xt7qjq0stw34_1151 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7qjq0stw34/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7qjq0stw34/data/1997ms474.dao.xml unknown archival material 1997ms474 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center.  Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. W. Hugh Peal manuscript collection West Publishing Co.'s Docket, volume 3, no. 13, with Advice from Lord Erskine text 43.94 Cubic Feet 86 boxes, 4 oversize boxes, 22 items Poor-Good Peal accession no. 11453. West Publishing Co.'s Docket, volume 3, no. 13, with Advice from Lord Erskine 2017 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7qjq0stw34/data/1997ms474/Box_11/Folder_32/Multipage3764.pdf 1922 February-March 1922 1922 February-March section false xt7qjq0stw34_1151 xt7qjq0stw34  

10. Paid
St. Paul, Minn.
Permit No. 4

 

 

West Publishing Co’s

casket

Comment
Advice from Lord Erskine
Procedure in Income Tax Cases
Instructions" to juries
Dr. Osler and the Supreme Court
World’s Largest Law Ofice
Cases of Interest
“Of the Record ”

 

’ 2 " No.13

 

 

 

' (Postmaster : Return postage guaranteed by West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota

 

  

 

 

0 STATE

is sufficient unto itself
in the matter of precedents

Every state court, in the course of a year,
cites a very considerable number of outside
decisions. '

Certain states enjoy a very decided preféra
ence in this matter.

They are, in the order named,

V Massachusetts,
New York,

Illinois.

The “Northeastern Reporter,” including these
states (as well as Indiana and Ohio), pro-
Vicles the most economical means of adding
these decisions to your library.

\ The Thin Paper 2-in-1 Edition
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Winslow’s “Forms of .
Pleading & Practice

Based on forms that have had the approval of ‘the Courts

A collection of over 3,500 formsrfor every step to be taken in a
legal action, from the filing of the complaint to the final judgment.

By HON. JOHN B. WIVNSLOW

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3 volumes Buckram binding v 2,800 pages $22.50 delivered . , .

For Use in All Code States

 

 

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On acceptance of this order, you may send “Winslow’s P‘Orms of Pleading and
Practice under the Code,” 2d Edition, 1915, bound in buckram, in 3 volumes, at

‘ $22.50 delivered. .,.

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Judicially Defined

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Series, 12 volumes, bound in buckram, for which I agree to pay $72.00; $12.00 cash with this
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Name——-----------------,--'--------- Address----—---~---------——-------———

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

  

 

   

F. G. Stutz, Editor

 

; .. West Publishing Co’s

 

VOL. 3 ST. PAUL, FEB-MARCH, 1922 i NO. 13

 

 

Comment

ByiMembers of the Publishers' Editorial Stall

Appellation Jazz

hoever hooked the monickers on the different members of the Weare
family who figured in the case of Glassock v. Weare, 234 Southwest-
ern Reporter, 216,’ certainly showed a marked partiality for the tenth letter
of the alphabet. Look them over: Jared, Jerome, Jahaza, Jaakim, Jaffa.
Jacova, Jabus, and Jaza. '
53’ it? 121
Judicial Interpretation of “Shimmy"

(t t best, the ‘shimmy,’ wherever rendered, is not a refined or elevating
dance. Slightly exaggerated, it easily becomes a suggestive and inde-
cent performance.”——Judge Saunders, of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia, in Pope v. Commonwealth, 109 Southeastern Reporter, 429.
i3! 33‘ D? i
Sanctily of Precedenls v
“Chem is no superstitious sanctity attaching to a precedent. It is proper
that precedents should not be lightly changed, or without sufficient
cause. But they should not be adhered to when an opinion has clearly mis—
construed a statute or is otherwise palpably erroneous. This court has never
held that it was infallible, nor has’any other court. We have repeatedly
overruled our own decisions, and a large pamphlet was issued some years
nr ' ago, containing ,a list‘ of such cases, and a similar compilation now wOuld be
two or three times as large. The same is true of the United States Supreme
Court and all other courts. Men and nations may—

( ‘Rise 0n stepping-stones
Of their (lead selves to higher thinng

 

 

“Courts can only maintain their authority by correcting their errors to

(2445)

accord with justice and the advance and ,progress of each age. They must'

 
  

     
   

  

 

 

2446 Comment

slough off that which is obsolete, and correct whatever is erroneous or con-
trary to the enlightenment and sense of justice of the age and to the spirit
of new legislation.”—Chief Justice Walter Clark, in State v. Falkner, 108
Southeastern Reporter, 756.

