xt7p5h7bsj8w https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7p5h7bsj8w/data/mets.xml Lexington, Kentucky (Fayette County) University of Kentucky Alumni Association 1966 v. : ill. ; 28 cm. Quarterly, Publication suspended 1922 and resumed with v. 1, no. 1 (May 1929); v. 5, no. 9 (May 1933) not published; issues for v. 37, no. 2-v. 40, no. 1 (spring 1966-spring 1969) incorrectly numbered as v. 38, no. 2-v. 43, no. 1; v. 40 (1969) complete in 3 no. journals  English [Lexington, Ky. : University of Kentucky Alumni Association, Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Kentucky alumnus University of Kentucky. Kentucky alumni 2002- Kentucky alumnus monthly Kentucky alumnus, vol. 03, no. 37, 1966 text Kentucky alumnus, vol. 03, no. 37, 1966 1966 2012 true xt7p5h7bsj8w section xt7p5h7bsj8w *;'   _
LF Qs: ‘  V,
 Q ‘
" jay;  
  M M
Qi 2 iiiglfi *
~; :;v»;*· ;` 
  J ‘ 
=*  - ~ T
  v—,~      OW     i .
  =‘ " M  ,.¢, A   ~»-`. M Swimgn m
  ·*»— 6   - `Vf     6 >    vari ·
    ,._. _.   mcg ‘[¢0·;:>»¤·cxaa;
en;    ._ 3 ,,..·" ` ' “
A     *3/;,// ‘ —···· ;
   ,r      Q
7 `  HJ _;`Z'**··-». W °|
U   41 ...·»..   9. on
‘ 4. `·»;T ;,· - ·;¤..
.- » ,j .
ii  "» _ ‘  
6 _J  ;
. ;¢  `
. wg
i"  _
  ’·   ,1%* 
  ` l _ QZ?
  V -’ "’
L:  ‘ ` V  _4 _ , . 
¢¤* j—  Pi-=  ` _ » ,; %. vm
1  -·¤    
· 3 ` `r;kr;N—•`* `  
I J-—»   
  @2% QEWZZZZC/gy
L  —A  SUMMER 1966
4.  ~
` V1" 

 .?`  ¤Z— T I A
.‘ **.7   L .
 .»   2 -  ~
, s l
" A ,
 xsi [ l i
A *1*   = Alumnus
 - .     1   5
* i _ 1 ‘ Q
 _ 5 _,
` ‘ l . ·.
ir A A · Avg, A
¤ ` T _ A .
, . \ 1 = • E >_ . A
r A ? IHS · `
A 1 A A   . gg _
V g I {   l Al `~ { {J li'!
    '  A 1*     "  
1 ·  é  W3 S A   »
l \ l F  1 7
1  a _— ~ ,
. i  ;— \ _ ~  V
l l j ‘   ‘ ,
J   1 ;A    i A .;.»5= .
 · \ i     ` 3 , f. · ,.
r ; ` A ‘ i ' v'
. x . _ .7 lr ,
, Q . » , e   .
i l I _ ,,5:. V _ _
, 2 S ‘
i     I UK Alumni Association Director Helen C. King is shown
_.     , ;   as she presents Alumnus editor, Quentin D, Allen, far
  , . ` ,1; ; right, and graphic designer, Robert ]ames Foose. awards
, V A ,   won at the 1966 American Alumni Council meeting,
-    . A     \Vhite Sulpher Springs \Vest Virginia,
2. i ` 1
4 I   g
A i l.   The Kentucky Alumnus, official magazine of the Uni-
  ’ . gi  A \'€]`S1t}` of K€lltllCk}` Allllnlll ASS()C1iltl()ll. 11115 \\`O]1 tllI`(’€ of
A = _ i il , the American Alumni Council’s 1966 publication awards.
  1   The UK magazine, edited by Quentin D. Allen. `55.
A   ca Jtured the Time-Life Award as the most im nroved
`— I A it  alumni publication in District Three, an area embracing
A   I l t i nine southern states, and tied for second place among the
A ‘     lllltlOl],S C()ll€g€ GDC] lll]1\'€l`S1t}·’ $.IllIITlI1l ]Tlt\gllZll]€S.
J 1 ‘ E Sharing the national runner-spot with the UK magazine
. Q I   *— was the alumni publication of Franklin and Marshall Col-
  ` ' ` A . V lege, Lancaster, Pa. The first—place winner was the UCLA
  l p ii   1D21gll.Zll]€.
