xt7msb3wtd0h_42 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2.dao.xml unknown 166 Cubic Feet 381 document boxes, seven textile items, three map folders, one artwork archival material 72m2 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center.  Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Frederick Moore Vinson papers Economic stabilization. Elections -- United States -- Congresses. Judges -- Correspondence. Judges -- United States. Judicial opinions Judicial process -- United States Legislators -- Correspondence. New Deal, 1933-1939. World War, 1914-1918 -- Veterans. World War, 1939-1945. Carter v. People of the State of Illinois text Carter v. People of the State of Illinois 2019 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2/Box_176/Folder_16/Multipage5411.pdf 1946 1946 1946 section false xt7msb3wtd0h_42 xt7msb3wtd0h No. 36 — Carter V. Th~ People of the State of Illinois a

Recirculated Opinion of Frankfurter 11/29/h6 — Returned
l2/2/b6 - note ”I Agree C.J."

 

 .-

Supreme Court of the United States.

;
z.—

Memorandum.

________L;/f‘f;___2:_)___, 194 C;

 

 No. 36 - Carter v. People of State of Illinois.

.. . V In! ., 1 1 .
Onlnlon recxrcuiated 11 2g’h6 — returned w1th iOlLOWID?
t‘ l x.)
notation.

"I agreea

Suggestion —

Is there any need to spell out what is the common law
record and emphasize the fact that the so-called reocrd
referred to by Murphy is not the record?"

 

 SUPREME COURT GE THE UNITED STATES

No. 3G.——Oe'ronmt TERM, 1946.

Ilariee Leroy Carter. Petitioner. V . _ _

()n \\ rtt oft¥rt10rar1 to
the Supreme (‘ourt of
the State of Illinois.

11.
The People of the State of
Illinois.

[November —, 1048.]

In. Jt‘s'rteic FRANKFCHTER delivered the opinion of the
Court.

ln 102R petitioner pleaded guilty to an indietment for
murder and was senteneed to imprisonment for 9%) years.
In 194.") he hroue‘ht a petition for his release on \Vrit of Tir—
ror in the Supreme ('ourt of Illinois: elaiming that the ('on—
vietion on \vhieh his eonfinement \vas hased was vitiated
by the denial of his right: under the Fourteenth Amend—
ment to the assistant-e of eounsel. The Eu weme Court of
Illinois sustained the aetion ot' the trial eourt and atlirmed
its judgment of eonvietion. 35)] 111. 094. In view of the
importanee ot‘ the elaim. if valid. “'0 brought the case
here. 32K 1’. S. n.

In a series of eases of \vhieh .lfoorev.Dempsey/.261TES.
St}. was the first. and Ala/tern]! v. THU/(”SSPP, 327 l'. S. 274,
the latest. we have held that the l ‘rue l’roeess (‘lausie of the
ltlourteenth Amendment seeures to every person eharged
with erime the right to a fair ascertainment of guilt or inno—
(-enee. Inherent in the notion of fairness is ample oppor-
tunity to meet an aeeusation. l'nder pertinent. eireum—
stanees. the opportunity is ample only when an aeeused has
the assistant e of eounsel for his defense. And the need for
sueh assistanet- may exist at every stage of the proseeution,
front the arraigmnent to sentencing. This does not. how—
ever. mean that the aeeused may not make his own defense,
nor does it prevent him from aeknowledging guilt when
fully advised of all its implieations and 'apahle of tinder-

 

 36
2 CAR 1511 0. PEOPLE OF 1LLINO1S.

standin” them. Neither the historic conception of Due
Process nor the vitality it derives from advancing stand—
ards of justice deny a person the right to defend himself or
to confess guilt.

