xt7msb3wtd0h_39 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2.dao.xml unknown 166 Cubic Feet 381 document boxes, seven textile items, three map folders, one artwork archival material 72m2 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center.  Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Frederick Moore Vinson papers Economic stabilization. Elections -- United States -- Congresses. Judges -- Correspondence. Judges -- United States. Judicial opinions Judicial process -- United States Legislators -- Correspondence. New Deal, 1933-1939. World War, 1914-1918 -- Veterans. World War, 1939-1945. Lewis case (Chief Justice drafts) - United States vs. United Mine Workers - nos. 750-760, nos. 781-782, no. 811 text Lewis case (Chief Justice drafts) - United States vs. United Mine Workers - nos. 750-760, nos. 781-782, no. 811 2019 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2/Box_173/Folder_4/Multipage4781.pdf 1946 1946 1946 section false xt7msb3wtd0h_39 xt7msb3wtd0h SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 759, 760, 781, 782 AND Sllstc'rOBER TERM. 1946.

The United States of America,
750 1'.
United Mine \Yorliers of Ameriea. 2m
Unincorporutctl Association.

The United States of America.
760 7'.
John L Lewis. Individually and as
President of the United Aline Work—
ers of America.

United Mine Workers of America. an
T'ninettrporuted Association. Peti—

781 1*.

The United States: of Allli‘l‘iC‘t.

John l.. Lewis. Individually and as:
President of the United Mine Work—
ers of America. Petitioner,

752 7‘.

The United States of America.

United Aline “Yorkers of America. an
Uni!tem'tmrrtted .»\ssociution. a n d
John L. Lewis. Individually and its
President of the United Mine Work—
ers of Amerieu, l’ctitiom:'rs.

811 t'.

The United States: of America.

[February —, 1.947.]


On W'rits of Cer—
tiornri to the
United States
Court of A1)—
penls for the
District of C0-

THE CHIEF Jeane}; delivered the opinion of the Court.


 759, 760, 781, 782 it: 811

In October. 1946. the llnited States was in possession of
the major portion of the country’s bituminous coal mines1
Terms and conditions of employment were controlled “for
the period of Government possession” by an agreement 2
entered into on May 29, 1940‘, between Secretary of lnte—
rior Krug. as ("oal Mines Administrator. and John L.
Lewis. as President of the l'nited Aline Workers of Amer—
ica.“ The Krug—Lewis Agreement embodied far reaching

1 The United States had taken possession of the mines on May 21,
1940. pursuant to l‘Ixccutive Order 9728, 77 l“. ll. 55%, in which the
President, after determining that lahor distnrhances were interrupting
the production of bituminous coal necessary for the operation of the
national economy, directed the Secretary of Interior to take possession
of and operate the mines and to negotiate with re}u'esentatives of the
miners concerningr the terms and conditions of employment.

The Presidents action was taken under the (,‘onstitution, as Presi—
dent of the l'uited States and Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy, and hy virtue of the authority conferred upon him by the War
Lahor ltisputcs Act, :37 Stat. 1133-}, :30 l'. S. C. App. Supp. \', 300, 1501—
1:31]. Section I} of the Act authorizes the seizure of facilities necessary
for the war effort if and when the President linds atid proclaims that
strikes or other Iahor disturbances are interrupting the operation of
such facilities.

Section 3 directs that the authority tnider that section to take
possession of the specitied facilities will terminate with the ending
of hostilities and that the authority under that section to operate
facilities seized will terminate six ntontlis after the ending of hostilities.
The President on liecemher Ill, 1046, proclaimed that hostilities were
terminated on that day, 12 l“. 11. l.

'-' The initial paragraph of the contract provided that:

“This agreement hetween the Secretary of the Interior, acting as
Coal .\lines Administrator under the authority of Executive Order NO.
Ell—1N (dated .\lay ‘_’l, lit-lo, ll 1“. It. 5:303), and the United Aline
\Vtil'lit‘l's' of America, covers for the period of Government possession
the terms and conditions of employment in respect to all mines in
Government possession which were as of March Ill, 1940, stiltject t0
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, dated April 11,
19 1.7).”