_V • Z il  The UK magazine also won an Alumni Council special
 _ · Q A   { award for two articles published during the past year. The
I     prize-winning stories, both by the magaxinc`s editor,
.t  ; . ` p A Quentin D. Allen, were “Crowth Comes to Kentucky], a
 _ A A l   report on the development of the UK community college
·’  1 3 system and “The Enrollment ]am A Crisis Yet l.illI`(‘S()l\'(‘(ll‘ COVER
:`  . _   which urged parents to help institutions of higher educa- iwlkilm
Q f A *“’}*· _ _ striking
  ‘ A [lll!} TIIIXC-Lli(‘ l1\V}.1l`(l tlll(l Clt&ll[l()ll \VCI'C pI'(‘S(‘lltC(l tt) the vit']
 , E j Helen C. King, Director ot Alumni Allairs, by Steven Y. ni and
=;  E ‘ l   3 Swett, manager of the Education Department of Time, Kclltllck
¢ § i Inu vision u
I , greater (
 S I   » , ,
A {  
. 1 * 2

SLMMER 1966 Volume XXX·I駗 Issue 3 y Z
The Kentucky Alumnus is published quarterly by the University of Kentucky Alumni   *
Association. Type A Membershm in the Association includes subscription to the Alumnus.
Editor ............. QUELTIN D. A1.1.1~:x
Managing Editor ........... ]AY BRUM1-*11:1.0
Alumni News Editor .......... A DA D. PuaFBORo
Graphic Design ........ Lomuxra M. Wrucrxsox
Contents j
Yietneunz Question Mark ` p
of the World 3 An Analysis . - 
Something Beyond Vision T Photographic Essay `
Communication Bonanza  
of the Future 12 Teaching, 2000 A.D.    
l .
Big-Little Business: - · 
Friends or Foes? IT A distinguished alumnus l  
speaks out l f
A A University ls A Place; . 
It Is A Spirit XXII 21 The Senior Associates move r —
forward   L
Annual Report 22 Helen G. King   n
The \\`eel< Tlmt \\`ns 24 Seven days of “getting together"   Q
and attending I`nircrsity functions S.
V ~» ~ ..   T
CO\»ER_ Ihsimlu L H li Alumni on the Co 30 Featuring E. ]. "Ert" Rutter. I zto j ~
. ‘J *‘ < 1 ne _, .. . . . ,, ,  
Wilkilmm hl; U It I Babe Parilli and Bishop “1ll)lH' Is. 3 L
. a ‘ ·‘e; et u ·
  . . Smith Y T
Sinking cover symboliziug .
the vital inter >l·1v of ·1lum- F
ni and the €.n§\_m_gitv of About the Alumni 36 Are you dere. Charley? lf not, ‘ ~
I I I         ___`   °‘:§;§;§;§;§;§ __;§g§g§r`     ~ . 1;1. 11111 11
    11111111 ·-·. °*7°{ `‘·=·. F. N·Vi¢?"‘°m "  ` ° 1   *','I‘
1 ‘ 1} .11a.   ’l   ‘·._ __1."=$i§$§14 » ‘  ’¤"   {IY  
I I 1     1__         _ 1 ;1'1I1“1H
I I I -   B¤¤9‘<°k I?} ".°'°'°': Y°%I es ;AI1111I1.
, ;     '·; •       $,.VIgfI1¤ITI Q2? 1 I NW
I ’       .E1”   O   11111. .11
I   ~       I ·rn°rnP°{]£]g:..' •     OC     III link
I I   1 ;;;E§E;- " `1?*€E§_C¤mb%;§;E;§r' 9 _ 1 1- __ AO \¢§ j1 "_"
1 ‘ 1¢:¥:¥:€ ':§:§1_ _.;.;.; ._.;:§:§:?"' S _ 1 1* "‘" "`
‘ I 1 éééiiii. ‘==€2%2a¤1 ..1. ’=$252%2=1:1=2%aia€=°‘° 4*4 g  1 \K %&   ‘»‘‘’;“ 1
I I   _1   "‘*¥%§%z&z&i21.1. -».., i`?:‘I"?¥I***¢·. '`”''' I `.°` Bn, 1 ._._   ‘· \’hY\"   1111 I
  I IQ *‘°=§=i;E¤E;E;E;;5;, M¤I¤Y§:¤ og  ; iu: 111
1 IQ ‘°*=i=;5;5;g:¢ "E¤§¤§=1     ‘·.-   1111  
  I I 111 ‘·==2;S;:1 ._.. •K¤¤*¤ *-¤·¤¤¤r 41*0   4- .··‘ 1 _ ° LUCCAS 1 11`1  
‘ I I ;;g;;;;;;._ ‘·¤=i;E;._ *;;;:51;; Q   19**   gi; _ I   ,_
I 1 =E¤"*·°=E=;-. ‘·=:=. ;¤;¤;¢;¤;-1 0 1=:£=·=‘·=S~;£·`· p9}   -;r;¤· 1
1 I ?:¥§¥:¥:i:¥:¥:-.1     • (xg if 1 5 ..·· · ,.··‘ '  ·§;§:'     1_ ` · ‘ *-1 *“
I "?:¥:EiZ§E§$§m`;§E_   5`       I .;:§:¥“;:Q:&:§:¥:¥:¥:?:¥:E1;:ZQ;§:Q;_ _. _'____ _   111 1-I
5 * °€EE§EEEE§:;..     KAUMANTAN -5512:, AZ? .E¥?E"` 'E?E?E .·:§E§E¤‘ ‘`‘`‘ *¥E¥2¥¢2?E?E?€1S 1   1¤¤111
I I `1‘· ‘=°=%2i25a€2i2ia.. ‘·2=2=2i2€2=1.1      1 1.2€2¤1=:=iX .1i2€¤*·1.1. ·’%§%§%2%E€?`    * 1*-~1··~1
1 1§2§$}§=%2§2§2;11. "i2Z.° *211     2§2§=   2    1 ~·11 1 ·111· 11