He Wasn’t Sure

Che following cross-examination recalls Mark Twain’s statement, on
reading a newspaper report of his death, that the report was “greatly
exaggerated”: “Q. You went to Arizona on account of tuberculosis? A.
Yes, sir. Q. You are not afflicted with that now, are you? A. The doctor
gave me a week to live after I got there. Q. You didn’t die, did you? A. I
don’t think so.”——-Quoted from Judge Tolman’s opinion in the Supreme Court
of Washington, in Welker v. Wallace, 200 Pacific Reporter, 561.

53‘, ‘35. .0

The Professzon’s High Standard

7701-, alone is it sufficient to preserve the high standard of the legal pro—
v fession, that each individual member act in‘a manner above reproach.
He should, in addition, bring to the attention of the proper authorities any
breaches of the ethics of the profession that come to his attention. Judge
Teller, of the Supreme Court of Colorado, in People v. Class, 201 Pacific
Reporter, 883, said in discussing the question: “it is the privilege, if not the
duty, of every attorney to call to the attention of this court any act of a li-
censed attorney which may fairly be considered to disqualify him. Calling
attention to breaches of professional duty should beencouraged, rather than
denounced, and it is only by the exercise of constant vigilance on the part of
the members of the bar that the profession may be kept up to that high
standard which should characterize it.”

Biffittii

steep.

fudges’ Salaries and Allowances

a judge occupies an honorable pesition. The honor of it is more accept-
able to him than to his creditors. It is of little value in meeting the high
cost of living. In these times small salaries, with or without the honor of
position, are betWeen the upper and nether millstones, being ground always
into shorts. Even legislators once in a while see this truth. So did the
South Dakota Legislature, in providing $150 as‘ a monthly allowance for ex—
penses of the Supreme Court judges, receiving salaries of $3,009 per annurn.
Some critics were ungenerous enough to claim that such an allowance was a .
payment of additional “compensation,” or a “perquisite” or “emolument” of
the office, and violative of the Constitution fixing the judges’ compensation
and making it unlawful for them to receive any such additions. The allow-
ance was made in a lump sum to enable the judges to meet the expense of
moving to the state capital and of-living ata place other" than their legal“
residence. The Supreme Court being interested, a special substitute court

 

 

was appointed to hear and determine the question in an original proceeding " '

by the Attorney General to prohibit the state auditor from drawing war-2 ~
rants for such expenses. The allowance was sustained in State v. Reevest _
184 Northwestern Reporter, 993. The court, in the course of its opinion, ar- - ‘

 

 
 

 

   

 

 

  

l

 

   
   

cific, 1008.

 

 

Comment I. I ‘ 24,47

gues that such allowance is not an emolument or additional compensation
within the meaning of the Constitution, as that is something positively and
directly conferred on the holder of an office, and not something inseparably
and incidentally used by him in the discharge of his duty. The question '
whether the amount of $150 is excessive is dependent on the standard of liv-
ing of the judges and was for the Legislature to determine. Expense al-
lowances to judges of the lower court and many state officers were also con—

sidered in this opinion.
£3 33‘. ICE

Taxation of Seat in Stock Excjiaiige

@axation often presents a threefold problem. The taxpayer, the collector,
and the courts have their own difficulties to meet in regard to it. In the
following case the court had a novel question to answer. A membership or
“seat” in the New York Stock Exchange was purchased for $60,000 by a
resident of the state of Ohio. Its ownership enabled him to conduct from
his office in Ohio a lucrative business through other members in New York.
It had a market value for the purpose of" sale, though transferable only with
the approval of a committee, and was subject to disposal on the member’s
death by the committee. The Supreme Court in Anderson v. Durr, 42 Su-
preme Court Reporter, 15, holds that Such a membership is a valuable prop—
erty right, in angible in its nature, but of so substantial a character as to be
subject to state taxation in Ohio. Such‘taxation does not deny to the owner
due process of law, though t1" e membership privilegesexercisable locally in

' New York enabled that state also to. tax them;- it does not deny the equal

protection of the law. to the'owner,'though other brokerS-in New York are
not taxed on.the privilege of doing business in New York, Stock Exchange
Securities; and it does not impose a burden 0n interstate commerce, though
the member conducted his business from his Ohio office through other mem—
bers in New York, as property employed 1n interstate commerce may be sub-
jected to ordinary property taxation. This decision gives a negative an'swer
to the questiOn, f‘Does the law shield the rich from too great taxation ?”

