xt7sxk84n30q https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7sxk84n30q/data/mets.xml Ohio United States Works Progress Administration 1937 Other contributors include: Robert C. Lowe (Robert Chapin) and William H. Garner under the supervision of A. Ross Eckler; 26 pages, 27 cm; This bulletin is one of a series presenting state constitutional provisions affecting public welfare; Includes bibliographical references; UK holds archival copy for ASERL Collaborative Federal Depository Program libraries; Call number Y 3.W 89/2:36/Oh 3 books English Washington D.C.: Works Progress Administration Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Analysis of Constitutional Provisions Affecting Public Welfare in the State of Ohio text Analysis of Constitutional Provisions Affecting Public Welfare in the State of Ohio 1937 2015 true xt7sxk84n30q section xt7sxk84n30q   _ »
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· U

This bulletin is one of a series presenting
State constitutional provisions affecting public wel-
• fare, prepared to supplement the State by State di-
gests of public welfare laws so as to provide in ab-
stract form the basis for the public welfare services
of the several States. '
{ The provisions quoted are those concerned
.• directly with public welfare administration and such
others as may substantially affect a public welfare
program, even though only indirectly related. It
would be impossible to consider within the limits of
this study every remotely connected constitutional
- provision. The indirectly related provisions in-
• cluded, therefore, have been restricted to those con-
cerning finance, legislation, and the methods of con-
· st itut i onal amendment .
` An attempt has been made, by a careful se-
} lection of the most recent cases decided by the high-
1 • est courts of the States, to indicate wherever possi-
» ble how these provisions have been construed. These
y cases are included in footnotes appended to the con-
, stitutional provisions shown.
It is hoped that these abstracts will be
• useful to those interested in public welfare ques-
tions in indicating how State and local public wel-
fare administration may be affected by constitutional
  powers and limitations.

Incidence of Responsibility for Welfare Program 1
Financial Powers and Limitations
Taxation and Assessments 4
Exemptions 11
. Borrowing and Use of Credit 12
Other Income 17
Appropriations and Expenditures 17
Provisions Affecting Legislation 17
Constitutional Amendment or Revision 25

` `

 » •
· Ohio 3;,
- I. Incidence of Responsibility for Welfare Program_§/
* l. Constitution (1912), with all amendments to February l, 1937.
_ "In construing the Constitution of Ohio, if a power of legis-
· lation is not limited or denied, it may be said to exist." Green
• vs. Thomas, 37 0. App. 489, 175 N. E. 226 (1930).
2. "The Constitution contains no provision requiring that the relief
; of the poor shall be conducted and provided for in institutions,
` nor does it prohibit outdoor relief of the poor. The entire system
for the establishment and maintenance of benevolent institutions
and benevolent works of the state has proceeded upon the idea that
° the Legislature, in the exercise of its general legislative power,
was vested with authority to do whatever in its judgment the public
welfare demanded, always provided that the thing done should be for
a public purpose and should not take public money for the advance-
ment of a purely private object . . . It was early decided in Ohio
_ that the whole subject of relieving the poor, where it is done in
‘ pursuance of law, is of statutory origin and depends on statutory
’ regulations." State vs. Edmondson, S9 O. S. 351, 106 N. E. 41
· The Legislature passed an act providing that "all male blind
persons over the age of El years and all female blind persons over
the age of lS years who have been residents of the State for five
( ° years, and of the county for one year, and have no property or means
with which to support themselves, shall be entitled to and ieceive
not nnre than $25.00 per capita quarterly". The act was held in-
X valid as providing for "an indeterminate gratuitous annuity, a gift
j pure and simple", because "The act does not direct that the payments
shall continue during the lifetime of the beneficiary, nor does it
j ' limit the time, nor provide that payments shall cease with the needs
l of the donee, or provide for any subsequent inquiry"; and further
) "If the power of the Legislature to confer an annuity upon any class
of needy citizens is admitted upon the ground that its tendency will
be to prevent them from becoming a public charge, then innumerable
classes may clamor for similar bounties . . . and it is doubted that
° any line could be drawn short of an equal distribution of property".
Lucas County vs. State ex rel. Boyles, 75 O. S. 114, 78 N. E. 955
An act creating a State board for the relief and benefit of the
needy blind and providing that "any person who by reason of loss of
eyesight, is unable to provide himself or herself with the necessaries
· of life and has not sufficient means . . . so to do, shall be entitled
to the benefits of the law", held invalid. The court said that inas-
much as such a person might have children, friends, or relatives
· (Footnote forwarded)