I I    Qi? /   ··‘-     :?€?€¢E ·?*¤.  -ri?¤*¤;¤E¤E¢E¤Ec;¤;.;-.-I?I¥’I?I¤ .... .-E¤E¤E¤;·...   " ***1 I*I<
1 1 ‘*2i2%2=2=1.1&: ¤2€2%2%2. ··‘·~··‘-‘·   —.--;   ·‘·` ziaia? ei; * °‘‘‘‘‘`   .;:?E:¥:¥¤EEEEi-.;l§ _‘1‘·‘· ;'::IEI1EZ;..   *11
? 1 "‘*=*=%=i¤i25z%z¤2i2..1 :¤E?E?E??' hdOn · izisiz.  1%2%2¤ .·:§i21@i2i2¤2?%" *=%a%2€1 ” -·‘1I ~ *11*1
1 , I ‘·*¤E¤E¤E=§¤;-. . .-;=*=*¢*° ¤1·1¤ e$IC| `*=*¤E¤E¢; ·¢·*·‘ .-i¤;¢:¥2$1E"i¤E¢§¤E¢E :¤c2¢E¤·- I*<=~1I~~1
I I - '·?:§:§:§:§:§:;:§:¥ • Dluk _   _.;.; ¥:§:§:§:;.__ jfiwiiz "¥:·:·:?* .?Z€Z§· 1111 1,,,I\
I I I   _ JAVA BALI §E¤E¤E?’?*? F ‘ '?**   ‘E¢i;:;:;rE?E?’:` ?E§E§§;;;;:;:;:§?E?Z?E-1;, 141_1V I Ih1·1111l1t.11-i`
I I 1 ""‘¤‘¤?=€¤?=€=€$€E€E=$?EE§E§$E;:;:;:;;·1·;·;-1. ...·...   1:  · .   "=**=** ARAFORA sm I‘I*I‘ *35 I*=·¤11·111·—»~
; I 1   ‘‘‘‘‘‘ ·‘·‘·*=’=*=E¤§¤E;E;§;E;S;E;E;E;;;:;i;;;;;;;;;E;E;E;E  ;E;§;EgE;E;§=‘    R _._. :.;.,,,;.2;;;,; ._._1_   ____ I5 11111.1111 tl
T\N10°‘_ _._._._. ,2 ._._ ___:;E;E;°" .;,132;* OF Ii **—*1=·I1 1111111
  CARPENTAM III \`11·111.1111.
-   T`. `  `;Zj.;.j.;:j;_:_; _·_·_ A:;.j;Zj;j:`   Mus! {1
  · ‘ ‘·1·.;.;·;;;·i·Z· Y111 1·1‘111111·11t
  l 41 1I<·11I11 _1
_;§E§E¥` ` AU ST RALIA 11 11111.1l11|1t11
  I·=II··1I S1111tI1
  II11- lm. I1]1I_I
I ... $I1.\HIII\. \\()l

W ° t
]_€ Il3IIl °  
C ·
• Y
Questnon Mark of the World i
by Dr. Richard Butwell ( ·
Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy T ·
ll(‘l`C Cilll l)L‘ ll() (l()lll)l llltil \/lClll2lIll p()S(}S LIS gl'CLll l()(ltly (3X(5l`ClS€ 21 gl`€Hl€l`   Ol} H`lOl`€ of ll`l€ people than » J
Ll (lilllgL‘l' l() lllU \\`()I`l(l LIS lilly SlllglC Cl`lSlS of lllc CVCT l)Cf()I'€ ll`] lll€ \VLlI"S lOIlg lllSl()I`V.
years since the Second World War, including the It would be erroneous to believe that this hold is one ( .
‘ l$)5()-53 Korean \\`ar. lt also provides an op- wholely of terror, although terror plays its part. Many of   :
Si pannnity. however, to mobilize the free nations of South- the so-called “invaders" (from North Vietnam) through  
east .·\sia in a new and meaningful attempt to protect their the years have been men from South Vietnam who earlier   ‘
part of the world from aggressive nets at the hands of went north to Communist territory. \Vhen they returned,  
 those who have directed the long and very bloody war in they employed various means to win the support of rela-
\`it·tnam. tives. friends and others who lived in their former villages. Z
O The war in Vietnam is now. always has been and surely There is no comparable base of support for the Saigon {
aill continue to bc. a political war. It is. in fact. a civil government. Indeed, only a very small handful of South
a.a—despite rapidly growing American participation on Vietnamese have any idea who governs them (except in  
the Sl(lL' of lllL‘ Stlll1(Jll g()Vl‘l`lllllClll llll(l \`tll`l()llS   of lllC 1ll()Sl g€ll(j‘l`Ll.l terms), \Vl`ll()l`l is IlOl SUl'pI`lSlI'lg ll`l€ \VH}` {
support given by Peking to Ho (Zhi l\Iinh`s Hanoi regime. coup followed coup in Saigon after Diem’s ouster. A 
% lt has long been a fancy of American foreign—poliey The increasing American military commitment in Viet- i l
» 5pt)l{t‘Sllll’ll. ll()\\'L'VL*l`. l() SI)(‘tll'{ of llll ulll\`tlSlOll” of S()Ulll lllllll Illtly lll lllCl be l`€p€i.lllIlg the gI"€Hl l`IllSliIl{€ of l,lllll€d ` ·
' l-lflllillll. SltllCS Sllpp()l`l (llllllllg lllC   V€2`1TS. The       i   {
What kind of “invasion"? could rely on the Americans meant that he did not have  
Vietnarn was temporarily divided along the seventeenth to bid so strongly—or possibly even at all—for internal   L
parallel in 195-1. ostensibly for purposes of an armistice support.    
