xt7msb3wtd0h_40 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2.dao.xml unknown 166 Cubic Feet 381 document boxes, seven textile items, three map folders, one artwork archival material 72m2 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center.  Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Frederick Moore Vinson papers Economic stabilization. Elections -- United States -- Congresses. Judges -- Correspondence. Judges -- United States. Judicial opinions Judicial process -- United States Legislators -- Correspondence. New Deal, 1933-1939. World War, 1914-1918 -- Veterans. World War, 1939-1945. Lewis case (dissents and concurring) - United States vs. United Mine Workers - nos. 750-760, nos. 781-782, no. 811 text Lewis case (dissents and concurring) - United States vs. United Mine Workers - nos. 750-760, nos. 781-782, no. 811 2019 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2/Box_173/Folder_5_6/Multipage4980.pdf 1946 1946 1946 section false xt7msb3wtd0h_40 xt7msb3wtd0h Supreme Court of the United States.

Mam orandum.



Nos. 759, etc. -— October Term, 1946.

PER CURIAM: These writs of certiorari bring issues before
this Court that are of importance. These arise in a. suit filed by the
United States in the District Court for the District of Columbia against
the United Mine workers of America and John L. Lewis, individually and
as President of the Union. At the time the action was instituted, the
United States was in possession of a large part of the nationfls bituminous
coal mines. The mines had been taken over by the President on May 21,
1946, by Executive Order under the authority of the Constitution, as
President of the United States and Commander-in—Chief of the Army and

Navy, as well as by the authority conferred upon him by the mar Labor

. Disputes Act. So far as conditions of employment of labor were concerned,


the operations were based upon an agreement entered into May 29, 1946,
between the Secretary of the Interior, as Coal Mines Administrator, and
John L. Lewis, as President of the United Mine Workers of America.
Differences over the meaning of the contract having arisen and the Mine
workers having served notice on the Coal Mines Administrator of a ter-
mination of the aforementioned agreement as of 12 o'clock midnight,
Wednesday, November 20, 1946, the Government filed this suit under the
declaratory judgment act for a decree that the defendants, the Mine workers,
and their President had no power by their sole action to terminate the
agreement. A temporary restraining order was sought and granted by the
District Court on November 18, 1946, that enjoined these defendants "from
permitting to continue in effect the notice" for termination of the
agreement. ‘

On an allegation that the defendants had violated the restraining
order, a rule to show cause why the defendants should not be punished for
contempt was sought by the United States and granted by the court on

November 21, 1946. The court found the defendants guilty of contempt on








 _ 2 _

December 4, 1946, and punished Mr. Lewis with a fine of $10,000 and

the Mine Workers with a fine of $3,5oo;ooo. The court issued a ten--
porary injunction in substantially the form of the restraining order.
The ultimate question before us on these writs is the validity of the
imposition of these fines for the violation of the restraining order.

To reach a conclusion it has been necessary for this Court to
consider the application of the Norris-LaGuardia Actzand the war Labor
Disputes Act to this situation. Questions are here as to the constitue
.tionality of the imposition of punishment for criminal contempt without
an indictment and without a trial by jury. we have been asked to say
whether the fines imposed were excessive under the Eighth Amendment to
the Constitution. If all of theSe problems are resolved in favor of the
Government, this Court must determine whether the discretion of the trial
court was wisely exercised as to the amount of and the method by which
these fines were imposed. It must further adjudge whether it has the
power to remold the judgments entered below and if it deterndnes that
it is authorized to do SO, what form should be given here to the decree.

The Court finds it is unable to adopt by a majority vote an
opinion which discusses and decides the necessary issues for the deter—
mination of these cases. Opinions by different Justices stating their
views on what seem to them the important issues of the cases have been
prepared for filing with the Clerk. Those opinions discuss in detail
the facts and the rules of law which are involved in the judgment to be
entered. It is sufficient here to state the following conclusions.

Eirgt. A majority of the Court is of the opinion that the
Clayton Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the war Labor Disputes Act
do not apply to the declaratory relief sought in these proceedings.