5‘ In compliance with Executive Order No, 0728 and § 5 of the “lit‘
Lahor Disputes Act, the agreement had been submitted to and ap~
proved by the National Wage Stabilization Board.


 759/, 760, 781, 782 & 811

changes favorahle to the miners; " and. except as amended
and supplemented therein. the agreement carried forward
the terms and conditions of the National Bituminous Coal
“'age Agreement of April 11. 19-15.“

On Octoher 21. 104(7). Mr. Lewis directed a letter tO‘
Secretary Krug and presented issues which led directly to
the present controversy. According to Mr. Lewis. the
Krug—Lewis agreement carried forward .3 15 of the Na-
tional Bituminous Coal “age Agreement of April 11. 194.").
{Hider that section either party to the contract was priv—
ileged to give ten days’ notice in writing of a desire for a
negotiating conference which the other party was required
to attend: fifteen days after the lwginning of the eon-
ference either party might give notice in writing of the
termination of the agreement. effective five days after
receipt of such notice. Asserting authority under this
clause. Mr. Lewis in his letter of October 21 requested that

a conference hegin Novemher 1 for the purpose of negotiat—
ing new arrangements concerning wages. hours, prac—
tices. and other pertinent matters appertaining to the
bituminous coal industry.‘3

Captain N. ll, (‘ollisson. then Coal Mines Administra-
tor. answered for Secretary Krug. Any contractual basis
for requiring negotiations for revision of the Krug—Lewis

4 See [Mfr/I p. —.

5 The saving clause was in the following form:

“lixcept as amended and supplemented herein. this agreement
carries t'orward and preserves the terms and conditions contained in
all joint wage agreements eti'ective April 1, It’ll, through March 331,
1013, the supplemental agreement providing for the six (ti) day
worluveel“. and all the various district agreements executed hetweeu
the limited Aline \\'orkers and the various (‘oal Associations and Coal
('ompanies tltased upon the al'oresaid ltasic agreement t as they existed
on March 53], ltttf}. and the National Bituminous Coal \Vage Agree-
ment. dated April ll, HHS.”

‘5 The letter also charged certain ltreaches of contract h_v the Govern—
ment and asserted significant changes in Government wage policy.


 759, 760‘, 781, 782 & 811

agreement was denied.“ In the opinion of the Govern—
ment. § 1.3 of the 1941.") agreement had not been preserved
by the Krug—l.ewis agreement; indeed. § 1.3 had been ex—
pressly nullified by the clause of the latter contract pro—
viding that the terms contained therein were to cover the
period of Government possession. Although suggesting
that any negotiations looking toward a new agreement be
carried on with the coal mine owners, the Government
expressed willingness to discuss matters affecting the
operation of the mines under the terms of the Krug-Lewis

Conferences were scheduled and began in “'ashington
on November 1. both the union and the Government ad—
hering to their opposing views regarding the right of either
party to terminate the contract." At the fifth meeting
held on November 11. the union for the first time ot't'ered
specific proposals: for changes in wages and other conditions
of tanplovment. On November 3 Secretary Krug re—
quested the union to negotiate with the mine owners.
This suggestion was, rejected.” On November 15 the
union, by .lolm L. Lewis. notified Secretary Krug that
“l’it'teen days having now elapsed since the beginning of
said eont'erente the lfnited Mine Workers of America,
exercising its option hereby terminates said Krug—Lewis
Agreement as of 12:00 o‘clock P. 31., Midnight,
“vednesdav. November 20. 1046.”

Secretary Krug again notified Mr. Lewis that he had no
power under the King—Lewis agreement or under the
law to terminate the contract by unilateral declara—

7(‘aptain (‘ollisson also specifically denied breaches of contract and
changes in t loverunu-ul wage policy.

