdiction or which would impair,

obstruct, or render fruitless, the determination of this case by the


“Axo rr Is rt'n'riiicn onniiiucn that this restraining order shall
expire at 3 o'clock p. m. on November 27111, 1040, unless before such
time, the order for good cause shown is extended, or unless the
defendants consent that it may be extended fora longer period;

“Axe rr Is rljn'rnign onomuu‘n that plaintiff's motion for preliminary
injunction be set down for hearing on November 27th, 1040, at 10:00.
O'clock a. m.” '


 759, 7110, 781

782 & 811

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 759, 760, 791, 782 & 811

Defendants’ first and prineipal eontention is that the
restrainin;r order and preliminary injunction were issued
in violation of the (‘1;1yto11 and Norris-MGunrdia Acts.
We have eon1e to a eontrary deeision.

It is true that (‘one‘t'ess deereed in ,3 20 of the Clayton
Aet that “no s11e11 restraining order or i11111netion shall
pt‘oltilzit‘ any person or persons . . . from reeonnnending,
advising: orpersuadingothers . . .” tostrike. 111?, 11y the
Aet itself this provision was made applieahle only to eases
“between an e111ployer and employees, or between
employers and employees. or hetween mnployees. or be—
tween persons employed and persons seeking e111ploy—
ment. ” “" For reasons whieh will he explained at
greater length in dismissing the applieahility of the Nor—
ris—lintl11ardin Aet. we eannot eonstrne the general term
“(*1111111;yet"' to inelude the 1'11i‘ed Ftates. where there is
no express referenee to the Ynited Hates and no evident
atlirnmtive grounds for believing“ that Congress intended

to withhold :111 otherwi—te availalile remedy from the Gov—
er11111ent. as well as, from a specified class of private

Moreover. it seems never to have been suggested that
the proseription on i11j1111“tions found in the ('htyton Act
is in any respeet 11roader than that in the Norris—
Lat tunrdia 1\et. Defendants do not s11ggetlifl or notifying any person of an intention to do any
of tlleaets heretot'ort s; eeified;

“(hi .\'_"t‘e<’-iltL" with ether persons to do or not to do any of the
acts heretofore speeitied; and


 759', 760, 781, 782 & 811

,S' 13 are in general terms and make no express exception
for the linited States. From these premises. defendants
argue that the restraining order and injunction were
forhidden hy the Act and were wrongfully issued.

Even if our examination of the Act stopped here, we
could hardly assent to this conclusion. There is an old
and well—known rule that statutes which in general terms

“til Advising, urging. or otherwise causing or inducing without

fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified. regardless of any such
undertaking or promise as is descrihed in section 3 of this Act.”

”Rice. 13‘ When used in this Act. and for the purposes of this Act-—

“(al A case shall he held to involve or to grow out of a lahor dispute
when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry,
trade. craft. or occupation: or have direct or indirect interests therein;
or who are employees of the same employer: or who are memhers of
the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees;
whether such dispute is (ll hetween one or more employers or associ-
ations of employers and one or more employees or associations of
employees: (’2) hetween one or more employers or associations of
employers and one or more employers or associations of employers;
or (Si hetween one or more employees or associations of employees
and one or more employees or associations of employees: or when the
case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a ‘lahor dispute’
(as hereinafter defined) of ‘persons participating or interested’ therein
(as hereinafter definedl.

“(hi A person or association shall he held to he a person partici-
pating or interested in a lahor dispute if relief is sought against him
or it, and if he or it is enojaged in the same industry, trade, craft. or
occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect
interest therein. or is a memher. oflieer, or agent of any association
composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in
such industry, trade. era ft, or occupation.

“(cl The term ‘lahor dispute' includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment. or concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing. maintaining, changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment. regardless of
whether or not the (lisputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee.

“tdl The term ‘eourt of the l'nit'ed States’ means any court of the
l'nited gtates whose jurisdiction has heen or may he conferred or
defined or limited hy Act of Congress, including the courts of the Dis—
trict of Columbia.” V


 759, 760, 781, 782 & 811


divest pre—existing rights or" privileges will not be applied
to the sovereign without express words to that effect.20 It
has been stated, in cases in which there were extraneous
and affirmative reasons for believing that the sovereign
should also be deemed subject to a, restrictive statute. that
this rule was a rule of construction only .21 Though that
may be true. the rule has been invoked successfully in cases
so closely similar to the present one,22 and the statement of
the rule in those cases has been so explicitf’” that we are
inclined to give it much weight here. Congress was not
ignorant of the rule which those cases reiterated; and,
with knowledge of that rule, Congress would not, in writ-
ing the Norris—LaGuardia Act. omit. to use “clear and spe—
cific [language] to that effect.” if it actually intended to
reach the Government in all cases.