Second. A majority agrees that a decree may be entered by


this Court that modifies or reforms the judgments entered by the trial





 _ 3 _

Ehigd. A majority agree that the judgments assessing fines
against John L. Lewis and the United Mine workers should be modified.
They further agree that the modification should provide substantially
as follors:

A fine of $10,000 against John L. Lewis and a fine of $1,000,000
against the defendant Union payable separately unless they respectivelyA
purge themselves of their contumacy within a reasonable time. The de-
fendants are given five days after the issuance of the mandate herein to
show to the District Court that they have fully and unequivocally complied
with the temporary restraining order issued November 18, 1946, and the
preliminary injunction issued December 4, 1946. The defendants can effect
full compliance by nithdrawing unconditionally the notice given, signed
John L. Lewis, President, on November 15, 1946, to J. A. Krug, Secretary
of the Interior, terminating the Krug—Lewis agreement as of twelve o'clOck
midnight, wednesday, November 20, 1946, and by notifying, at the same
time, its members of suCh withdrawal in substantially the same manner as
the members of the defendant Union were notified of the notice to the
Secretary of the Interior above—mentioned; and by withdrawing and simi-
larly instructing the members of the defendant Union of the withdrawal
of any other notice that may have been given to the effect that the Krug-
Leuis agreement is not in full force and effect until the‘final determina-
tion in the suit pending in the District Court of the basic issues arising
under the said agreement.

The mandate herein shall issue on anday, March 19, 1947.




Nos. 73!), 700, 781, 782 AND 811.70C’1‘0BER TERM, 1946..

The I'niteti thiteS of America,
73‘.) 1‘.
Liniterl Mine Workers of America. an
I'niiieorporntetl Association.

The, United States of Ameriea,
760 7'.
John L. ‘Tiewis. Intlivitlnuiiy :1an {is
President of the t'niteil Mine \Vork—
ers of America.

[inner] Mine Workerfi of Amerien. :11) OH.“ ”A": ”if (“m-i
Pninetn'liorzlterl ASsoci-Lition, Peti- “.0171” to the
tioner 1, mtetl Mates

751 i 7.. Court of A1)-
' penis for the

Distriet of (70-


The I'nitetl States of Ameriez.

John L. Lewis. ilnlix'ithntiiy :1an :19
President of the [initetl Aline \York—
ers of Amerien. Petitioner.

7.82 2‘.

The t'nitetl States of Ameriea.

I'niterl Aline Workers of Amerien. an
l‘nineorporntetl Assoeintion. and
John L. Lewis. Indivirlnnih' and as
Presitlent ot' the [initetl Mine Work-
ers of Amerieu. Petitioners,

811 1'.

J‘he I'nitetl States of Aineriez.




Mn. .It'S'l‘lt‘IC Ilium. reversing in part illlti affirming in

For the remons stated in the opinion of Tim (‘IHEF
JL'SI'iCL‘, I agree that the (‘luyton Aet. the Norris—Lu—


 730. tc't‘t'.~~rREVERSING IN PART
2 l'. S. 1‘. l'Nl'l‘lCI) MINE \\'(,)RI{I:IRS.

Cuarrlia .\et and the War Lahor Disputes Act do not:
applv to the final relief of injunction sought in these pro—
eeetlings. It follows from that position that the restrain—
ing ot'rlt‘l‘ to preserve the eontraetual relations of the
l'nitett States aml the l‘nitetl Mine \Vorkers of America.
pentling a determination of the Mine Workers assertetl
right to terminate the Contract, is a valitl restraining

()ur nation‘s experienee has proven that a people may
relv upon the ortlerlv proeesses of governmei'it to redress
the malatljustments or wrongs that (levelop in a society
ol'tlainetl ant] eontluetetl to give the greatest opportunity
and the most satist'aetorv life to the greatest number. An
important element in those ortlerlv processes is the jutli-
('ial system. It aets to atljust eontlieting interests. It
ean only so aet when allowed to maintain an existing situ—
ation until final judgment is rentleretl. This was the
purpose of the restraining order. The, violation of that
ortler ealls for punishment to vindicate the authority of

eourts to t'unetion in preserving ortler and atljtttlieating
rlit't'erenees. ;\ punishment for contempt imposetl by a
eourt is unusual lteeause it is rare that our eitixens tlisrC—
gartl the aeeeptetl jutlieial solutions for internal contro—
versies. When jutlieial orrlt-rs are (lisregartletl. the power

to punish t'or eontempt must he reeognizetl to preserve
the imlepentltatee ot' the eourts antl to enahle them to
operate for the puhlie welfare. There is no (louht that
Mr. Lewis and the l'nion tlisoheyetl the restraining