”(V'olllierenees were earried on without prejudice to the claims: of
either part)" in this respect.

"Seeretary King and Mr. Lewis met privately on November 13
and again on November ll.


 7'59, 760, 781, 782 & 811
U. s. 1:. t'XiTED MINE WORKERS. 5

tion.” The President of the T'nited States stated his
strong support of the Government‘s position and requested
reeonsideration hy the union in order to avoid a national
erisis. llowever. Lewis. as union president. eireulated t0
the mine workers eopies of the November 15 letter to
Seeretary Krug. This eonnnuni *ation was for the
“ot’lieial information" of union inemhers.

The linited States on Novemher l8 filed suit in the Dis—
triet (‘ourt for the Distriet of (‘olumhia against the lYnited
Mine \Vorkers of .\meriea and John L. Lewis. individually
and as president of the union. The eomplaint was hrought
under the Deelaratory Judgment Aet ” and sought a judg—
‘inent to the et't'eet that the defendants had no power uni—
laterally to terminate the Krug—Iewis agreement. And.
allegingr that the November 1.") notiee vas in reality a strike
notiee. the l'nited States. pending" the final determination
of the eause. requested a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunet ive relief.

The eourt. immediately and without notice to the de—
fendants. issued a temporary order ‘3 restraining the

1" Set-retary lira: had heen advised hy the .‘tttorney General. whose
opinion had heen sought, that § 1.3 of the 1045 agreement was no longer
in litll't‘t‘.

1‘ .liidit'ial (lode. § QTld. 3 l7. 5‘. C. 400.

l: The pert ineut part ol' the order was as t'ollows:

“Now, Therefore. it, is ‘w the Court this 15th day of November,

“Urdered. that the defendants and eaeh ot' them and their agents,
servants. employees. and attorneys. and all persons in aetive eoneert
or partieipation with them. he and they are herehy restrained pending
further order of this (‘ourt t'rom permitting: to eontinue in ell‘eet the
notit-e heretol'ore Q‘th‘I] hy the defendant. .lohn ll. Lewis, to the Set-re—
tarv of Interior dated Novemher 13. lttstti: and from issuing or other-
wise a’ivinz puhlieity to any notiee that or to the el't'eet. that the Krug-
Jiewis Agreement has heeti. is. or will at some future date he termi-
nated. or that said agreement is or shall at some future date he
nuaatory or void at any time during Government possession of the
hittuuinous eoal mines; and hem breaching any ot' their obligations


 759, 760, 781, 782 & 811

defendants from continuing in effect the notice of Noyem—
ber 1.3, from encouraging the mine workers to interfere
with the operation of the mines by strike or cessation of
work. and from taking any action which would interfere
with the courts jurisdiction and its determination of the
case. The order by its terms was to expire at 3:00 p. m.
on November 27 unless extended for good cause shown. A
hearing on the preliminary injunction was set for 10:00
a. in. on the same date. The order and complaint were
served on the defendants on November 18.

A gradual walkout by the miners commenced on Novem—
ber 18. and by midnight of Noyembe ' 20. consistent with
the miners' “no contract. no work” policy. a full-blown
strike was in progress. Mines furnishing the major part
of the nation’s bituminous coal production were idle.

On November 21 the l'nited States filed a petition for
a rule to show cause why the defendants should not be
punished as and for contempt. alleging a willful yiolation
of the restraining order. The rule issued, setting Novem—

tiiider said lirug—ltewis Agreement; and from coercing, instigatiing,
indueing, or eneouraging the mine workers at the bituminous coal
mines in the (jtwerninent's posst ssion, or any of tlieiti, or any person,
to interfere by strike, slow down. walkout, cessation of work, or other—
wise, with the operation of said mines by continuing in effect the
aforesaid notice or by issuing any notiee of termination of agreement
or through any other means or deyiee; and from interfering with or '
obstrueting the exercise by the Secretary of the lnterior of his func-
tions under leeeutiye Order 0725; and from taking any aetion which
would interfere with this (‘ourt's jurisdietion or which would impair,
obstruet, or render fruitless, the determination of this case by the

“And it is further ordered that this restraining order shall expire
at f} o‘eloek p. m. on Noyember 37th, 1040, unless before such time
the order for good eause shown is extended, or unless the defendants
consent that it may be extended fora longer period;

"And it is further ordered that plaintiff's motion for preliminary
injunetion be set down for hearing on November 27th, 1040, at 10:00
o'eloel; a. m.”