 ' i ,
2. Ohio ‘ _
I. Incidence of Responsibility for Welfare Progam (Cont'd) ·
A. Institutions for the benefit of the insane, blind, and • L
deaf and dumb, shall always be fostered and supported by the State;
and be subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by the Gen-
era} Assembly. §/
(Footnote #5 - Continued)
supporting him or in a position to support him, such payment could •
not be said to be for a public object but would be the giving of a
bounty to one who had no real need for it in order to prevent his I
becoming a charge upon the public. State vs. Edmondson, B9 O. S. ,
351, 106 N. E. 4l (1913).
Another act under consideration in this preceding case provided
that "any person of either sex who by reason of loss of eyesight, is
unable to provide himself with the necessities of life, who has not ‘
sufficient means of his own to maintain himself, and who unless re-
lieved, as authorized by these provisions, would become a charge ,
upon the public or upon those not required by law to support him, is
entitled to its benefit, if he has become blind while a resident of
the State . . . and of the county for one year". The law provided
also that "such relief shall be in place of all other relief of a
public nature". Also that the board of commissioners might modify
or change the amount of relief given or discontinue same entirely • —
when and if the beneficiaries in their judgment no longer needed
The court held the act valid and said "Every safeguard has been ·
adopted to secure the application of the money to the support of the V
individual and to prevent him from becoming a public charge. It is `
not an indeterminate annuity, unlimited in time or uncertain in its g i
application. The express object and the practical provision of the
enactment is to furnish relief to the blind who are poor and needy.
It is not questioned that the relief of the poor is a proper public ·
purpose". Ibid. (
See also Board of Health vs. City of Canton et al. vs. State ‘ _
·ex rel. O'Wesney, 40 O. App. 77, 178 N. E. 215 (1931), and other •
cases cited under footnote 17, page 8. Y
Where an act provided that "the findings of the probate court v
shall be final and conclusive unless reviewed, set aside, or modi-
fied by the board (for the relief and benefit of the needy blind)
at their discretion", the court said "it might well be doubted
whether the Legislature has power to confer on an administrative •
board the authority to review a final order made by a court of
record. If the order of the probate court can be regarded as a
judicial order, the provision for review would be invalid, for such
a board cannot exercise judicial functions". State vs. Edmondson,
89 O. S. 351, lO6 N. E. 4l (1913).
3. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. l. •
The word "institutions" means the places where, and the means
by which, the afflictions of the persons referred to may be relieved;
it is sometimes used to mean the establishment where the operations
of an association are carried on, and is also used to designate the ·
(Footnote forwarded) _

 i •
` Ohio 5,
· I. Incidence of Responsibility for Welfare Program (Cont*d)
(• B. See page 13, par. (d).
C. Laws may be passed fixing and regulating the hours of
labor, establishing a minimum wage, and providing for the comfort,
health, safety and general welfare of all employees; and no other
provision of the constitution shall impair or limit this power. 4/
(Footnote #3 — Continued)
organized body. Gerke vs. Purcell, 25 O. S. 229 (1874); reaffirmed
• in State ex rel. Walton vs. Edmondson, 89 O. S. 351, 106 N. E. 41
( This section was held to be "neither a grant nor a limitation
’ of power, but a recognition of the fact that by enlightened people
such classes are treated as wards of the State, and is an injunction
upon the General Assembly to foster and support institutions for their
* benefit". Lucas County vs. State ex rel. Boyles, 75 O. S. 114, 78
N. E. ass (isos).
See page 1, footnote 2.
Upon the proposition that under this section the State was re-
quired to support such institutions by taxation and could neither
` order nor authorize a county to levy a county property tax to meet
l ‘ * the expense of maintaining inmates committed thereto from the county,
the court held that inasmuch as "such provision of the Constitution
is not self—executing and that the mode in which such institutions
· are to be fostered and supported is left to the discretion of the
general assembly", the State might require a county to so provide.
State ex rel. Price Attorney General vs. hume, 105 O. S. 304, 137
. • N. E. 167 (1922).
Q 4. Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 34.
E Barber shop closing hour ordinance held constitutional as being
VL a valid exercise of the police power and as a valid regulation of
` the hours of labor and general welfare of employees under this sec-
_ tion. City of Zanesville vs. Wilson, 51 O. App. 433, 1 N. E. (2d)
1 • 638 (1935). But cf. Olds vs. Klotz, 131 O. S. 447, 3 N. E. (2d)
{ 371 (1936), where the court distinguished a similar ordinance
1 relating to retail food and grocery stores and held it unconstitu-
tional on the ground that the ordinance had no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare and
was in violation of the due process clause of the Federal Constitu-
’ tion and the due course of law clause of the Ohio Constitution (Art.
I, Sec. 16). The court stated that whereas barbering was not
essential to health or life, "the necessity of having food available
at the time it may be required to supply pressing human want" could
not be overestimated.