Neither is there any tlt)lll)l in mv miinl that the tlistrict
eourt punishetl l'or both a eivil and a eriminal Contempt».
These ortlet‘s so show. They tintl lmth as to Mr. Lewis
aml the Mine Workers that eaeh has (‘Ulllllllllt‘tl a erim-
inal eontempt mat a eivil eontempt lievontl a reasonahle
«louht. l>istinetions hetween a eontempt whieh is eivil
am] a eontempt whieh is eriminal are narrow. It is easy
to say that the eriminal eontempt order is punitive, that


 7.30. i-:‘rC.~——l-ll?\'liltf\'lNU IN PART
l'. S. r. l'NlTlil) MINE WORKERS. 3

it is ontorcd to \‘indioato tho authority of tho court: that
a civil contompt is romodial and for tho honofit of tho com-
plainant. Actually tho two aro intorminglod. Whon
punishmont is inflictod for a civil contonmt‘. it has a o0—
orciyo otl'oct' upon tho oontomnor. \Vhon it is inflictod
for a criminal contonmt‘. it otton has a romodial ot‘t'ootr
upon tho roliof sought hy tho conmlainant.‘ “'horo the
oontonmt continuos. tho oontomnor knows ho is liable to
furthor punishmout. Tho (litlicultios of distinction are
mauniliod in tho prosont casos hocauso tho l'nitod Statos
is hoth tho conml. inant For ultimato oiyil rcliof hy injunc—
tion and tho actor in l>ringing tho contompt charg'os.

To this proooodina'. howoyor. it sooms quito cloar to me
that tho linos inmosod aro prodominantly to Vindi‘ate
tho authority of tho court to maintain tho oxisting' rola—
tionships hotwcon tho l'nitod Statos and tho dot‘oudants
holow duringr tho court‘s considoratiou of tho (Toyoru—
months potit ion for roliot'f' It was said by counsol for the
(loyot‘mnollt at tho hoaring' on tho rulo to show causo that
tho roiostion of any contompt hy thoso dotondants in the
futuro might ho dolayod until tho court could oonsidor
what. it" any. lurthor action would ho appropriato. The
rulo issuod hy tho trial court roouiros tho dofondants to
show “why thoy should not ho punishod as and for a
contomot of this court." Tho potition for tho rulo is
couchod in languago that sooms to charg'o a willful dis-
ohodionco of tho rostraining ordor rathor than a complaint

for damagos or a roquost for romodial action.” When we

‘(ion/m m- \'. [Ir/oil's- Slow .Q‘ Hunt/o ("on 221 ll. 5'. “R, 441—417;; El‘
[Mir/r (frown/«111.3137 l'.fi\'u\7. Ill.

3 Soo I'M/t «/ SIM/m- \, (y'tr/I/IHH/l. 'JTT If, S 225': Alf/olnn'lxon \'. Tilt/[ct]
NIH/m :_r /‘- /, Howl/«4 /'_ goo ll. S, [2: /:'il' [HF/4‘ (y'l'oxxrnroL 21'“— 11 h“ (57;
(It’ll/‘IIW‘N \'. lit/(HTS SIM/‘1‘ d" ll’ll/Itt't' (VHU _l_)l ll. S. -ll\‘

9' \Vr' said in [in/loo ill/Io/ ('o, \. ll‘i/Nolt. '37th l" S, 107. lllli

"Whoro :t lino i< imnowd tardy 3‘ comlu-nsation to tho oonmlainanti
and partly :t< punishmont‘ tho criminal i'oaturo of tho ordor isdominant
and tixo> its charactcr t'or purnosos ot' royiow.”


 7.3!), iti‘ttw—RFYICRSlNC} IN PART
4 If. S. "r. l.fl\'l'l‘l§l,) MINE WORKERS.

look at the evidence for the Government. we find little
to indicate the Government was um,h,~rtaltt; (loll/[It /‘.s V. (I/ii‘hr/Stvlles,32153 L15,
tit”. tilt}.