 759, 760, 781, 782 & 811

ber ‘23 as the return day and. if at that time the contempt;
was not sufficiently purged. setting November 27 as the
day for trial on the contempt charge.

On the return day. defendants, by counsel. informed
the court that no action had been taken concerning" the
November 15 notice and denied the jurisdiction of the
court to issue the restraining order and rule to show cause.
Trial on the contempt charge was thereupon ordered to
begin as scheduled on November 27. On November 36
the defendants filed a motion to discharge and vacate the
rule to show cause. Their motion challenged the juris—
diction of the court and raised the grave. question of
whether the Norris—Lat}uardia Act 1” prohibited the grant-
ing of the temporary restraining order at the instance of
the l'nited States.”

“‘ ~17 Stat. 70. 20 I'. '3. C §§ lOl—lla').

1“ The grounds otl'cred tor the motion were:

”l. The 'l‘emporary ltestrainin;r Order is void in that this case in-
volves and grows out ot' a labor dispute. linder the provisions of the
Norris—lathnii'llia Act (47 Stat. Tttt. and the provisions of gection ‘30
ot' the (‘layton Act (35 ti. 9. (l. 3'15}. 7530), this llonorablc Court is
without jurisdiction wer the subiect—matter of this cause.

“‘1. litmity acts only where there is no plain, adequate, and complete
remedy at law. The allegations of the l’etition tor the lule purport to
show a violation of the War Labor litisputes Actfia serious offense——
in which tield there is no place for equity intervention.

“5:. (tbservancc of all the strict rules of criminal procedure is re-
quired to establish criminal contempt. it is apparent that the alleged
facts set out in the unveritied l’ctition and in the allidavit’ of (“aptain
(‘ollissoir tiled in support of the ltule, are based wholly upon hearsay,
int‘ormation and beliet‘ and are not sutlicient to sustain the lule to
Show Pause.

“t The object of the Petition for the llule is necessarily punitive
and not compcnsatory. Accordingly, it. beingr for criminal contempt,
the l‘etition should have been presented as an independent proceeding
and not as supplemental to the original cause.

“3. The 'l‘emporary Restraining Order is beyond the jurisdiction of
this llonorable ('ourt and thercl'ore void because it contravenes the
First. l’it'th. and 'l‘hirteenth Amendmti'nts to the Constitution of the
United States.”


 & 811

After extending the temporary restraining order 011
November ‘27. and after full argument on November 27
and November 20. the court on the latter date overruled
the motion and held that its power to issue the restraining
order in this case was not affected by either the Norris—
Lat luardia .\ct or the ( ‘layton Act.”

The defemlants thereupon pleaded not guilty and
waived an advisory jury. Trial on the contempt charge
procemled. The Government presented eight witnesses,
the defendants none. At, the conclusion of the trial on
December 3. the court found that the defendants had per—
mitted the November 15 notice to remain outstanding,
had encouraged the miners to interfere by a strike with
the operation of the mines and with the performance of
governmental functions. and had interfered with the juris—
diction of the (‘ourt. Both defendants were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of both criminal and civil con-
tempt dating from November 18. The Court entered
judgment on December 4. fining the defendant Lewis
$10,000. and the defendant union $3,500,000. On the
same day a preliminary injunctio'ivi. effective until a. final
determination of the case. was issued in terms similar to
those of the restraining order.