nal preparatory to reunification talks. The fact that these The Communists were not so unfortunately circum—   ¢
tilts never took place hardly changes the fact that Viet- stanced. They had to seek support among the people of ’
mm has been the site of a struggle for power for 20 South Vietnam—by fair means and foul. And they suc- ` Q
l<’~tT$ ll()\V l() (l(’lt‘l`llllllL‘ \Vlll('ll of S(‘\`Cl`1ll C()lllpCllllg lll- ('(’€(l(’(l-·1lll(l lll`9   1lpptlI`€I`1llV SUC‘(.`€€CllIlg.    
(llCt’IlUtlS Clll(‘S Sll()lll(l SllCL`(‘("(l l() ()ll(’lllll(’ lTI`CllCll L‘()l()lll1ll \\`lltll ('tlll il l-OI`€lgIl pO\V€I` (l0 to \VlI`l ll \VllI` for ll g()V€I`Il·    
i§:;1§;i§QiQiQ:§1;E;._;,', authority. ment that almost completely lacks support of its own i
  ll-ll? ltlL`l (ll. llll‘ lllllllt’l`   lllill lllC Sll`llgglC lll \'lC’llllllll p€()pl(*? rl`ll(’ L~Illl€(l Sltll€S llilS Il€V€‘IA lLl(.'€(l   qU€SllOll l  
  l$pl'lllltll`lV 0llC f()l' IllL‘ll·S tlll(‘QltlllCCS. Tll€’I`(’   llO llll· S(1lltll`€lV €llOllgll. i  T
tl   mttliate likelihood of any significant break-through in this 2. The United States faces the problem not only of l  
¢   l€§[lt’Cl   ll]C Stltllll \llCllltllllCS(‘ lllll€S (lll lll!} k~llll€(.l tlll lIllSVlllpilll`lGll(.` g€ll(‘l`tll pOpllltl(.`€ blll 1llSO of ll. gO\`€I`1l· »  Q
    Sl·llCS. lll(lCt_‘(l. lllt’ StllQ()ll g()\'t‘l`lllllt‘lll llllS   I`€tlllV lll l]lC‘lll llltll l‘I`€Qll€llllV SGGIDS less (lE‘l€l'Illlll€(l llltlll lll€    
  QP lltlin this task in any serious fashion. Americans to fight the Viet Cong.    
__ Z The only possible chance of salvaging something from There are many who will dispute this statement. They    
  the lnilitarily, economically. and politically costly South will cite the vigorously determined statements of \`a1`iOnS ’  
Ll   `lltltlulnese situation is at the conference table. There- high Saigon ofiieials. military and civilian alike. They also i "
  ami Only there—might the United States and its friends will note frequently expressed South Vietnamese fears E  .
  lllllll Some chance of earning lasting gains. concerning American acquiesence in negotiations with the F  
  ` lllete ilt`0 $(’V(’I`tll l`CtlS(lllS \Vll}` tl p()llllC`lll VlCl(ll`V   C()lllI]]lll]lSlS tll](lL‘l` ClI`ClllllSltlllL`€S llOl of lll€ll` t`lppl`O\`Lll. {  
OF   llllllllldnilitary means is not possible for the United States (It should not be forgotten that many of the pF€Sel1l   _ 
{PEN-mm  lllltetnam_ lenders of South Vietnam would not l`An\‘€ mllC`l`1 of 11   L 
:_;,;._._;____,_,;.;Z;5;Q;¥‘ l- ll0St important of all probably. the South Vietnamese personal public future in the event of paeification. neu-    
'i'iZi¥ii1i'i'i`. g0ll1llllll(’lll and its increasingly involved American ally tralization or reunihcationl. l g 
 are deilllllg l\`llll tl ll()Slll(‘ p()p\lltlll(lIl. l.)l`()l)tll)lV tlS Illtllly Blll \\'()l`(lS t`t1`(‘ lltll (lt‘€(lS. tllltl lll€ llll€IlS€ jOCl'{(’Vlllg l`Ol` Q  
lSl“`0·ll1il‘cls of the people who inhabit what is commonly power among soliders and civilians alike since Diemls I  
clll€(l Stllllll \vl(‘tlltllll \V(‘l'(` 0ppOSl‘(l l() ll]U g()\'(‘l`lll'llClll (ll ()llSlt"l' Sllgg€SlS llltll Illtllly (ll lll? StllgOIl l€ll(l€‘l'Slllp gl`Ollp V j
lhllillft President Ngo Dinh Diem at the time of his fall have been more concerned with their place in the hier- , i 
lll murder in N(n·einl>er· 196:3, The military situation has archv than with winning the war. ;  .