But we need not place entire reliance in this exclusionary
rule. Section 2,“ which declared the public policy of the

L“Lew/1s: Trustee v. rafter] States. 0‘2 ll. S. (313, (322 (1875): (Tufted
States- v. I/ermn. 20 Wall. 231. 363 (INTDS); sec Guarantee Co. v. Title
Guaranty (o. 224 [7.9.151155 (1012).

L" (’Hr'ter/ States v. ('alitm‘n/a. ‘39? U. S. 175, 186 (1936); Green V.
CHI/er] Stalex. fl “7”” [137), 038‘ (18130).

33 ['nite/t Stalea \'. Stevenson. 215 l’. S. 100, 107 (1900): Fluted
States v. :1 Inez'iean Bell Telephone (o. 150 l'. q. 549. 553—755 (1895);
Du/tar Sari/tax Ban/r v. t'nited Slates. 1f)\Vall.2?7,21-}R,239 (1373).

1" “The most general words that can be devised (for example, any
person or persons, bodies politic or corporate) affect not him {the
sovereign] in the least, it they may tend to restrain or diminish any
of his rights or interests.” Dollar Savings Ban/r v. United States. 19
“Will. 2‘27, 239 (1873). “if such prohibition is intended to reach the
Government in the use of known rights and remedies, the language
must be elear and sneeifie to that effect.” United States v. Stevenson,
2131'.>‘.l‘.1t).l‘.)7 (15109).

In both these eases the question, as in the present ease, was whether
the l'nited States was divested of a certain remedy by a statute or a
rule of law wliieh, without express reference to the United States,
made that remedy generally unavailable.

'-’" “Sign 2. 1n the interpretation of this Act and in determining the
jurisdietion and authority of the courts of the United States, as such


 759, 760, 781, 782 & 811

l'nited States as a guide to the Act’s interpretation, car—
ries indications as to the scope of the Act. It predicates
the purpose of the Act on the contrast between the position
of the “individual unorganir'ed worker” and that of the
“owners of property” who have been permitted to “organ—
ixe in the corporate and other forms of ownership associa—
tion”, and on the consequent helplessness of the worker
“to exercise actual liberty of contract . . . and thereby to
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment.”
The purpose of the Act is said to be to contribute to the
worker’s “full freedom» of association. self—organization,
and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to
negotiate the ‘erms and conditions of his employment. and
that he shall be free from the interference, restraint. or CO—
ercion of employers of labor. or their agents, in the designa—
tion of such representatives . . . for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining. .” These considerations on their face,
obviously do not apply to the Government as an em—
ployer or to relations between the Government and its

jurisdiction and authority are herein defined and limited, the public
policy of the linited States is hereby declared as follows:

“Whereas under prevailing economic conditions. developed with the
aid of um'ernmental authority for owners of property to orflanize in
the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual
unorganized Worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty
of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain
acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though
he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows. it is necessary

that he have full freedom of association, s1ilf-oru‘anization, and desig—

nation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms
and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the
interl'iwence, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their
agents. in the designation of such representatives or in self—oreanixat’ion
or in other concertml activities for the purpose of collective bareaining
or other mutual aid or protection: therefore. the following definitions
of. and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts
of the United States are hereby enacted.”


 759, 760, 781, 782 & 811

If we examine SS 4 and 13. on which defendants rely,
we note that they do not purport to strip completely from
the federal courts all their pre—existing powers to issue in—
junctions. that they withdraw this power only in a speci—
fied type of case. and that this type is a case “involving or
grownup; out of any labor dispute.” Section 13. in the first
instance. declares a case to be of this type when it “in—
volves persons" or “involves, any conflicting or competing
interests" in a. labor dispute of “persons" who stand in any
one of several defined economic relationships. And “per—
sons" must- be involved on both sides of the "ase. or the
conflicting interests of “persons" on both sides of the dis—
pute. The Act does not define “persons". In common
usage that term does not include the sovereign. and stat—
utes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do
so.” Congress made express provision, R. S. s 1. 1
1'. S. C. § 1. for the term to extend to partnerships and cor—
porations. and in § 13 of the .\et itself f