On December 5 the defendants filed notices of appeal
from the judgments of contempt. The judgments were
stayed pending the appeals. The United States on De-
cember 0 filed a petition for certiorari in both cases.
Section ‘2 ‘0 (e) of the Judicial (,‘ode authorizes a petition
for certiorari by any party and the granting of certiorari
prior to judgment in the Circuit (‘onrt of Appeals.
l’rompt settlement of this case being in the public interest,
we granted certiorari on December 0. and subsequently
for similar reasons granted petitions for eertiorari filed
by the det'andants. _ IV. S. g, ~, »—~. The cases were
consolidated for argument.

1'7 Lib Stat . 755$, 25) L7. 5. C. § :32.


 )0, 781. T 2 & 811

Defendants’ first and primipal contention is that the
restrainingr order and preliminary injunction were issued
in violation of the ('layton and Nt)rris—LaGuardia Acts.
\Ve have come to a contrary decision.

it is true that Congress decreed in ,3 20 of the Clayton
Act that “no such restraining order or injunction shall
prohibit any person or persons . . . from recommending,
advising. or persuading others" to strike. But liy the Act
itself this provision was made applicable only to cases
“between an employer and employees. or between
employers and employees. or l>etween employees. or be—
tween persons employed and persons seeking employ—
ment. " "‘ For reasons which will l)(‘ explained at
greater length in discussing the applicability of the Nor—
ris-liatluardia Act. we cannot construe the general term
“employer" to include the ['nited States. where there is
no express reference to the l'nited States and no evident
atiirmative grounds tor believing" that Congress intended
to withhold an otherwise available remedy from the Gov—
ernment as well as from a specified class of private
persons. '

Moreover, it seems never to have been suggested that
the pmseription on injunctions found in the Clayton Act
is in any respect liroader than that in the Norris-
I.a( lnardia Act. l’)et'endants do not sugge tin their argu—
ment that it is. This Court, on the contrary. has stated
that the Norris—Lathtardia Aet “still further . . . [nar—
rowed] the eiremnstam-es under which the federal courts
could grant injunctions in l21l)t)l' disputes." ‘7 Conse—
quently. we would feel justified in this case to consider the
application of the Nm'ris-lizdluardia Act alone. If it does

not apply, neither does the less comprehensive proscription

‘" l)/:/J/( .I' (no. \’. Dr‘urimI. 27d l'. R. 443, 470 (ltlfl ); American
Foam/rt} x \, y/h’V-‘(l/ll‘t/(VIN/7’1"]...‘c-H—lviiq. 154, 2113 t 1031).
‘7 Cit/{t // Slides: v. [ll/[(Z/lt'oftul; 31'.’ U. S 210, L331 HUM) .


 7.39, 760, 781, 782 a 811
10 U. s. tut'xrrno MINE WORKERS.

of the (‘layton .\ct: “ if it does, defendants reliance on the
Clayton .\ct is unnecessary.

By the Norris—Lat'xuardia Act, Congress divested the
federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in a
specified class of *ascs. lt would probably be conceded
that the characteristics of the present case would be such
as to bring it within that class if the basic dispute
had remained one between defendants and a priyate
employer. and the latter had been the plaintiff below. So
much seems to be found in the express terms of §§ l and 13
of the Act. set out in the margin.” The spccifi *ations in

1‘ See also I'M/[er] States y. [It/[eltcst'nt. swim. 312 If. 3' at 235, 2536
(lllsll l ; le/‘It Broil/("II ('o.\'. (VII/'(lI/Jifls [15,797, SUB (1945)).