 * .
4. ohio '
II. Financial Powers and Limitations .
A. Taxation and Assessments 5/ •
(1) state
(a) No tax shall be levied, except in pursuance of
law; and every law imposing a tax, shall state, distinctly, the object
of the same, to which only, it shall be applied. 6/ •
5. The powers of taxation are legislative and except for express and
implied constitutional provisions, are vested in the General •
Assembly without interference on the part of other governmental
agencies. State vs. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 120 O. S.
462, 482, 166 N. E. 407 (1929). Aff. 281 U. S. 74 (1950). `
‘ Section 26 of article II of the Constitution (see page 24, A
par. (6)) provides that all laws of a general nature shall have a
uniform operation throughout the State. Under this section an act ’
which provided for the establishment of library buildings and the
levy of taxes to retire bonds issued therefor, but limited in its
application to those counties where a library system had already
been established, was held invalid. The act actually could only
apply to Hamilton County and of this fact the court took judicial `
notice. Brown vs. State ex rel. Merland, 120 O. S. 297, 166 N. E. °
214 (1929), and cases cited therein.
An act provided for a State-wide uniform levy on property ·
classed as intangible, the proceeds to be distributed under State
supervision for local purposes. The act superseded prior enact-
ments which permitted local county levies on the same property at
rates which varied as between the counties. Distributive pro- ’
visions of the act which distributed the funds collected on the
basis of the pre-existing local rates were held invalid under
section 26 of article II (see page 24, par. (6)) of the Constitu- Q
tion as being inequitable and not uniform in their application
even though general in their terms. Gorman vs. Friedlander, 44
O. App. 14, 184 N. E, 248 (1932). Pursuant to this decision the ' -
Legislature passed an amendment providing that certain amounts of ;
the taxes collected should be divided among public libraries and
township park—districts. In an action in injunction brought by
a city to enjoin the county from disbursing money in hand under
the terms of the added amendment the court denied the writ on the
grounds that no political subdivision of the State has any vested ‘
rights in taxes levied and in process of distribution, and until
such distribution is made the Legislature may divert the proceeds
among the subdivisions as it deems best to meet the emergencies
which it finds to exist. City of Cleveland vs. Zangerle, 127 0. S.
si, isc N. E. sos (isps).
6. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 5. . l
An act provided for the levy of gasoline and motor fuel excise
taxes to be used for roads and poor relief. A later act provided
(Footnote forwarded) _ ·