The solicitude for securing; justice thus embodied in the
Due Process ( 'lausc is not satisfied by formal compliance or
merely procedural regularity. It is not conclusive that
the proceedings resulting in incarceration are unassailahle
011 the face of the record. A State must give one whom it
deprives of his freedom the opportunity to open an inquiry
into the intrinsic fairness of a criminal process even tl ough
it app ars proper on the surface. J[ooncy v- [[11111/1a11, 2114
1'.S .1053 Questions of fundamental iustice protected 11V
the Due 1’1i1ress (lause may be iaised to use lawyer’s
langu Lac dc hor. s tl1e1e cord.

but the Due l‘iocess ( lause has never been perverted
so as to force upon the forty—eight States a uniform code
of criminal procedure. Except for the limited scope of the
federal criminal code. the prosecution of crime is a matter
for the individual States. It is fol them thei "‘fOIC to
choose the methods and practices by which crime is
brought to hook, so long as they ohserve those ultimate
dignitics of man which the 1'nited States Constitution
assures. [1’1'1111'11 v. \111‘ [(1.911] 17 1 1 S 17; 1713;1[1’3-
5911111'1’ v. Lewis, 1111 1 . S. 22. 31.11111} discretion must he
left to the States for the manner of adjudicating a, claim
that a conviction is, 111iconstitutional. States are free to
devise their own systems of review in criminal cases. A
State may decide whether to have direct appeals in such
cases. .1[c[\'1111c v. burs/1111, 17153 1'. S. 11841, (187. and if so,
under what circumstances. People v. Gcrscu‘i/z, 294 N. Y.
1113’). ()r. they may want to afford the opportunity to, chal—
lenge constitutional defects which is required by Jlooucy

[[11/11/11111 by providing remedies of their own choice.
Accoulingly. a State may provide that the protection of
rights granted by the federal Constitution be sought

 

 36
CARTER 1'. PEOPLE OI" ILLINOIS. 3

through tho writ of In? ms (vi/"pus or (own) nob/R. Klztt—
lt‘t‘ of .\lorhons. 393% N. Y. I‘ll. It may 11:10 (‘rtt‘l‘i ol' thoso
nnvivnt writs in its common law st'opt‘. or they may be put
to l](‘\\' nsos. 0r. tho thtto may :tt'ford romody hy it simple
motion hrmuzht (-ithor in tho court of original conviction
or :tt tho phat-o of dotvntion. Matter of [at/{NIX y. Col/Z-
.s'lz in, ”fifth N. Y. 19, 23: son I’m/21v V. G: rxmri/‘z. supra. at
103. Fo long :18 the rights undor the I'nitt‘d States (‘on—
stitntion may ho pnrsrnwl. it is for a ‘ritato and not for this
(‘om‘t i’tHlt‘filtt'tlH"Illtttl(‘l)}'\‘\'l1l(‘ll‘tl‘i(‘_‘»'1115‘-_\'l')(‘ vindicated.
NMI‘ l'tn'lc ('J' I'!‘/. ”7/ 1'! mm; \'. Nikon. 31% 11>. 583.

An t1t‘(‘l1!~1(‘tl nniy ll:1\‘{‘ hor'n donit‘d the assistance of
connsvl Illltlt‘l‘ t‘ll't'ttltlFlitltt‘f‘Fl \yhiwh (‘otistitnto an infring‘ —
litt‘ltt ot' the l'nitt-d Slitlt‘.“ ('ttnstittition. If the State 21f—
t'orrls no modv tor rodrorssing‘ that wrong. ho may come to
Tllt‘ todwrtil (-ottrts for rolitl. lint \y’lmro :1 rmnody is pro—
Vltlt’tll)_\‘tl1(‘§“tttl(‘.zttlt‘iit‘lttlttlll mist first (‘KllilllSt it in the
H]:‘.Hll"l‘ in \t'hit'h tho Ftnto lil'(‘:4t‘lll)t‘S. Hr PUT/1’ Hunt v,
321 l'. ‘5. 11-1-1 [Ill/MTV.Alli/yttggllift-’13:. For tho rela—
tion of tho l'nitvd Hitters 11nd the courts of tho linitotl
Ftntos to tho States :md lllt‘ t'om'ts of tho fitzatt‘s is n. yory
dwli-f'ntt‘ muttt‘r. When 21 detondzntt. {is hrro. inyolos a.
rt~mvdy !)]'()\’l(lt‘(l hy tho State of Illinois the dwision of the
Stutt- ( ‘onrt must ho jndg’twl on tho hosis of tho soolw of the
rmnody Ill‘tn'ltlt‘tl and what tho r-om‘t properly ln’td hot'orc it
in snrh :1 [H'tlt‘flt‘dlllfl ll'tmdx V. .\'r'.".".\-tbrim:r. 3138 If. S.
, 'l‘ht- Illinois .‘itlltl't‘mt‘ (‘ourt said that the only
thing lrt‘hll'vfi‘ it is\ hat is known thlt-I' Illinois pt'flt‘tlt'C as
tho (‘Htllttmli low l'("t"(ll'!l. .\nd so tho wry narrow question
now lwl'ort‘ its is \K'l‘it‘tllt‘t' the Common lzm' rm'ord (\stzth-
lishos tlntt tho (it t'ondnnt‘s SMHCHN‘ is \'()Itll)(\(‘11118(‘l]1tllt‘
prm-wdings thztt lt‘tl to it ho \\'21f€tl(‘lll(fitl the assistance of
('(illllSt‘l.