This :tt‘t'ti]‘ti~ with the historieal dex'eiopment ot' trial for eontenipt.
ISL-n. sit: tSmI. tsT; Hex: Sen, § 7

33; Ito Stat. llt'fi}; .hidieiai (,‘ode

”St't’ [iii/Non \', [IN/TH] Std/1N. 2.)“) 1.3ti 21:). :31"), "11‘: [211' [)I'II‘TU
Item/h 11/. 7 Walt. lititi, 37'): /:'_r [INF/1' VIV/i’tiugtlwlsl. ,1 Pet, ltt\: [Jesse/It V.
I", II, (Urn/j» // t'o, itapaiie. ('olllelnpt‘ §§ [-1], 17M, 1.7]; 43} ('oi. L.
lit-\g, (‘ontempt or ln‘innenunsy Tsti, .\'_’ti.


6 U. S. '2'. l'Nl'l‘l-ID MINE \YORKPZRS.

tion the tat-t that the issue as to the interpretation of the
limo—Lewis eontraet has not been determined. The
notiee to .\lr. Krug ot' the termination of the contract has
not heen withdrawn. The opinions in this e: se show that
the prohlem ot‘ the power of the distriet eourt to enter a
restraining order required elose reasoning. See l:'.r [it/rte
Young, 2t)” l'. S. 122%. 142. 1423. a deeision handed down
after I'M/Ml Nit/les- \‘_ Slop/i. 203 1'. S. 303. ' The defend—
ants lielow aeted upon the adviee ot' eounsel. .-\ few acted
as authorized representatit'es of Mine Workers. with its
hundreds of thousands of ttnion members. These mem—
bers followed their ttnion leadership with confidence.
That. leadership had proved itself eapahle and ettieient-
o\’er the years in handling: the responsibilities of leader- p
ship. ts position on the t-ontraet and upon th ‘, appliea—
ltility ot' the .\'orris—l.a(tuardia and the War lahor Acts
was not eapt ions or without reasonable basis. All of these
tat-tors have weight in determiningr the proper amount of
line to i)(‘ imposed heeause of the violation of the
restraining: order.

We have some analogies as to the attitude of (longress
on the proper punishment for willful disohedienee of law-
l'ul orders of eourts ot' the l'nited States. In the (‘layton
Aet. § '32. SN Stat. 7:39. the punitive fine was limited in the
ease ot' a natural person to Sltlttt) and six months imprison~
ment. In the War Lahor Disputes .\et. .50 (h). 37 Stat.
Inf). punishment t'or intert'erenee with (_i(t\'(‘t‘ltlttt‘ltt opera—
tion of plants lw strikes or their interruption was limited
to a tine ot' $3tttttt or to imprisonment t'or not more than
one year or lmth. .\ union eannot be imprisoned. The
reeord shows the tinaneial t'apaeit_\' ot' .\lr. Lewis and sonic-
thina' as to the resourees ot' the .\line Workers.

The threat to the national eeonomy l)_\' the work stop-
page of the miners was t’ormidahle. lixperieneed men

sueh as these. who undertake h)’ a legally reeognized use

ot' eeonomie power to redress assumed interferences with,


 739, 1-:'1‘<+~~Rl7\'liRSINC IN PART

their rights. reali‘e the eonsetluenees to themselyes and t0
the nation. I eannot say. however, that these men acted
in this instanee otherwise than in aeeordanee with their
eoneeption of their legal rights. After this adjudieatiou,
they will he finally advised insofar as eourts ean adjudge.
In the future eomparahle aetion would place the case in
an entirely different posture.

l'pon this reeord and in the eireumstanees presented hy
it. I feel that the line entered hy the distriet eourt against
the [inited Mine Workers was exeessiye in hoth the dis—
eretionary and eonstitntional sense. It is to he remem-
hered that the yiolation of the restraining order had eon—
tinued for ahont wo weeks. It was and is yital for orderly
adjustments of disputes that the interloeutory injunetious
should he oheyed. lt is also most important that miners
who share with all eitixens the ditheulties and advantages
and risks of .\meriean demoeraey should reeeiye equal jus—
tiee and punishments eommensurahle with those inllieted
upon other Violators of (-ourt orders. The fine assessed
below. as I see it.does not meet this test.