0hio 5,
. · II. Financial Powers and Limitations (Cont'd)
~ ° A. Taxation and Assessments (Cont'd)
(1) state (Cont'd)
(b) No property, taxed according to value, shall be
so taxed in excess of one per cent of its true value in money for all
‘ state and local purposes, but laws may be passed authorizing additional
taxes to be levied outside of such limitation, either when approved by
at least a majority of the electors of the taxing district voting on
’ such proposition, or when provided for by the charter of a municipal
corporation. Land and improvements thereon shall be taxed by uniform
rule according to value . . . 2/
(Footnote #6 - Continued)
that the same revenue be used for roads, and did not mention poor
` ’ relief. Furthermore the act did not expressly repeal the former sec-
tion relating to use of the funds for poor relief. The court held
the former section repealed by implication, saying however that "the
rule is well established that repeals by implication are not favored.
The presumption is against an intention to repeal an earlier statute
unless there is such inconsistency . . . between the statutes as to
` ° preclude the presumption". The court said that to hold otherwise
would violate this section of the Constitution. Rogers et al. vs.
· State ex rel. Lucas, 129 0. S. 108, 193 N. E. 754 (1934).
held to apply only to the levying and distribution of general
taxes for State purposes and not to taxes levied and distributed by
the State for local purposes. City of Cleveland vs. Zangerle, 127
° 0. S. 91, 186 N. E. 805 (1933).
A provision in an act requiring the counties to pay into the
State, moneys collected by them for blind relief under prior acts,
such moneys to be placed in a State fund QHG used by the State for
a similar purpose, to wit, blind relief, was held violative of this
section. State vs. Edmondson, 89 0. S. 351, 106 N. E. 41 (1913);
° see also State ex rel. Village of Cuyahoga heights vs. Zangerle,
103 O. S. 566, 134 N. E. 686 (1921), p. 690 et seq. for discussion
of principles.
7. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 2; (adopted 1933).
There are levies which may be made in excess of this limitation,
including, those necessary for the retirement of bonds outstanding at
° the time of the adoption of this amendment; special levies for con-
servancy and sanitary districts; levies for municipalities and other
political subdivisions formerly exempted under the pre—existing 15
mill limitation section. Ibid. See also page 13, par. (d) for
soldiers' bonus bond levy which falls outside of this limitation.
, For purposes of taxation, in Chio, all property both real and
• personal, stands on an equal basis and constitutes a single class
taxable at its true money value. City aailway Company vs. Beard,
293 Fed. 448 (D.C.S.D. Ohio, 1923).
Excise taxes are not subject to the uniformity requirement of
· this section. Calerdine vs. Freiberg, 129 C. 5. 453, 195 N. E;.
• 854 (1935).

6. Ohio
II. Financial Powers and Limitations (Cont'd) · '
A. Taxation and Assessments (Cont'd) • i
(1) state (ccnwa)
(c) Laws may be passed providing for the taxation
of the right to receive, or to succeed to, estates, and such taxation
may be uniform or . . . graduated . . . and a portion of each estate •
not exceeding twenty thousand dollars may be exempt from such taxa-
tlOI1• 9/
(d) Laws may be passed providing for the taxation
of incomes, and such taxation may be either uniform or graduated . . .
but a part of each annual income not exceeding three thousand dollars
may be exempt from such taxation. 2/
(e) Not less than fifty per centum of the income •
and inheritance taxes that may be collected by the state shall be returned
to the county, school district, city, village, or township in which said
income or inheritance tax originates, or to any of the same, as may be
provided by law. 1Q/
(f) Laws may be passed providing for excise and fran- •
chise taxes and for the imposition of taxes upon the production of coal,
oil, gas and other minerals. 1]] ·
8. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 7.
Taxes on inheritances, incomes and occupations are not property
taxes but are excise taxes and as such are not subject to the require- ’
ment that they be uniform and according to the true value in money.
State ex rel. Zielonka vs. Carrel, 99 0. S. 220, 124 N. E. 134 (1919).
9. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 8.
See footnote 8, above.
10. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 9.
While this section implies that the State only may initiate '
income and inheritance taxes, there is no prohibition on the impo-
sition by the political subdivisions of excise and franchise taxes,
and taxes on mineral products, until the State interdicts the exer-
cise of the power. State ex rel. Zielonka vs. Carrel, 99 0. S.
220, 124 N. E. 134 (1919). When the State however, has entered the
same field of taxation (as by levying an excise tax upon the owners '
of motor vehicles) it is not competent for the municipalities to
levy such a tax in addition to that levied by the State. Firestone
vs. City of Cambridge, 113 0. S. 57, 148 N. E. 470 (1925).
ll. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 10.
Excise taxes include taxes on the performance of an act, the
engaging in an occupation, and the enjoyment of a privilege. .
Saviers vs. Smith, 101 0. S. 132, 128 N. E. 269 (1920).
"Funds raised by taxation of franchises, rights, and privi-
leges may be applied to purposes of general revenue, or any other
purpose authorized by statute." State ex rel. Schwartz vs. Ferris, ·
53 O. S. 314, 41 N. E. 579 (1895). Thus an annual motor vehicle
(Footnote forwarded) •