This was“ is tot:tllf=' ditl't‘rr‘nt from a 0:190 lil~i0 Rim V.
()lmn. 23136 I'. S. 786. In that vase the reward properly ho—

t'oro this (‘otn't contuinvd Sjtt‘t'lllt‘ :tllt‘gtttions hmring on,

 

 36
4 CARTIER 1‘. PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS

the disahilities of the defendant to stand proseeution with—

out the aid of eounsel. There was not. as we have here

an um-lnillenged finding by the trial court that the aeeused

was duly apprised of his rights and, in awareness of them,

chose to plead guilty. The judgment explicitly states:
“And the said defendant I’ll-iriee Iteroy Carter eom-
1nonly lilttm‘ll as lloy (‘arter haying been duly ar—
raigned and heing ealled upon to plead expresses a
desire to plead guilty to the erime of murder as
elrtrged in the indietinent. ’l‘hereupon the (“ourt-
fully e‘»:pl:iined to the Defendant Ilariee Leroy (‘arter
eounn-Lmly known as lloy (alter the eonsequenee of
sueh plea and of all his rights in the premises includ—
ing the rig :t to have 2, lawyer appointed hy the (‘ourt
to defend hint and also of his right to a trial before ‘1
jury of twelve jurors sworn in open (‘ourt and of the
degree of proof that would he required to justify a yer—
diet of guilty {against him under the plea of not guilty
hut the defendant llariee l.eroy (‘arter eonunoan
known as lioy ('arter persists in his desire to plead
guilty and fora plea says he is guilty in manner and
form as ehi'n'ged in the indiettnent."

From the eonnnon law reeord. we do not know what
manner of man the defendant was. Facts hearing on his
maturity or eapaeity of eotnprehensiou or on the eireuiii-
stanees under whieh a plea of guilty was tendered and ae—
eepted are wholly wanting. We have only the Iaet that
the trial judge explained what the plea of guilty in\ olyed.
To he sure. the trial eourt did not spell out with laborious
detail the y-n‘ions degrees of hotnieide under Illinois law
and the various defenses open to one aeeused of murder.
lint surely the ( 'onstitution ot' the I'nited States does not,

require of a judg‘ that he estahlish with particularity
the pert'orntanee of his duty.

The only peg on whieh the defendant seeks to hang a
elaint that his right to eounsel was denied is the faet that.
the judge did assign hint counsel when it mine to sentenc-
ing hhn. Front t iis t'aet alone, we are asked to draw the

 