A\ fine of $Itttttttt upon .\lr. Lewis and $230.0th against
the .\line Workers wottld punish them fairly for their dis-
ohedienee of this restrainingr order during the fourteen or
fifteen days it was in et'feet prior to their trial. The pos-
sihility of further tines for further disohedienee would
make sueh orders remedial as well as punitiye. “'ith the
('laritieation of the law hy this (’ourt and the entry of such
a judgment. the eourt's order. I haye no douht. would he
oheyed promptly hy defendants. If their eontumaey eon-
tinued. eourts have heen granted adequate powers to
coeree (-omplianee.


 While fihese oontenpt orders are incidental to the issue
over the contract, it is important for the administration of Justice
that they should be passed upon. The conclusion of the Court that
the Government has the right to preserve order, through its courts,
pending determination of the declaratory duds-out litigation, is
for he the essential element of these certiorari.

In order to permit a. judgmnt here, I therefore agree that
the District Court judgments in contempt be set aside. EVery need
of order will be semd by a jungent which enters fines for oon‘beupt
eom'bted prior to December 4, 191.6, to be refitted in toto on a
complete purge of the conteupt. I agree that those fines should be
$10,000 for John L. Lewis and $1,600,009 for, the United Mine Workers.






 .. 361,39 «.3 933 N. .

33,, w
1,33 a£?£gg§..





 February 25, 1947

MEMORANDUM for The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
Ir. Justice Jackson and Ir. Justice Burton.

RE: N08. 759, 9150., Unite State v. United m .Workegg.

would it be agreeable to insert as a new paragraph
or as e continuation of the former paragraph in the Chief
Justice's last circulation, on p. 3, after note 81, something
like the following:

“well informed men may disagree upon the basin
controverey. There are expressions in our cases
that did leave room for differences of opinion
as to the effect of interlocutory injunctions
from a court that finally may be determined to
be without power to adjudge the controversy
presented. gaggggggfiggggpb 209 U. S. 123, 142,
145. The opinions in this case show _het the,
defendant's position as to the Norriafi‘ Guerdie
Act had support in reason. While the violations
were willful, they did not have the element of
malicious disregard of national welfare that
calls for the most severe punishment.




 February 20, 1947.


Nos. 799, etc., Unite; Mine Workers.

To take clear IV suggestion in IV memorandum to the
Conference of February 15, I suggest that it would be appropriate
to add to the judgments and sentences of the District Court appearing
at R. lOL-Z, the following proviso:

"5 provided share is reserved, with or without
further hearing, the power to reduce separately

the fines assessed, if either or both containers
purge themselves of contempt prior to mesh 31,
1947, by withdrawing the notice heretofore given

by United Nine Workers of America by John L. Lewis,
President, on November 15, 1946, to J. A._ Krug,
Secretary of the Interior, terminating the Krug-
Lewis Agz'eelten‘h as of 12 o’clock, iidnight, Wednesday,
Novenber 20, 1946, and by notifying at the sale tits
~lshe ushers of the United Mine Workers of America
of such withdrawal in substantially the same tanner
as the said members were notified of the letter to
the Secretary of the Interior above mentioned.‘

Eii'he District Court is directed in case the
Unitedé Mine Workers purge themselves of contempt,
as above indicated, to radically reduce the fine
imposed upon that organisation.



 m 38.; 33M.


mm, “‘0’ 73:. '2; 3 i .z'.. ‘3'? $.11: -

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 Supreme‘u’aflrt ‘of the United States.


____________________________ , 194





Nos; 7.30) 700) 781, 782 AND Sllfi—OCTOBER TERM, 1946.

The I'nitml F‘mtrw nt' America,
7.70 7).
Unitr‘d Minn Al'nrlim's‘ of Amm‘im,
If}iiimurpnrntrtl Association.

The I'nitml Statue of America,
760 7’.
Julin l,. limrirx‘, lrnlividunlly and HS
J’rt‘sidvnt (it tlu‘ l'nittrd Mine Work—
ers of America.