Sltiltlllll \V()l`S(‘ll(‘(l Slll(`C llltll llIllC, tlll(l lll? \llL‘l C()llg ll`llll€ gOV(‘I`llIll€lll   St.‘Cl(S to ll€"lp   llOl tlll effective Oll€. l 
3 "
I E,

   l li
l  ’-     z
2 l l T a
  I ll l Jl
_W {   l     é
  z ·— 1 1 I
 - i ! Y & l
l { l . = ’
l 2 x    
I · l E ’ ‘
  i g l  1_ l
“ f l l *  Ti l
· \ I l s   l
1 ` I  
‘ l · 1 [  i · .
l l     5 CHI`! th€ Ullitéd States SLll.)StitL1t€ fOI` it il] \\`hi\t ShOlll(l be CI‘llitlllClIt, Lllld Lll'lll$ to LlSSlll'L‘ al \'(‘l`)' l)l()<)(l}' \\’;ll` lUI` A l»~;_; PI1Il)(l§(‘N
 ’ Z '   `  - { 3 top priority political-military eH0rt? time to co1m——orcvcn vi¤.·tm·y (uml not lICCl‘S$All`ll}` .¤t .l   pzim`u·iIy 1
I { l l`     \Vh3_t €Vid€I]C€ is l[h€1”€ that SOLlth Vi€tIlilH`l’S 1€2`ld€l`$ tant (lntcl, gwilml Ll lu
  Q , I l have stopped plotting against 0116 H110th€1` and h€iV€ HOW If the illl`-$tl'll·(L‘S have any clluct in South \`i¢·!11.»m..t .ml1u·igl1l
A l l t p]2lC€d p1`0S€CUti0H of thé WHY 215 the HF$t—¤0t thi? second may well bc in cvidcncc thcy suggest to p<·;m·-]¤m.;· 'I`lu·u· i>
 . J _   l O1' third—pri01‘ity`? Ol'(llllill`}' \’iCtll;lIl]CSC that victory may not bv so chuuly t°.· lZ»lI`(‘|{l1('Ill
U i ‘ ’ -   1 3. There are 01]].}*3. hmldful Of iI1S(m1<:€S of OlltSid€ (Mild hmuineut prize of the L`()ll]lI]lll)lSlS (ibut is, ol <·m¤111~¤, .2 rufully us
j I [ European) peoples SUCCBSSHJHY Clidiitillg th€ PEIUZBYU of such OI'(lll);ll`}' pcz1s;mts ever ll(‘Lll` of the sU‘il<¤·> .l!.»lZ>` in \~ll'lIlill
" I l I I l political 0fg21HiZ3ti01i to A$ilU1·0F Af1`i€ii11—P€0P1€$ in thi? coxmmmist-001ntmllcd or infhncnnccd t•.·r1‘it<>1‘y or l>c·l1c2· M to [YS
Y ; l   years since the Second \VOl`ld \Vz11‘. Not that the United what they hear), ti~·:;~ of nt
il     I States would like t0 be cIz1ssiHc-td with the f€W SU€C€SSf11l The fact is that the people of South \`i¢-tnuun .m· v.».:· md SE,-\'l`
_` \ V K   ` :_ instances in this I€Sp€Ct——lil<€ the POl`fLlgU€S€ ill A11g0ll1. weary, Some of them support tlw Viet (Yong l)l’('.llI$l’ il.:·‘· llc lvnilucl
  l l `_  ` °. The hard, Cold truth Of the lTl21ft€l' is {hilt 111OSt Vi€(`D&1m€$€ believe the Viet Cong nrc winning and that this. ll1<‘l‘<·i~ ir Y¤·~*~11l’u*S 1
  l 1 Ll? 1 apparently d¤¤’t want the kind of government which the is the easiest way of mdmg me iigmmg. 'l`lu—y l1;m·z.— ·.~. l1<·11t}wy
`       U-S- \Vi1¤tS th€H1 to h€1V€ flfld the S11ig011 g0V€1'111¤€11f is higher loyalty to causes or principles S)`ll\l)<>llXt‘m
 T j E   will UpOI1 tht? South Vi€tf12lm€S€ p€Op]€—€V€H if it is the und what ure the practical L‘()l]S(‘(lll(‘]l(`t‘S ol (‘ilL'll wl iln¤·ii1' Ywllt in m
lg 1   ll  “l`ight WiH”? 1, The United States can lllilllllillll. or i11n·1‘m·.1S<‘. il? <0mlUu11iste
  ` i   V _ Th€Y€ is g1'OWiI1g €ViCl€11C€ to suggest {hut what the level Of its military ]_`)l'(‘SSllI`(‘ against tho ('UIllIllllIll>l* in Q_ A Sm
  K {   E l UDit€Cl St2lt€S is €1](l€Z1VOl`i11g t0 (10 in Viétllalll   DOY \viQt]];[]]"|, p;u·{jCulurly jlg ;;ir-5{l·ll(p5 ;1g;ll;]5l (;u‘g¢·t$i1lll.F \`Immm_ I
\ ‘ l I l p0ssible>—p0litic¤Uy. And, if it is not P0$$ib]€ P0lili€¤ll}'» North. H0 Chi Minh amd his }`()llIlj§L‘l' colleagues .u‘<· l*\ Mm. SAK j
j * 3 l l there is reason to doubt that any military solution will bc ng mums fmmtigul mul '[`hqy m-(·_ lmwl-vw.  ml $(.]{_,-C:
l r l  Calatiom ilwluding attacks against N01‘th Vi€t¤1UTL is economically mnl>ll\l>l|*$! wlll Slntvg um] il
$·    l l I { If South Vietnam were cordoncd off today, there is every Vietnam gud this fighting? Given thc nppam·ni =\l>llll.Y Ul lllvy hm] ml
~ {   ll `, 2 IGHSOH to believe that there are enough Viet Cong guél'- the United States thoroughly to 1‘11v;1;.{c Vi<‘l¤*¢“" lll ll Wfvoxm-M V
2 l l l   l 1”ill21S, capable of féplenishing themselves by internal re- technical military ggnsg, would this ;lQ()()l]]pllSll .’\|U""'°‘m llil1(—,\m(,l.`
li   3 l  R I 4
‘ . 1 ‘ 5

 $ I-; ·
Q s
’ é Q
E I ll  
f I. i 2
. `I _ /\_ _
A ` -5   r L
\°' I ‘ "* I
. > t •*
P · ,
  "" I   • .
‘ Q Y \ ,. A · s
{Hi _j _ ;_·pos4·s ni South \-ivtiiriiii I\\lIl(‘lI prt·~l1iii.il>l) iu\<¤l\¢‘ \'l(’i]|illl|_ I,.ios dud (jrmiliotliu were ull l)€iIiQ (liSCUSS€I|' INIIII It) Illt‘ ;\II|(’IiIL.lll\ tt)   Ah l1.il`(l JI IIl(‘ (`Ullf(‘I'€’IlC(? tLiI)l€‘ MS S()l`I`l€ ."U]€I`l(.’iU]S
1i.gi[__» - §i,i·igliI»oiiiiu non-t oininuiiist ~t.tt<·~ in $¤uillu·.t~\ .·\~i.t T uqiyit to fight toduy on the battlefield iii Vietiizlfn.
Lp-Ii _ IIllI<‘ IN ·|lI¤|IIll‘l rl\[)¢'('I til II|(' Pl|}l)I(‘Ill IILII IN .\l\<) IIN! 'I`}|(_ I)rC\ ions U(_¤()tidti()H§ On   \'i€tHaI.n and Laos
1.i_iij~ - Z'i‘I|Ilr‘lIII\ dis·u~~¤·¤l: thc cost p·»Iiu¤¤¤IIi -·¤¤· ii·tiilu·tl iii settlements thtrt ultimately proved to be at
UM., » ··_,}|i it url] is uuht.nily—ol prt-st·nt .\ui<·ri<·.u¤ i>·»Ii¤·i<·> |i·i.ti iiioiiiiieil iiiiIuieg_ There were several quite Specific
`* =i ` II"II'·IIIIr ·IIII"II‘·‘II lII"""""III·III"I' “IIII \II"II'·IIII I‘·I` .1ntl xcrifiulilc reasons for this. The biqgest general Sl'10rt-
·i I»i`· `· ? it I` N u~·i:I<·¤t ut tI¤¤· I<*¤iIIu¤—¤t¤‘ i>r<·I»I··¤¤¤~ ¢¤·I} 1¤<‘IQIII>*¤¥'I¤Iii (I~IIIII’*’*II·* their iiiixvisv iittempts to guiiruiitee the internal political
~ ·*I* ‘ * I `IIIIIII III"IIII"'I` II`II·III·II"I ·III‘I III" I)IIIIII°lIII""· II*I“ complexion of countries und the inadequacy of the control
iii., ·M ·*» tnittil Smtcs hotli such rlvptli of Iuuu·u¤ =uiII¤<‘¥` iliwit-eg estiililislietl to keep the pence that proved to be
tI.,»;i:   ’l|<>¥··II>I<‘ iiiiied settleiueut should be sought. und. if Sought and
iu. UT; ~ i· .;~ nf (I,lIllI\JttI].l-\ l1*.itlt'i`\lii]W l¤1I1t`l‘IiIiI|IIl I'<`\I\—II III DIISI (>l)[;iii](·(l_ \\'I]€tli€r it Call] l)€ l(€pt· I
t.·i.1 t·   €··uti~ui ou the put ot Iioth II`II·III·IIIccointl possibility is ;\iucric.ui witlitlruwul from through the neutrtiliztition of most of what used to be
¤`I* ?I·   Iititmtin. ll the l`nitt·d Stutcs cannot win in \Iietn;ini. eulled French lndochin;1 tC;unl>otli;i and Laos us Well HS
es in il ~~:iii· so. let it quit the country. lint it tuumot in clear South \`ietn;nn*. tis urged by Ciunboditui Chief of State
II"'II‘·*‘I ` ·II`I`II`I|\`l` do so. nor c.un it do so ruitl iii.iiiit;tiii its poli- l’rii1t·t·XorotloinSil1;u10ul»<.TliecomiuiliiistsIiialyllltilllzltely
`I III·’· "   ><·ll—rt·~p¢·t·t in Soutlitunst .·\si;i ruitl iiiuiiy iiiorv tlistniit eoiiio to control South Yietutimis Q0\’e1’lil1`1el1i. but SllI`€l)`
hm I·—=`·‘ iitioiis. this is ti inutter for the \`ietn;unese to decide. South \`iet—
tlio   {lit- Litt is th.it thi- l`nitt·tl Stdtes hits strongly eueour- n;un`s exteruul reltitions. liowever. tire another niutter.