 36
CARTER 1'. PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS. 5

inferenee that the aeeused was not, eapahle of understand—
ing the proeeedings whieh led to his plea of guilty. and was
therefore deprived of the indispensahle assistanee ot' eoun-
sel. \‘t'e eannot talve sueh a jump in reasoning. i-\ trial
court may justitiahly he eonyineed that a defendant
knows what he is al-out when he pleads guilty and that he
rightly helieyes that a. trial is futile because a defense is
wanting. But the imposition of sentent‘e presents quite
dill‘erent eonsiderations. There a judge usually moves
within a large area of diseretion and douhts. Sueh is the
situation under Illinois law. The range of punishment
whieh a judge in Illinois may impose for minder is he—
tween fourteen years and death. It is a eommonplaee that
no more ditlieult task eonfronts judges than the fixing of
punislunent when not determined hy statute. liven the
itiost seltlassured judge may well want to hring to his aid
every eonsideratitm that Counsel for the aeeused ean ap—
propriately urge. In any event. the designation of eoun-
sel to assist the aeeused at the senteneing stage of the
proseeution in no wise implies that the-defendant was not
eapahle, et' intelligmt sell-proteetion when he pleaded
guilty. (t.(VIII/Ze'iot'th1rl'on’a327liSS‘3.

\l'e eonelude that on the reeord hefore the Flttprenie

Court of Illinois there was no showing that Carter‘s plea
of guilty was made under eireumstances which eut the
ground from under the resulting sentenee. In restrieting
its reyiew to that reeord the Supreme Court of Illinois
followed loeal praetiee. and the praetiee eonstitutes allow—
ahle State appellate proemlure. Other t'aetors suggesting

fundamental unfairness in the proceedings hetore the trial
judges 1'. {/.. the mental eapaeity of the defendant. his: in—
ahility to make an intelligent ehoiee, preeipitaney in the
aeeeplanee of a plea of guilty hy the trial judge—sate not
het'ore us lveeause they were not het‘ore the Fupreme (‘ourt
of lllinois in this proeeeding. \Vhether the defendant is
entitled to press the denial by the State of Illinois of such

 

 36
6 CARTER 2'. PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS.

other etmstitutionul (‘lillltlS. it \Vlll he time enough to eon—
sitler when that issue is properly het'ore us utter heing
presented in a proeeecling in the State, eourts z’nrpropriute
to that purpose. or. if none is urailuhle. in 21 federal eourt.
II'oor/s \'. Nu l'-\’[/I(I~Il/.”]‘. sup/"(1," [fir [rm/e Haze/z supra.

It is pointed out that in its: opinion. the Supreme ("ourt‘
observed that Innler Illinois law a defendant who desires
counsel must ask for it and show that he ‘unnot afford
one of his own choice. Inasmuch as there is nothingr in the
I‘eeot‘tl het'ore us tointlieutt‘ that the rlet'entlunt minted
eounsel or that the (-iremnstnnees IXILItlt‘ it necessary for
him to have professional Quishrnee other than that given
by the (‘onrt‘ there is nothingr in the statement of the
Supreme (‘ourt alone from \rhieh we can infer that these

normal requirements of Illinois law tn‘ejutlieetl this (IC-
fenthurt or lnurle the ohserrmree of the Illinois require—
ment in any wise ineongruous with t1 e l'ull eonstitutiorml
rights: of the defendant.

Jud; went ‘11 fro-med:
/ .J

 

 Circulated:

Recirculafied: _____________________________ :

{£327

l’.

 

 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

N0. 36.~O(‘T01;ER TERM, 19-16.

Ilarioo LomJ' Carton Potitiono‘ v _ i ' .
hi Vi wt of (oi'tiorm‘i to

tho Flipi'onio CONN of
the State of Illinois.

0.
The Pooplo of the State of
Illinois.

[Dooomhor 0. 1946.]
M12. .Tt's'rioE Mt'itPHY. (lissonting‘.