'L'nitrd Aline \anlwrs of Ann‘rim, 51H
l‘ninmrpnrtltml Association, Poti~
251 7!.

le l'nitnd Stzittis of America.

Jtlllll T,. limris. lndiridunlly and as
l’rtwidnnt 01' the l'nitvd Aline Work—
(‘rs of Anivrim, PM it iuncr,

782 7r.

Tllt', l'nittid Suites Of America.


['nitr‘d Alinv \Vnrkt‘rs ()f Aint‘rim. nn
l‘nnu'nrlmrntml A 5 sun in t i 0 11 21nd
.lnlrn 1.. lmu'is. lndiridunlly nnd us
Pl‘t‘fildt'lll nt' tlw l'nitvd Aline lVoi‘k—
hrs of Alllt,‘l'lt'zl. l’vtit lulltfl‘)

811 1'.

The United Stntvs of Anim‘im.

[March —. 19-17.]


0n Writs 0f (“0r—

tinrzu‘i t0 the-
l'nitnd States
(hurt Of An—
])t‘:tlS fur the
District of C0—

Mn. .lt's'rn‘r: ll]..\t't{ and .\In. .It's'rnru Dtu'ums, con—

(*urrin‘;r in purl and di~srnting in Inn‘t.

Fur tln- rmsnns :iwn in tlu-(‘nurt‘snlrininn \\'(‘21f_"1‘(‘C
that llt‘ltllm' the Norris-llutjuurdiu‘ Act; nor the War


2 U. S. e. ['Nl'l‘lil) MINE WORKERS.

Labor Disputes Act barred the Ct'ivernment from obtainu
ing the injunction it sought in these proceedings. The
“labor disputes" with which (‘ongress was concerned in the
Norris—I‘Mluardia Act were those between private em-
ployers and their employees. As: to all such "labor dis-
putes.” the .\ct drasticallv limited the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts: it barred relief by injunction except under
very narrow circumstances. whether injunction be sought
by private employers. the (lovernment. or anyone else.
But the attention of (‘ongrcss was, neither focused upon,
nor did it purport to at't'ect. “labor disputes". if such they
can be called. l'ictweei’i the Government and its own ein-
plo_vees. There was never an intimation in the progress
of the Act‘s passage that a labor dispute within the Act’s
meaning would arise because of claims against the Gov—
ernment assertml collectively by employees of the la—
terior. State. Justice. or any other ('xovernment depart—
ment. (‘ongress had never in its, history provided a
program for fixing wages. hours. and working conditions of
its emplovees by collective bargaining. Working condi—
tions of Hoverninent employees had not been the subject
of collective bargaining. nor been settled as a result of
labor disputes. It would require specific congressional
language to persuade us that ('ongress intended to em—
bark upon such a novel program or to treat the Govern—
ment emplttver—employee relationship as giving rise to a
“labor dispute" in the industrial sense.

We have no doubt that the miners became Govern—
ment emplovees when the (lovernment took over the
mines. It assumed complete control over the, mines and
their operation. rl‘he tact that it utilized the managerial
forces of the private owners does not detract from the Gov-
ernment's complete authority. l’or whatever control
(,‘tovernment agents delegated to the private managers.

those agents had t'ull power to take awa_v and exercise
themselves. It we thought. as is here contended. that the