IIIII ITIIII ‘f;I`II IIIV SUIIIII \-lt‘Il|,lIl](‘\t‘ It) l`(‘SISI Il]t‘ ('UIIIIIIIIIIISIS.     SIIPPUSIIIQ [IIC \\.ll` \\`L"lI(" t’ll(lC(l lll \·lC`tlliU]] lllld the L`()In'
yous   xxi this ter-; iiiiporhuit n·sp<·t·t partly rt-sponsilile for the munists did come to power tit some future dtite in Saigon
giimuiit st.itc ol .tIl.tiis. \lort·oxi·r. \\`.1sliiugton czuuiot ii;— iwith or uithout reuiiificutiou of the so·c;1lled "two Viet-
IIIII III‘II'I II'I<` Ilic olltwts iii- ;i\xitIulr;iw;iI tm iillii-s t·Ist·xx‘lit·rt· wlm I|;ll]]S“I_ \\li.1t tliilI<‘i`t‘iit‘t‘ \\`Ollltl il IIIAIIQC? :\ QYULII (I€‘L\I—
IIII `IIIIIII IIIIYIII I`IIl'l`('l'Il}` \xtu|tlt·r \\Il(‘IIl('|` tI1i~y_ tiit1_ might not Iw if the ctiiiimuiiists \\`€rc to seek to expallltl fl1c‘il` COIIUOI to
IIII IIIIIEIII IIlI*III\\It i|| gi fiiiiirp I](1|i|‘ UI} ]|(·(·(l   [lip giiiiig i;(‘[$ [tit) l]t)I, t‘ll]l}I`;lL’t‘ UIllt‘l` SUIIIIRIRINI :\Si&lI\ UUIIIIIIIIKDS-
III I`III III I IIIIIIN Il`il\l‘§ tlic incgtitigitiiig tulilo us tht- only- I`t‘;lSUIl— ll<>\\ to pl`t‘\’t‘1li this?
III IIQIIIIIII IAIIIII *IIII`IIlIilIl\(‘ l(‘II[, _·\||(l     il Q()(>tI ;llI(‘l`|1ilII\`t‘_   IOU 'l`Il(‘l`l‘   . Oli t'(\lll`St‘. lll) IIOOI-}71`O0i \\`ll·Y·
iiimy .-\int·i·it·;ins. iiicliitliiii; souit- otlieiul ones. st-ein to 'l`ht—i·e is tunple reason to doubt. liowex·ei·. that the
III IIQIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIV Iltlll I}(‘ut)li;tIit)]]   ;\ I\i||tl (III (lt‘iI(*;i[_ IIIl)t‘ lI|ii[t‘tl IIlliit‘tl SIRIUS fill) SlIt`L`t‘$$iIllll}` QIILIYLIIIICLI 1I IIUIIIIAXII \`I\`I`
IIIII NMI] II‘III`$iI|t\\`t‘l` }lIl;lI';lI\it‘t‘ IILIS SONIC llll\`QlIlIlIQ.`t‘$ IIUI
·‘II"""I°`III II III·‘ :\im·i·it-luis iyiii-il li-SS iii-ll iii t;i—iii·i·ii iii l$)3t1 iu-Iioii iuiuiy tlistitlviuitugesqiieluding the absence of good reusous _

  _· $II`$   I
J   * I  I I
  i é I. I
I I  ; I  
¤ I  I   I
t I I = I I
I 2 •   I I
 I I I I . I
i I I S L  
i ‘ 2 I I
I · I I I
’ I I I I  
· A s Ii Q
I I I  ii
! I ·
» I I I I  I  
 — I ii; I  ;= i BI
  ? I   I I '
 I I I I I
. I I    , I for China to undertake, and adhere to. such a guarantee. It is extremely difficult-—if really possible over a pr;
· I · I I   A continuation of the type of International Control Com- longed period of time—for an outside force, or x.ii;I_·;i
I I I I I I mission (on which India, Canada and Poland have served outside forces, to keep peace in a distant part of the uorIf
I I I I I I in Vietnam and Laos—and, formerly, Cambodia) would A more realistic approach would be to encourage cf;
, I I I I seem highly naive in view of past failures. stronger powers in a particular region to exercise leialei->E.;;
  ‘     § Possibly the wisest approach would be a five-nation in pursuit of such an end. There has been a great deal if
Ig I   I control commission composed of other states of Southeast worry in some quarters concerning the foreign—polity 1:.·
II I I     I Asia, the countries which have the most to gain or lose by tentions of Indonesian President Sukarno. Perhaps sur}.;
II · I II   I what happens in Vietnam the next few years (the Philip- peace commission would provide a means for Iiitloiiozrl.