T onnnnt ogroo that tho mhnittorl tnots l't‘Yt‘fll that tho:
potitinnor hos hoon onnviototl of Ilittl‘tlt‘l‘ :intl sontonootl to
90 vom's in prison in Ht‘Pt)!‘(l:Hl(‘t‘ with (lno timooss of low.
llnthoi‘ ho has hoon tlonrii'otl of his tromloni fnr lifo with—
out tho ni4l (If :H] nttornoy to gnitlo him along; tho omnnli-
ontotl mnl twisting lzihvi'inths of tho hm: i\ntl thoro is
not tho sliqhtost ‘ithi'mntivo iniliontinn tlmt ho intolligzontly
wnivotl his right to oonnsol or that ho nntlorstnml the
intrionto lognl prnliloms lll\‘(ll\'(‘tl in his intliotniont nntl
mnviotimn. Duo moooss oannot thrive in tho absonco of
Slioh P‘Clrlt‘llt‘t‘.

Thor-o is an initinl 1n'nl;lom Rs tn what ovitlonoo is hofni‘o
this (hurt :it this tiino. lt is snirl thnt no mo llllilit‘fl to
tho onnnnnn law 1'(‘(‘(n‘(l lrolm'o tho anroino ('onrt of llli—
1mm room'tl that inolwlos with tho intliotmont. tho jntlg—
inont on tho plon of guilty. tho minnto ontry homing (in
tho sontonoo. Hnrl tho sontonoo itsolt‘. “'0 no nskotl t0
(-lnso mn' oyos tn :1 tt'nnsol'int nt' tostiinnny in olmnootinn
with :1 homing nn mitigation of tho ntl'onso. This tosti-
mony was t ~tl\' tho St‘vto's nttni‘noy anl ('()l](‘lll‘1‘(‘tl in hy
tho prosirling jmlgo. 'l‘ho Stnto of lllinois does not deny

 

 

 

 36—DlS‘FlCN' ‘lNG

2 CARTER c. PEOPLE OF ILLTNOIS.

any of these facts: it merely reeuests that we disregard
them as (kid the Supreme (‘ourt of Illinois. that we blind
ourselves to what is printed in the record hefore us.

Legal technicalities douhtless afford justification for our
pretense of ignoring plain facts before us. facts upon which
a man‘s very life or liherty coneeivahly could depend.
Moreover. there prohahly is legal warrant for our not re—
mandiug the ease to the Supreme (‘ourt of Illinois to allow
those facts to he incorporated in the formal record before
it and to reconsider its decision in light thereof. But the
result certainly does not enhance the high traditions of
the judicial process.

Be that as it may. however. facts are facts. And when
they appear in the record hefore us in a case involving a
man‘s life or lilierty. they should not he ignored if justice
demands their use. Here the facts in question are not
crucial. since the hare common law record alone reveals
a lack of due process. V’Jut the additional facts do serve
to emphasize the ahsence of an intelligent waiver of coun—
sel and petitioner's failure to comprehend the legal prob-
lems placed in his path. They serve to make any decision
on the issue in the case more intelligent and more just.
The discussion that follows. therefore. is based on all the
Certified facts in the record heforc us.

Petitioner. a Negro. was 30 years of age. at the time of
the relevant events in 1038‘. He had no schooling. al—
though he was ahle to read and write. He was of average
mentality and had never hefore run afoul of thelaw. Dur—
ing the preceding eleven years he had worked as a cook
and a mechanic. By reputation he was quiet, and
industrious.

While driving a car hack from a fishing trip. petitioner
became involved in a hitter and prolonged dispute with
the driver of a horse—drawn gravel wagon over the right,—
of—way on a road. This driver, a white man, refused to

 

 

 

 3GfiDlS‘S‘ENTING
CARTER 1'. PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS. 3

give petitioner enough room to pass. A violent argument
in raeial terminology ensued: roeks and gravel were
threwn at petitioners ear. Eventually, when the dispute
was renewed after a short interval, the driver got off his
wagon and advanced toward petitioner's ear. Petitioner
claimed that he thought the driver was reaching into his
shirt for a, gun. l’etitioner got out of his car and fired
three times. killing the driver.