- ““‘h‘iel. Xo court of the l'nited States shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in
any ease involying or growing otit ol any labor dispute to prohibit:
any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as
these terms are herein detinedt from doing, whether singly or in
eoneet t, any ot' the following arts:

“tat ('easing or ret'using to perform any work or to remain in any
relation ot’ employment:

“tbt lleeoming or remaining a member of any labor organization
or ol‘ any employer organization, regardless ot‘ any such undertaking
or promise as is described in seetion 2‘; oi'this .\ct;

“tel l’aying or giving to, or withholding t'rom. any person partici—
pating or illte'es‘tetl in sueh labor dispute, any strike or unemploy—
ment beneliis or insurance. or other moneys or things ol‘ Value;

"tdt liy all lawt'nl means aiding any person participating or inter—
ested in any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is
prosecuting, any aetion or suit in any court of the United States or
(dairy State;

“(e1 (Living publieity to the existence of, or the facts inyolyed in,
any labor dispute. whether by advertising. speaking, patrolling, or
by any other method not involving l'raud or Violence;

"'I l) ,\ss‘emltling peaceably to aei or to organize to act in promotion
ol' their interests in a labor dispute;

“tgt _\d\'ising or notii’ying any perSon ol an intention to do any
til“ the acts llet'etol'ore specified;

"(lit Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the
acts ltt'i‘etol'ot‘e specified; and

“tit Adyising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without


 759, 760, 781, 782 & 811

,3 13 are in general terms :nnl rue-lie no express exception
for the l'niteil Stutes. From these premises. (let'enilnuts
argue that the restraining 0"«ler nutl injunction were
forhirlrlen hy the i\('t :llltl were wrongfully issueil.

liven if our examination of the Aet stoppeil here. we
eouhl hzirilly assent to this eonelusion. rl‘here is an old
fliltl well known rule thut statutes which in general terms

(liyest pie—existing rights or priyileges will not h\ applied

fl‘rltltl or \‘iolenee the nets heretofore speeiliml, reu‘urilless of any such

unllertnlcinu or promise :is is ileserioeil in seetion 53 of this Aet."

“Start 13"). \Vlien iiseil in this .\et, :llitl l'or the purposes of this Aet

“(:ii _\ ense shall he hell to involve or to Grow out of :i hihor ilispute
when the (‘ngi' inyolyes persons who :n'e enu‘ngetl in the suine innlustry,
t‘rmle, emit. or oeeupution: or l1:i\'e tlireet or inilireet interests therein;
or who we employees ol‘ the s2nne employer; or who are memhers of
the Stlliit‘ or :lli :tillll.‘tl(‘ll organization oi employers or employees;
whether sneh ilispute is ill hetween one or more employers or :issoei—
:it'ions of employers :tlill one or more employees or :issoei:itioiis of
employees: (2) lietween one or more employers or :issoeiutions of
employers tllltl one or more employers or :issoeiutions of employers;
or (3;) hetween one or more employees or ussoeintions of employees
”till one or more employees or :issoeiniions of employees: or when the
ense ili\‘ol\'es :iny eonllieting or ('iitiilietiilu‘ interests in :1 ‘lnhor ilispute’
(as hereinni'ter (it lilielli of ‘persons, pnrtieiputing or interested' therein
(:is hereinnl'ter ilefineill.

"(ht A person or :issoeintion slmll he lielll to he a person partici-
putinu' or interesteil in :i luhor tlispiiie it' reliel‘ is sought ugninst hint
or it. :Illll if he or it is enmiu'eil in the some inilustry. il‘tltlt‘.(‘1‘:lii,01‘
(ieetipntiiill in whieh sueh tlispute oeeurs, or hus .‘l xlireet or innlirect
interest therein. or is :i memher, oilieer. er :th‘Ili of any :issor'iution
('llllilith't'tl in whole or in part ol' employers or employees engaged in
sueh industry. li‘:nle, ei':it't,or oeeupzition.

“tel The term 'lzihor illsiitllt" inelu 173, lt\ti t lftiltit.

2:1)HHHW Surf/tux l'lt/irl' \‘. ('m’m/ Sit/It‘s. ll) \Vztll. 227
t1\7.‘lt : {'nt'tu/ Mutts \'. diner/cult Bel/ Telephone ("on 15‘.)

Elk—3.37) that-3}; (Ti/[ted States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S.
(loom. .