33' 33 33
Ski/lock a True Cosmopolitan

“t may be true that the Shylock that Shakespeare immortalized was a

Jew, but the character pictured by the master’s pen in the Merchant of j.
, Venice has been found in all ages, among all races, and in all businesses. Un-

fbrtunately, no race has a monopoly of him—no age that does not produce
too many of him, Thus it is, when one is selfish, covetous, grasping, when he

vderivesahard and one—sidedbargain, he'is not infrequently referred to as a

Shleck. ”—From the opinion of Judge Evan A. Evans, United States Circuit

. Judge, on motion for new trial in United States v. Heitler, 274 Federal Re- ‘
porter, 401. , . .

CE 13 35!
Did He Give Me Fish a Bat/2.3

t would be expected that an action would not hold for.‘ ‘pollution of
stream,” and the court reversed a conviction. Neptune v. State,‘,200 Pa-

   

 

  
 

 

Advice from Lorci Erskine

./ .

' / o~ W.“ /z,; ,6 J

457‘" /%;Z¢;CL,/ ,égii/f" 43fZL‘ ¢;::;;5,,, /}€ggP/;dfl4bfl,,r4:::»%«19' :2//>’_,iézi:%%€z¢;7

Sir —--I advise you by all means to submit your difference to arbitration. A barrister
is always the best arbitrator, and if your opponent objects to it, depend upon it. he
thinks himself in the wrong. But, if such a reference is objected to, refer it to any
honest indifferent man, who, if he doubts upon any point, can be advised at no ex?
pense worth naming. I have always considered every man as a lunatic or worse who
goes to law when he can possrbly avoid it. If you cannot agree on one arbitrator,
let each of you name one, and if they differ let them name an umpire. lam sir,
your obed't servant, T. Erskine.

(2449)

  
 

Procedure in Income Tax Cases Before the
, Bureau of internal Revenue 4

“By Walter E. Barton, oi the Washington, D. C., Bar

’ axpayers of the country are being
called upon to settle their income
tax liability for past taxable years
with the Bureau of'lnternal Rev—
-‘ enue in Washington. In this ar—
' ticle I shall discuss briefly the procedure. ap-
plicable to such cases. Due to the.limited
space, only the important phases of it can be
included. , -.

Section 250 (b) of the new ract imposes
upon the Commissioner the duty of examin~
ing the return. This authority is delegated
to the Income Tax Unit. The Commission-
er is also authorized to examine the books
of the taxpayer by section l308. TI

   

.1

me ex—
amination of the return and the books is
usually made quite a while after the tax is
paid. The correctness or incorrectness oi
the amount of tax shown to be due on the
return is thereby established.

It is necessary that the assessment be made
within four years after the return is filed,
except for years prior to l92l, in which
case the period is five years; however, the
time may be extended by agreement between
the CommiSSioner and the taxpayer. is
rule is further modified in the case of a false
or fraudulent return with intent to evade the
tax, or of failure to file return. Under these
circumstances, there is no statute of limita~
ti'ons against assessment. Section l3l2 pro«
vides that the Commissioner and the taxpay-
er may, agree that an assessment shall be
final. This .is binding upon both parties,
except upon a showing of fraud or misrepre-
sentation of fact materially afiecting the as—
sessment as made. .