Petitioner was taken into eustody that same evening
and was questioned far into the night. He was taken to
an adjoining town, allegedly to avoid moh violenee.
Twelve days later. on June 12. 1023. he was indieted. It
was eharged that he “did then and there unlawfully. and
feloniously. with maliee aforethough. by shooting. kill”
the named individual. On June 1.") he was arraigned with—
out the benefit of counsel. it being alleged liy petitioner
that he was held iileonnnunieado from the time of his
arrest. He was handed a eopy of the five—page indict—
ment. under whieh he eould have been eonvieted of first—
degree murder. lesser degrees of homicide. voluntary or
involuntary manslaughter. assault with a. deadly weapon,
or lesser degrees of assault. Various considerations of
defense. ineluding self—defense, were aeeordingly raised.
l'pon being asked how he pleaded. he expressed a desire
to plead guilty as eharged in the indietment. The trial
court's order. whieh hears striking resemblance. to the Illi—
nois statute on the subject (lll. llev. Stat” 194.3. (11.38,
par. 732‘). reeited that the judge “fully explained" to peti—
tioner “the eonseqnenees of sueh plea" and his rights to
eounsel and to jury trial. hut that petitioner “persists in
his desire to plead guilty” as eharged. There is not the
slightest evidenee that petitioner understood the conse—
quenees of his plea or that he intelligently waived his
rights to eounsel or to jury trial. All that appears is that
he "persisted" in his desire to plead guilty and that the

 

 EEG—DISSENTING
4 CARTER c. PI‘IOI’LIC OF ILLINOIS.

court convicted him of murder. the statutory punishment
for which was death by electrocution or imprisonment for
any period from fourteen years to life.

A further hearing was held on the same day and an
attorney was appointed. apparently not at petitioners
I‘t‘tjllt :t. to represent petitioner at a hearing upon the
“question of mitigation or aggravation of said crime of
murder to which defendant has pleaded guilty.” Such a
hearing was required by state law (Ill. Rev. Stat, 1945,
(‘11. 33. par. 732) where a guilty plea has been entered and
where the court has discretion as to the extent of the pun—
ishment. .-\ hearing on this matter was held three days
later. on June 18. petitioner's appointed counsel being
present. On June 29. in the absence of counsel. petitioner
appeared in court and was sentenced to serve 99 years in
prison.

I do not believe that these facts add up to due process
of law. l’ctitioner. an uneducated. bewildered layman,
was held incommutticado for fifteen days and was then
'alled upon to make a vital decision upon the basis of his
unintelligent understanding of the indictment—a legal-
istic. verbose document of five pages which would doubt—
less mean many things to many learned lawyers in light.
of the particular facts involved. l’etitioner‘s very life and
liberty depended upon his ability to comprehend the
variety of crimes covered by the indictment and which
one. if any. applied to the facts of his case. He was com—
pelled to weigh the factors involved in a guilty plea against
those resulting from the submission of his case to a jury.
He was forced to judge the chances of setting up a success—
ful defense. These :11" all complicated matters that only
a. luau versed in the legal lore could hope to comprehend
and to decide intelligently. Petitioner obviously was, not
of that type. Yet at this crucial juncture petitioner

lacked the aid and guidance of such a person. In my view,

 

 367I3IS‘S'ENTING
CARTER r. PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS. 5

it is a gross inisearriage of justiee to eondemn a man to
death or to life imprisonment in sueh a manner. See
PIN/W.” Y. Alabama. 297 I'. S 43: ll'illinms \'. Kaiser, 323
I'. h 471: Pit-m1 (Nae/1. 324 I'. F. 786.

It is said. of eourse. that petitioner waived his right to
eounsel. XIV answer is that sueh a waiver is immaterial
in a eapital ease of this nature without affirmative evidenee
of an intelligent waiver. Fueh evidence is non—existent
here. even looking solely at the eommon law record. Its
ahsenee heeomes even more emi'rhasixed when we View
the background of ignoranee. raeial antagonism and
threats of moh Violence. When the life of a man hangs
in the halanee. we should insist upon the fullest measure
of due proeess. Soeiety is here attempting to take away
the lite or lihertjv of one of its meinhers. That attempt;
must he tested hy the highest standards of instiee and fair—
ness that we know. It is no exeuse that the individual is
willing to forego eertain hasie rights unless we are eertain
that he has a full and intelligent eomprehension of what-
he is doing. Otherwise we take from due process of law
of a substantial part of its eontent.