'-‘-""'l‘he most general words that can l)t' devised tl'or example. any
person or permits. ltodies politie or corporatet at't'eet not him [the
sovereiunl in the least. it' the_v may tend to restrain or diminish any
ot' his rights or interests." Dot/Hr Sue/nus Hun/c \'. (VIP-NT] s‘tum. l9
\\'all. ‘_"_’T. “Jill! t 1‘53). “11" such [tI'tlilll)lil()Il is intended to reach the
t'iovernmt-nt in the use ot' known rights and remedies. the language
must lie elear and specific to that et'I'eet.” (fluted States \‘. Stevenson,
217i 115'. 1911.197 tlSttSt.

In lioth these eases the question. as in the present case, was whether
the l'nited States \\':1~'di\'e,iltllll‘i be tree to deoline to assoeiate witl his: l'ellmvs. it is Iieeessai'y
that he ha\‘e t'till t'reedom ot' assoeiation, sell—organization. and desig-
nation ot' reprtsentativa-s of his own elioosinu‘. to negotiate the terms
and eonditions ot' hEs employment. and that he shall be tree from the
interierente rrstraitit, or eoereion of employers ol' labor, or their
agents. in the designation ot’ sueh re]iresentatives or in seltloraanixation
or in other eoneerted :IetiVitil-s tor the purpose ot' eolleetive bargaining;
or tithe-1' mutual aid or proteetion: therefore. the t‘ollotvint: detinit‘ions:
ol'~ and limitations upon. the iurisdietiou and authority of the courts
ol' the l‘nited States are hereby enaett'd.”


 759, 760, 781, 732 a 811
14 _U. s. v. UNITED MINE wonKEits.

If we examine §§ 4 and 13. on which defendants rely,
we note that they do not purport to strip completely from
the federal courts all their preexisting powers to issue in-
junctions. that they withdraw this power only in a speci—
fied type of case. and that this, type is a case “involving or
growing out of any labor dispute.” Section 13 in the first
instance declares a case to he of this type when it “involves
persons” or “involves any conflicting or competing inter—
ests" in a labor dispute of “persons” who stand in any one
of several defined econtnnie relationships. And “persons”
must he involved on both sides of the ease or the conflict—
ing interests of “persons" on both sides of the dispute.
The Act does not define “persons”. In common usage that
term does not, include the sovereign, and statutes em—
ploying it will ordinarily not be construed to do so.”-
Congress made express provision in 1 l'. S. C‘. 1 for the
term to extend to partnerships and corporations. and
in § 13 of the Act itself for it to extend to associations.
The ahsenee of any comparable provision extending the
term to sovereign governments implies that Congress did
not desire the term to extend to them.

Those clauses in § 13 ta) and (b) spelling out the posi—
tion of “persons" relative to the em})loyer—emplovee rela—
tionship affirmatively suggest that the l'nited States. as
an employer. was not meant to be included. Those
clauses require that the case involve persons “who are
engaged in the same industry, trade, craft or occupation”,
who “have direct or indirect interests therein". who are
“employees of the same employer". who are “members of
the same or an affiliated organization of employers or em-
ployees". or who stand in some one of other specified posi—
tions relative to a dispute over the employer-employee
relationship. leery one of these qualificationsin § 13 (a)
and (b) we think relates to an economic role ordinarily
filled by a private individual or corporation, and not by a

37‘ I'll/ted Slit/m" \‘. Foopr 7‘ For/1.. 5'11'.’ L'. S. 1300, 004 tlle ); United
States v. For. 04 L'. s. 31.3, :321 (1570).


 759, 760. 781, 782 d“ 811
U S. i'. I'Nl'i‘lCD MINE WORKERS. 5

sovereign governmei’it. None of them is at all suggestive
of any part played l)_\,' the l'nited States in its relations
with its own employees. \Ye think that Congress failure
to refer to the l'uited States or to speeit‘y any role whieh
it might eommonly he thought to fill is s