After the completion of the office audit

of the return, supported “by a field examina-
tion; it any, the Bureau writes a letter
(known as the AAZ letter) to thetaxpayer,
advising that the audit discloses an oyer- or
under-assessment, as the case may be. Sec-
tion 250 (d) provides-that the taxpayer
shall be given 30 days’ notice by registered
mail within which to file an appeal and show
cause why the tax or deficiency should not

bé paid. :.No notice need be given when de- .
* (24.50.),

lay “would jeopardize collection of the
amount due. . ,

Since the enactment of the new revenue
law, the A—Z letter has been sent under
registered mail, and constitutes the statu-

tory notice. It is therefore necessary that

‘ an appeal be taken within the 30—day period;

otherwise, the tax will go on the assessment
roll, and no claim in abatement may be filed
to suspend collection of the same, as will
hereinafter appear. (

The preliminary hearing is a conference
in the Income Tax Unit. The taxpayer’s
case must be presented in writing and veri—
fied, although he may also present it orally.
Representatives of taxpayers must file power
of attorney.

An appeal may be taken to the'Commitj
tee on Appeals and Review, from the deci—
sion of the Income Tax Unit. iPrior to the
enactment of the present law, the taking of
an appeal did not operate to suspend as-
sessment. Now the assumption is that the
tax will not be placed on' the assessment
roll until after the taxpayer has been given
an opportunity to appeal to the Committee,
inasmuch as, there is no method of abating
the amount assessed as was the case under
former acts. The decision of the Commit-

tee is transmitted to the attorney of the tax— '

payer when made, but the file is returned to

the Income Tax Unit for audit in accord- ,

ance with this decision. In due course, the

taxpayer receives another letter giving him the _ .‘

result of this audit. .
Assuming that the taxpayer has been no~
tified and giVen an opportunity to be heard in
accordance with section 250 (d), he must
pay the tax within to days after notice
and demand by the collector, and no claim
-in abatement may be filed to suspend the
collection thereof. Presumably section 250
(e), which provides that a claim in abate—
ment may be filed in case’ the provisions of
section 250 (d) are-knot complied with, is

intended to take care of cases where the A—Z "

letter was mailed before the law became ef-
fective. , _ , -- » '

 

        

.....-_,... ._ VHL.

 

a...” “.mflw;_.,m .

  

 

 

 

 .m— ~v.—-\~Iq!“ AH"... ...

 

 

 

  

Instructions to Juries ~

After the tax is paid. if the taxpayer in—
tends to contest it, lie should file claim for
credit or claim forr refund. 7 Such claims

must be filed within five years after the re-'

turn for the year in question Was due. How~
ever, no limitation exists in cases where the
Commissioner, in .etermining invested capital
for any year, allows additional depreciation
for prior years, and such allowance re—
sults in an overpayment of taxes for such
former years.

During this procedure, all rights should
be preserved for suit. No question may be
raised by suit which was not presented be—
fore suit to the Commissioner of internal
Revenue.1 The filing of a claim for re-

 

1 t Kwnwer Military School V. Crutchlev, 274
“ml. 125.

      
    

245i

. fund or claim for credit is a necessary pre—,

requisite to suit“ All questions which it
is proposed to raise by suit should be the
foundation of such claims. _The tax must
be paid under protest.3

Cases should be prepared as carefully for
presentation before the Bureau of Internal
Revenue as they are for court. In doing
so, rulings of the various offices of the Bu—
reau, as well as court decisions. should be
thoroughly studied. if this is done, the
taxpayer in most cases gets what he. is justly
entitled to.

L’Srt'iiun 3111:“. ll. it‘ll. ill. H.
51H”).

7‘ Cllflorfiflrtil'r)tt_'c’.’l\ v. l'. N” 191 U. N. 3.73:. 24
Sup. (‘1‘. 2 W '1'). Ell. A1312: U, S. v. N. Y.
& (‘tthan 200 U. S. 488,

Conn). St, §

 

 

 

'2

l Steamship (W,

in
20 Sup. Ct. 3127, at) L. lurt. out), and many
others. ‘

  

instructions to juries

Rules Governing the Giving or Refusal of instructions

Who word “instructions,” as used
‘ to describe the directions given by
the judge to the jury on the trial of
a civil or criminal case, has a tend-
r ency to mislead, in thatuit seems
to imply some degree of subordination on
the part of the body instructed to that ‘in—
structing. The word may. perhaps, suggest
'3 ' the relation of principal and agent—-—a prin—
cipal who evolves from his own breast rules
of conduct for an agent who owes his exist-
“ ence solely to the act of the principal. The