Nor is it signifieant that eounsel was appointed for peti—
tioner to represent him at~the hearing as to the mitigation
of the offense. The error was done. the damage was eom—
initted. when petitioner was arraigned. eompelled to pl ‘ad
and eonvieted without the assistanee of eounsel. The
special hearing on mitigation held thereafter. for which
eounsel was provided. provided no opportunity for undo—

ing the et't'eet of the unaided arraignment or plea of guilty.
('t'. (Wt/1.22.!) \‘. Xru' I'm/1'32? l'. S. 82. The failure to have
eounsel in regard to those matters permeated the entire
proeeeding. with Illtl(‘lll)l(‘ effects that, could not he re—
moved at the special hearing. Due, process of law still.
was lacking.

 

 367~DISSFNTING
CARTER 2'. PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS.

Insistvnro upon counsel at nII stages of a capital case,
whore {1n intolhgont \VHIVH' 15 lacking. imposes no intoler—
nhh‘ hurdm upon the Inn' (*nforoenlont process. It is
nu'roly u rwognil ion of our attmnpt to ho Civilized. :1 recog-
nition that the prowss of (“ondmnning‘ human Iifo is to he
judged by STRIIIIIIHIS highor than those applied to the
proswution of :1 minor trufl'ir Violation.

I would thorcforo reverse the judgment below.

 

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 (V'

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 36 - October Term, l946 ‘

Harice Leroy Carter, Petitioner,
0n Writ of Certiorari to

v. ‘ the Supreme Court of the
, State of Illinois.
The People of the State of Illinois. '2

Mr. Justice MURPHY, dissenting. . I y

I cannot agree that the petitioner has been convicted of
murder and sentenced to 99 years in priSon in accordance with the
accepted principles of due process of law. My view does not rest Upon
his probable inability to understand the intricate legal problems

involved in his conviction and sentence. Rather it rest! upon the

admitted fact that petitioner, a layman, was deprived of his freedom

for life without the benefit of counsel at the critical stages Of the
prosecution. I do notfbelieve that any layman. however intelligent\or
learned. should suffer death or life imprisonment without the aid of
an attorney to guide him along the complicated and twisting _
labyrinths of the law. ' '

Petitioner; a Negro; was 30 years of age at the time of
the relevant events in 1928. He had no schooling; although he was
able to read and write. He was of average mentality and had never-
before run afoul of the law. During the preceding,eleven years he
had worked as a cook and a mechanic. By reputation he was quiet and ‘
industrious.

.‘While driving a car back from a fishing trip; petitioner-
became involved in a bitter and prolonged dispute with the driver of

a horsefdrawn gravel wagon over the right-of—way on a road. This

' a
‘

 

 _ \

gdriver,‘a white man, refused to give petitioner enough room to pass.
A violent argument in racial terminology ensued; rocks and gravel
were thrown at petitioner's car. Eventuallv, when the dispute was
renewed after a short interva1,/the driver got off his wagon and

advanced toward petitionerls car. Petitioner claimed that he thought
the driver was reaching into his shwrt for a gun. Petitioner got out

of his car and fired three times, killing the driver.

Petitioner was taken into custodv that same evening and was
questioned far into the night. He was taken to an adjoining town,
allegedlv to avoid mob violence. Twelve davs later, on June 12.,1928,
he was indicted. It was charged that he "did then and there
unlawfully, and feloniously, with.malice aforethought, bv shooting,
kill“ the named individual. On June 15 he was arraigned without the;
benefit of counsel, it being alleged bv petitioner that he was held }
incommunicado from the time of his arrest. He was handed a copy of
the five—page indictment, under which he could have been convicted
of first—degree murder, lesser degrees of homicide, voluntarv or d ‘
involuntarv manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, or lesser ”'1
degrees of assault. Various considerations of defense, including
self—defense, were accordingly raised. Upon being asked how he ,
pleaded, he expressed a desire to plead guilty as charged in the
indictment. The trial court's order, which bears Striking '

resemblance to the Illinois statute on the subject (Ill. Rev.Stat.,

1945, Chap. 38, par. 732), recited that the judge "fully explained" \

to petitioner "the consequence of such plea" and his rights to
counsel and to jury trial, but that petitioner "persists in his
desire to plead guilty" as charged. The court accordingly convicted

