COMMONWEALTH v. BRYANT, Appellant. 151
135. (1951).] Opinion of the Court.
Sung lll'an. 1‘. United States, supra, at p. 14; cf. also"
McNo-bh 11?. United States, 318 U. S. 332’ 346. In the
llthubb case a federal prosecution was involved, but,
as that case plainly indicates, the Supreme Court
standard of due process required of the States is, at
least, no stricter than that required of subordinate fed-
eral courts. In Lyon's 1‘. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 599,
the use of a confession in evidence was held not to
violate due, process under the Fourteenth Amendment
although “. . . counsel was not supplied [the accused]
until (If/('I‘ his prelin‘rinary examination, which was
subsequent to the confessions” (Emphasis supplied).
.\s in the. instant case, the prisoner was “. . . compe
tently represcntml before and at the trial . . . .” In
the lawn/m case, supra, use of the confession was held
not to have worked a denial of due process even though
the accused had specifically requested counsel before
he was subjected to crucial interrogation by the police
and counsel was not summoned. It seems implicit in
Poe-ell e. .‘llrtbanm, 287 U. S. 45, 71, that assignment
of counsel for an accused in a capital case is timely,
within the due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment, if not made “. . . at such a time or under
such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effec—
tive aid in the preparation and trialot’ the case.” In
the present instance the defendant had counsel from
the time of his arraignment: onward. Nor does he make
any complaint in such regard. His contention is that
he should have been supplied counsel at the moment
of his arrest and before the police officers asked him
any questions concerning the crime they were inves-
ligating.

’l‘he recognized limit of Supreme Court review of
State convictions vas well expressed in United States
e. .lIi/chcll, 322 l. S. 65, 68. True enough, the state-
ment was a dictum (a federal conviction being there