/ analogy is not a true one.
The jury is in no sense the agent of the
a... judge. They both derive their origin from
.. the same high source, and the judge, in lay-
ing down rules to guide the jury in their
deliberations, merely acts as the mouthpiece

   

of the law for'the purpose of marking out

a definite and clearly ascertained path by
which the ends of justice are attained. That
this is so becomes more apparent when it is
seen that even in those actions at law in
whichi the judge acts without the aid of a
jury, a party has a right to demand that the

x

r

principles of law applicable to the facts
found by the court shall be declared by it as
distinctly as in instructions to a jury, and that
such declarationsshould, as in cases tried be—
fore a jury, avoid comment upon theweight
and probative effect of the evidence.

The province of instructions to juries may
be said to be to state and apply the law
to the facts in a particular case, so that it
may readily be understood by the mind un-
trained in the law.
pose of such instructions should be to pre-
sent the issues of the‘case in'the most intelli—'
gible form, notice the claims of. the parties,
suggest so far as necessary the principles \of
evidence and their application, and define for
the jury and direct their attention to ”the
legal principles wl ieh govern the facts proved
or presumed in the case, and, where the evi~
dence is ‘of such a character as may easily
lead to the raising of a false issue, the court
should guard against such an issue by ap-
propriate instructions. It has been said,
however, that the principal benefit to~be de-
rived from a charge to the jury is not a state—

.

"‘From‘ the introductory chapter of “Randall’s Instructions to Juries? ‘ . _ i.

Accordingly 'the pur?

 

l

  
  
 
 
 
  
   
   
     

   

ment of the law, but the elimination of irrele-
vant matters. '

At the very threshold of a discussion of
instructions to juries lies the problem of de—
lining the respective provinces of court and
jury, since in every instruction to the jury
which is not a mere abstract statement of
the law there must necessarily be present in
the mind of the court the question how far
it can, or should, go without surrendering
its own prerogatives or invading those of
the jury. The problem. of course, is large-
ly to prevent the jury from being reduced to
a mere ministerial agent of the court. \Vhile
laws have been enacted from time to time
confirming and strengthening the status of
the jury as a part of our judicial machinery,
and courts recognize theoretically that the
jury performs functions equal in importance
to their own, yet when they come to instruct
the jury they frequently fail to visualize that
the province of the jury, although not so
tangible as an acre of land or a geographical
subdivision, has certain definite frontiers
which are to be defended.

The fundamental conception of the jury
system is a simple one: Two tribunals sit-
ting side by side in the adjustment of human
rights and relations, one supreme in the realm
of fact, and the other absolute in the realm
of law; the composite decision of law and
fact being rendered by the jury after being
duly instructed in the law by the court.
However, it must be admitted that we have
here a very delicate piece of mechanism.
Embarrzfssment is pretty certain to arise when
. one equal is called upon to instruct a coequal
as to their respective rights and duties. Hu-
man nature being what it is, there is a ,tend—
ency for the one to-be accorded dominance
and the other to acquire subserviency. .. .i

Moreover, in pointing out to the jury the
matters they are to pass upon, the boundaries
between fact and law must,be plainly indi-
cated. Yet it is not alvvays easy, even for
the trial judge, to fix such boundaries, and
not every judge has the power'of lucid ex-
pression necessary to avoidmisapprehension
by the juror, or, if the judge has such power,
he frequently has not the disposition or op-
portunity to use it in the hurry of the court—
room. Then, too, the trial judge trained,
not only in the law, but in the ability to
grasp quickly the meaning of facts, often
finds it“ difficult not to anticipate the con-

2452 i . Instructions to Juries

clusions of the jury. it ought not to be a
matter of surprise, therefore, that in the
trial of cases before a jury instructions, in-
tended to guard against error, become them—
selves a prolific source of error, and there is
often involved much of vexation. annoyance,
and 'hope deferred, which might, perhaps,
have been avoided, if the trial had been be—
fore a single tribunal.