, ___1__1__1_,_.4_44_1 1». 1 ..1

1‘ _ _

 

 him of'murder; the statutory punishment for which was death by
electrocution or imprisonment for any period from fourteen years
to life. ' ' a

A further hearing was held on the same day and an attorney was
'appointed; apparently not at petitioner's request; to represent
petitioner at a hearing upon.the "question of mitigation or
aggravation of said crime of murder to which defendant has pleaded
guilty." Such a hearing was required by state law (Ill. Rev. Stat.,
1945, Chap. 38, par. 732) where a guilty plea has been entered and
where the court has discretion as to the extent of the punishment.
A hearing on this matter was held three days later; on June 18.
petitioner'S'appointed counsel being present. On June 29; in the
absence of counsel. petitioner appeared in court and was sentenced

to serve 99 years in prison.

I do not believe that these facts add up to due proceSs of
law. Petigioner; an uneducated; bewildered layman; was held
incommudicado for fifteen days and was then called upon to make a
vital decision upon the basis.of his unintelligent understanding of
the indictment - a legalistic, verbose document of five pages which
Would doubtless mean many things to many learned lawyers in light
of the particular facts involved. Petitibner's very life and liberty
depended upon his ability to cemprehend the variety of crimes
covered by the indictment and which one; if any; applied to the
facts of his case. He was compelled to weigh the factors involved
in a guilty plea against those resulting from the submission of his,

case to a-jury. He was forced to judge the chances of setting up a

successful defense. These are all complicated matters that only a

 

 man versed in the legal lore could hope to comprehend and to
decide intelligently. Yet at this crucial juncture petitioner
lacked the aid and guidance of such a person. In my view; it is
a gross'miscarriage of justice to condemn a man to death or to
flife imprisonment in such a manner. See Powell v. Alabama; 287
U.S. 45; Williams v. Kaiser; 323 U.S. 471; fling v. glsgn. 324
U.S. 786.

It is said; of course; that petitioner waived his right to
counsel. My ansWer is that such a waiver is immaterial in a
capital case of this nature; especially when viewed against a
background of ignorance; racial antagonism and threats of mob
violence. When the_life of a man hangs in the balance. we should
insist upon the fullest measure of due process regardless of the
unintelligent actions of the accused. Seciety is here attempting
to take away the life or liberty of one of its members. That
attempt must be tested by the highest standards of justice and
fairness that we know. It is no excuse that the individual is
willing to forego certain basic rights. for nothing that he can do
can lower the standards Which society must attain in performing one
of its most reSponsible and solemn functions.

Nor is it significant that counsel was appointed for .
petitioner to represent him at the hearing as to the mitigation
of the offense. The error was done. the damage was committed. when
petitioner was arraigned. compelled to plead and convicted without
the assistance of counsel. The special hearing on mitigation

thereafter, for which counsel was provided, gave no Opportunity
for undoing the effect of the unaided arraignment or plea of

“if ‘ ‘w,’~

 'f

guilty. Cf.'Canizio v. New zgrg, 327 ms. 82. That hearing had

no relation to the determination of the particular crime

involved, the guilt of petitioner or the course of action

‘ petitioner should pursue in defense. The failure to have

counsel in regard to those matters permeated the entire
proceeding, with indelible effects that could not be raloved
at a special hearing. Due process of law was still lacking.

Insistence upon counsel at all stages-of a capital case

imposes no intdlerable burden upon the law enforcement process.

It is merely a recpgnition of our attempt to be civilized, a
recognition that the process of condemning human life is to
be judged by standards higher than those applied to the
prosecution of a minor traffic Violation.

I would therefore reverse the judgment below.

 

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