 ° I I   I I pines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Burma). It the sixth largest of the world`s countries (in terms of pq-
Ii    I     would be an “Asian solution" of the sort so long desired ulation), to exercise a truly stabilizing and gener.illj·‘
I I I =     f by Indonesian President Sukarno and others. It would be beneficial kind of leadership of the several Southeast Amt:
II I` ?   a means whereby the Southeast Asian states might en- countries.
III  `   I I deavor to minimize great power interference in their
  I I iii affairs, a goal of every single country in that part of the
    I I I I world. final point should be mentioned. By ll(‘llll`illiZ·lIliIIl
  I I     If such an approach succeeded, it might serve as a of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia i> Y·¤T
  I   I   springboard to CFOSS-notional cooperation on other ques- meant their isolation from contact—even ilkllli
I I II I tl0ll$ lll tilt? 211‘€21, something which surely is needed in economic and political intercourse-with (Illlill
I I \'i€W of the steadily increasing number of controversies If there is any possibility of reducing the (ihiuesc tlll`<‘·ll II
I I I I   I· among the countries in question. Communist advances in Southeast Asia, it is by giving the Chinese annDll` *‘P‘
  I I I  E2lSi€fn Europe and the impetus which these gave to portunity correctly to pursue any legitimate interesl IIIIVI
I I I _   NATO, which in turn encouraged other types of cooper- may have in the area with states willing to do lil1>lll<’i$
 I I I III ation in \VeStern Europe, should not be forgotten. The with them (which all such states should be willing ill llll Dr. \
 V I I It ll€€d to fzlShiOn 21 peace for Vietnam might well be con- as part of the international effort to normalixc (IllIll*III Yfilllll)`. V
j;  I   I   I sidered both an Opportunity as well as a danger (although relations with the rest of the world). A ll`lO(lll$ VIWIIIII l`·f ·- 1 »
w _ _,···t·
BEYCDND     ’ t
i `\ _ ,__ (\_ .
‘c1‘ a pr.- t ,·" `·— { —
)I` \.lIl~,'Z1 _ l  
the motif _ ’ i V . 
urage tt:     1 · ‘ `  
ll‘;ltlt’l`>l.Z:J A A _ '. · ' _
·at tleal j · M il I ` 4 1
polio 1:.» l · `. `._. »    _ ` .
ps sud.; ` A 2 I V   N . ‘, 1 ¤
IIl(lOllt"i»¢· °   ‘ ’ If,.] g ° '   .
ns ol pf- i · ° _   n.     ` `
ge11e1.1llj·‘ —g_ Taft,   ip" `  
east .X>l.:Z2 __» ’• ·      
Q ‘ ··   .   ‘ 
l ——; £·% I . E =
.. • ;
ltI`LlllZ.lll1‘Il _ i ` i f
lia is 1.; {  
[CI] .11l11c _ l  
tl1 (illllli 5 
1· tl11‘1~.11 t1 - / ` p
1 Vl-
 iii $·¤<>¤` $k<"f<1~   .5 1   “
U l)ll>lllt'$$    
ling 111 llil DT. \\`, Brooks II{l]]]llt()l]_ 11 professor of hygiene {ll](l pnblic health. brings an unique appl‘OaCll to pllOtO-   `
1- (Zl1i11ust Qrapliy, \\l()l`l·(lllt[ i11 a lllL‘(ll\lIN l&lllll)£IStC(l as severely limited by its literal nature. Dr. Halnilton succeeds in   I
.15 Vlwlllll (`(lll\`(`I`l`lll§{ tlle tll(lllS;lll(lt0l(l Cll`eCts of C1llllGI`Ll lGllSCSll21lINS llgllilllg Cll€‘IlllCHl$ t(’Illp€I“8tllI‘€ p2lp€l‘S. H t€ChUlCZll l ii
NQ 1*1*11  lll¥l$t€‘T}' alltl 1111 lllt(‘ll(‘Ctlli1l vision into 1111 exciting experience tor those who wish their \‘iSiOll to QIOW and their   i
tlllllolllm 'lllll(lS to poncler tl1e re11lities ;_lll(l inysteries of existence, Over and above photographic technique. DT. H1lllliltO1l`S   i
T Mmm ll