But, whatever the defects of the jury
system are, it will in all human probability
endure as long as our present form of gov—
ernment. It is too broadly buttressed upon
political, sociological, and historical reasons
to be overthrown by mere considerations of
efficiency. When our society is more per-
ectly organized, perhaps the juror will come
to the performance of his duties vvith an,
equipment which will enable the court merely
to lay down general principles, leaving to
the jury their concrete application. Until
that time arrives it will be the duty of the
profession to eliminate waste and friction by
a study of the precedents in the decisions
of the courts of last resort, of which there
are now a vast number, and which discuss
the relations of court and jury from almost
every conceivable angle.

It has been sought, from these decisions,
to construct a chart of the fundamental prin‘
ciples which should guide the court in git"
ing instructions, so far as their formulation is
affected by the necessity of preserving un—
impaired the supremacy of court and jury in
their respective spheres.

Under the common law it is competent
for the trial judge to give his opinion upon
the facts, as well as upon the law, so long
as he leaves it to the jury to find a verdict
according to their opinions, and in the fed-
eral courts, where the common law prevails,
ihis‘the settled doctrine, both in civil and in
criminal cases, that it is not reversible error
for the judge to express his own opinionon

the facts, if the rules of law are correctly ,.

laid down and all matters of fact are ulti-
mately submitted to the jury. In some of
the state courts, also, this practice still ob-
tains, in criminal as well as in ciVil cases.
As indicated by the foregoing statement,
such an expression of opinion will be erro‘
neous, even at common law, unless accom~
panied by an instruction that the jury are
not bound by the opinions of the court, or
at least unless. the jury are given clearly to‘

  

 

 

‘)_:,.K.,;W.fi,..,,\,w .

 

135:

:éil‘lLIr'Ss 1“; 7

,

A
,l
.t

    
 
  
 
 
   

 

  

 

      
         

Dr. Osler and the Supreme Court €453

understand in some part of the charge, that
they are the exclusive judges of the facts.
The greatest caution should be used in the
exercise of such power of comment, that the
jury may be left free and untrammeled in
the determination of questions of fact sub-
mitted to them. It follows that the man—
net of expression by the court of its opinions
must not be such as to be likely to prevent
the jury from acting upon an opposite opin—
ion. Moreover, the expression of such an
opinion is only permissible when it is based
upon the evidence in the case.

The general rule is that the court is not
obliged to exercise such power of comment,
and that it may, in its discretion, decline to
express an opinion on a matter of fact sub-
mitted to the jury. ln some jurisdictions,
however, both in civil and criminal cases, it
is held that sometimes it may be the duty of
the trial judge, within the limitations of the

’i

t‘p‘ 1:;

Dr. Osler and the Supreme Court

ome years ago Dr. Osler created a
near panic, among those of us who
,I thought we were just reaching the
“i age of discretion, by announcing
that after a certain age a man's
usefulness began to decline and that it was
time to think of putting him permanently on
the shelf. If this version of the matter has
not already been exploded,- the finishing
touches may be put to it by applying it to
the present United States Supreme Court.
The following table of the Judges of that
court shows the dates of their birth, the dates
of their appointment and their present ages:

 

  
 

Holmes ........... 1941 1.002 .80
McKenna ......... 184.”. 1805‘ TH
Day .............. mm 191»; 72
Brandeis .......... t ‘ 1910 _ (3?)
Tail: ... ...........1 1921 (it
Clarke ............ 14 at 1016 (H
Pitncy ............ 135K 1912 03’.
Van Devnntor . . . . . .1850 1910 £22.
B‘Iclteynoltls ....... 1862 101-1 59

This makes an aggregate sum ‘of 607
years for the nine Justices, or an average
ot‘about 67% years. '

In this connection a review of the work of
this court for the, past year, as set forth by

   
  
 

above rule, to tell the jury how the evidence
strikes his mind.

Because of the fact that judicial utterances
concerning the evidence are apt to be given
great moral weight by the jury, sometimes
leading them to shirk responsibility by adopt—
ing the opinion of the judge and because of
the fact that judges have not infrequently
evinced partisanship, molding verdicts to
their will, the power of the court to comment
on the evidence or to charge on the facts has,
in the great majority of the states, at various
times and in varying degrees, been abridged
by constitutional or statutory limitations.