Government’s possession and operation of the mines were
not genuine. hut merely pretended. we should then say
that the Nt)rris—liafltIardia Aet harred these proeeedings.
For anything less. than full and eomplete Government
operation would make this proeeeding the equivalent
of the C‘xovernment's seeking an injunction for the benefit
of the private employers. We think the Norris—liaGuardia.
Aet prohihits that. But as we read the War Lahor Dis—
putes .\et and the Presidents order taking over the mines
against the haelcground of eireumstam-es whieh prompted
both. we think that the GOYOI‘HIIH‘HT operates these mines;
and those who work in them, during the period of complete
Government eontrol. are employees of the (loy'ernment.
Sinee the Ni)rris—liaflnartlia Aet is inappli 'al)le. we
agree that the Distriet (‘ourt had power in these proeeed—
ings to enter orders neeessary to protect the Government
against an invasion of the rights it asserted, pending
adjudieation of the eontroversy its: complaint presented
to the (‘ourt. It is therefore unneeessary for us to reach
the question of whether the liistriet ('ourt: also had power
to enter these orders under the doetrine of (Vii/ed Slates
v. XIII/m, 202’) l'. S. 2(33. We agree that the court had
power summarily to eoeree ohedienee to those orders and
to suhjeet defendants to sueh eonditional sanetions as were
neeessary to eompel ohedienee. And we agree that in
sueh eivil eotiteinpt proeeedings to eompel t’tltedienee. it
was not neeessary for the eourt to ahide lty all the proce-
dural safeguards whieh surround trials for erime. With-
out sueh eoereive powers. eourts eould not settle the eases
and eontroversies before them. ("ourts eould not admin-
ister justiee if persons were left free pending adjudi *ation
to engage in eonduet whieh would either immediately in—
terrupt the judieial proetwlingsor so ehange the sin/11.x- ([210
of the sultjeet matter of a eontroversy that no ell‘eet‘iv€
judgment eould he rendered. Disorder in the eourtroom,
or so near to it as to interrupt a trial, and disobedience



of an affirmative court ortler. are typical examples of
offenses which must necessarily l)(‘ tlealt with sumnmrily.
To remove such imminent interference with ortlerly jttrli-
eial proceetlings. courts must have power to act imme—
(lizitely. In recognition of this fact. the contempt power
came into existence.1 This power is of ancient lineage?
has always llt‘t‘ll exercisetl liy our courts. nntl has the ex-
press reeognition of ( 'one'ress ttntler the name of contempt».
Rev. Stat. § 723. 25‘ l'. N. (I § 1-383. Where the court exer—
cises such coercive power. however. for the purpose of com—
pellingt tut ure oltetlience. those imprisoned “carry the keys
of their prison in their own pockets." In re Neritt, 117 F.
4475‘. 4-lll: liy olietlience to the court‘s valitl ortler. they
can entl their confinement: aml the eourt‘s coercive
power in such a “civil contempt" proceetling entls when

lSee I'. (L, (Witt/rt \Z (vi/Illlt] NIH/es. QtiT l'vi S. 1311—, 5:74—3:37: Fox,
(‘ontempt ot' t'ottrt t HUT) l’); lleale, ('etttrmpt often/"1,21 llai‘\'. L.
lle\'. tltttht 1tll.lt1ltsth).

3 "i\s early as the time ot‘ ltieltartl lll it was sat-l that the chancellor
of l’lna'lantl compels a party against whom an ortler is issuctl lty
imprisomm-nt: [3 li. lll. it, pl. 3'.’ anti :1 little later it was saitl in
the ehaneery that ‘a tleeree litlt“ not ltlIltl the right. ltlll only binds
the person to olterlienetu so that it the party will not olte_\*. then the
chancellor ma_\‘ commit him to prison till he oltey. atttl that it is all
the ehaneellor ean tlo.' ‘_’7 ll. \'lll. til This imprisonment was
lty no means a punishment, ltttt was merely to secure oltetlienee to the
writ ot' the king". Down to within a century it was very tlonlitt'ul if
the chancellor eottltl untler any circumstances inlliet punishment for
tlisoltetlienee ot' a tlt‘t’"t't‘. It the (leeree eomtnantletl the tlel'entlant to
transt'er property, the chancellor aetptiretl power as early as the six—

teenth century to sequester the I‘I'ttpt rty as security tor performance;

ltllt it' the tleeree were tor the doing of any other act. or were a decree
for an injunction. the chancellor was helpless it' he (‘Ullltl not com—
pel oftethenee lw imptisomnent. . . . In any case the contempt of
a, defendant who ltatl violatetl a tleeree in ehaneery (‘ttllltl lie pttru'et’l
lt_\' (ltllIlL': the aet eommantltul antl payinu' costs: or. it his tlisolttalienee
haul ltt'eii the Violation ot' a ttt’:.‘tti\t' injunction, he ('ttllltl purge him-
selt' ot' contempt lty nntloing what he hail tlone and paying costs.”


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