Whatever may be said of the policy of
the old common-law'rule, it is simple and
easy of application. That the barrier set up
for the courts by the modern rule has been
difficult to observe is attested by the multi—
tude of cases in which its interpretation has
been a matter of dispute.

‘0’, 31‘,

the Editor of the Amei‘ican Bar Association
Journal, will be of particular interest:

At the last term 608 cases were dis—
posed of, Zl8 full' opinions were handed
rlown and 390 “memorandum" opinions“ Of
.tnese 608 cases, dissent was recorded in 42.
Dissenting opinions‘ were filed in 14 and dis—
sent noted without opinion in 25. In 3 of
the 42 cases dissenting justices concurred
in the judgment of the court and the dis—
sent was directed at the course or nsoning
adopted in the majority opinion.

Those who have studied these cases in

which dissents were recorded will, it is be—-

lieved, agree that no uncertainty as to the
fixed and fundamental principles of the law
was evidenced, but that in most cases the
difference was as to which principlelof law
was applicable to the peculiar facts of the
case. This is the reason why it is so difficult,
in reading the prevailing and dissenting opin—
ions, to put one‘s finger on the error in either.
Usually both are right so far as the law is
concerned. . A

The court has made a gainvon its undis—
posed—of cases. as appears lrorii the follow-

   

2454

’ing table furnished by the courtesy of Mr.

C. E. Stewart, the Chief Clerk of the De—y

partment of Justice:
' Appt‘llul‘t‘, Original

 

 

' Docket “Docket Total
(.' UM s pending from i
previous 11-1111....... 396 24 410
LthS «101:1:(211111 Octolw 1,
. 110130, term ......... 'i 10 505
. Ttil'nl ............. {HI I} ' HTS
(‘11s11s disposed of at the ’
torrn .............. 508. 10 008
(Hist-s 1'1111121i11i11g‘ undis-
]111.\'1‘tl (1]. ........... 3-13 ll- 31?

Of the 598 appellate cases disposed of,
V only 92 were reversed; l39 were affirmed,
83 dismissed Z30 petitions for certio1a1i
denied 47 settled by the parties, and 7 cer
tified questions ansue1ed.

During and since the years of our par—
ticipation in the,World War, problems aris—
ing from that war have necessarily demanded
the attention of our highest tribunal. Some

World's Biggest Law Office

of the opinions delivered in cases involving the
war powers of the nation will rank in his~
tory as among the most notable contribué

1tions to our body of constitutional law.

Without some oi them,- our power to carry on
etlectne war would have been gravely im-
paned.

New problems will arise—the problems
of reconstruction and of a social justice
which shall end the existing war between
classes and interests. The more important
01 these problems are sooner or later brought
be1ore our court of last resort, and history
1ustihes the confident assertion that in the
pronouncements of that court \xill be found
most etiective aid to the solution of; such
problems i

A study of selected decisions of the Sn-
p1eme Court 01 the United States will re—
pay the busiest lawyer for the time devoted
to such study and is well wo1th while for
any layman.

31‘. "CE

\X/orldis Biggest Law’Ofiice

"""""¢ he office of the United States At—
torney for the Southern District of
New York'is “the biggest law
_ _ office in the world," according to
» its . present incumbent, Colonel
Wi iam Hayward. in an interview. in the
' New Yo1l< Times.
. The volume of legal business handled by
the local United States Attorneys office is
without parallel either in the United States
or in foreign countries. At present the total
number 'of civil and criminal cases on the
docket is l2,000.. A ‘ —
Of.” this number, about 2,800 are civil
cases, which involve all together $l l0,000,—
000, and,_of these 2,800 about l,200 are
admiralty cases growing out of the activities
of the United States Shipping Board during
’ the war, representing an aggregate of $40,-
000,000 in claims. Case's exclusive of those
of the Shipping Board represent a total of
$70, 000, 000.
It is obligatory for the United States Dis-
trict Attorney to represent the government
in matters of litigation and to serve as coun-

  

sel in friendly legal matters, such as the
examination of titles, further explained Colo—
nel/ Hayward, who added:

“A check for $2,750,000 passed across
my desk just a few days ago when the gov-
ernment'acquired title to the Roman Catho-
lic Orphan Asylum at Kingsbridge, whic