Ohio 7,
· I1. Financial Powers and Limitations (Cont'd)
° A. Taxation and Assessments (Cont'd)
(1) State (Cont'd)
(g) The property of corporations, now existing or
hereafter created, shall forever be subject to taxation, the same as
• the property of individuals. 12
(h) The General Assembly shall make such provisions
' by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school
trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of common
schools throughout the state. 15/
(i) See pagel5 , par. (0).
• (j) See pagel5 , par. (d).
(k) The General Assembly shall provide for raising
revenue, sufficient to defray the expenses of the State for each year,
and also, a sufficient sum to pay the interest on the State debt. 14/
` ° (1) No bonded indebtedness of the State or any
political subdivisions thereof, shall be incurred or renewed, unless,
· in the legislation under which such indebtedness is incurred or renewed,
provision is made for levying and collecting annually by taxation an
· amount sufficient to pay the interest on said bonds, and to provide a
sinking fund for their final redemption at maturity. 15/
(Footnote #11 - Continued)
license tax, being an excise tax on a privilege, is not required to
be used exclusively for the benefit of those who pay the tax, but may
be used for poor relief. Calerdine vs. Freiberg, 129 0. S. 455, 195
N. E. ee4 (ieee).
• See page 6, footnote l0.
· 12. Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 4.
` 15. Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 2.
No authority exists in law for the diversion or use of the
school funds of the State for any purpose other than the establish-
ment and maintenance of common or public schools. O. A. G. 1409
’ (ieee).
14. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 4.
15. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. ll.
Held mandatory upon taxing authorities to provide at time issue
, of bonds is proposed for an annual tax levy to pay interest and
principal. This does not necessarily require the setting of a spe-
• cific rate of tax at time of issue; this may be annually determined
by the taxing officials. Annual levies however must be provided for.
‘ Link vs. Karb, 104 N. E. 652 (1914).
. (Footnote forwarded)

8. Ohio
II. Financial Powers and Limitations (Cont'd) ·
A. Taxation and Assessments (Cont'd) •
(2) Counties 16/
(a) See page 5, par. (b).
(b) See page 6, par. (e), and footnote 10. •
(3) Other Local Units gif
(Footnote #15 - Continued)
Where bonds were issued in anticipation of the collection of
special assessments to retire same which later proved inadequate,
it was held that a writ of mandamus would lie to compel the author-
ities to levy and collect annually by taxation an amount sufficient ‘
to pay the principal and interest of the bonds. State vs. Brooklyn, • ‘
126 0. s. 459, 1se N. E. s41 (19ee).
This section is mandatory and the levy for debt charges is
preferred over all other levies even over levies for operating ex-
penses. State vs. Cuyahoga County, 196 N. E. 890 (1935).
l6. The General Assembly shall by general law provide for the organi-
zation and government of counties and may also provide alternative • (
forms of county government. Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 1, 5.
Counties may frame and adopt charters to provide for their
own form of government. The charters may provide for either the ·
concurrent or exclusive exercise by the counties of all or any of
the powers vested by the Constitution or general law in municipal-
ities. However no charter vesting municipal powers in counties •
can be effective until approved by the electors of the county, the
largest municipality, and by a majority of the other municipalities
and townships in the county. These charters may also provide for
the division of the county into districts for administration and
taxation purposes. Ibid.
See footnote 17, below, for municipal provisions. • ‘
17. Municipalities shall subject to general regulatory law be classed .
into cities and villages. All with population over 5,000 shall be =
cities and all others, villages. General laws may be passed to
provide for their incorporation and government. Additional laws
may also be passed for the government of municipalities adopting
them, but no such law may become effective unless approved by •
popular vote of the electors therein. Municipalities shall have
authority to exercise all powers of local self-government not in
conflict with general laws. Constitution, Art. XVIII.
The provisions of Article XVIII of the Constitution (imma- (
diately preceding) are not intended to prevent the Legislature from
organizing taxation districts which may include any number of munic— •
ipalities, townships and counties. State vs. George, 92 0. S. 544
(1919). .
(Footnote forwarded) ·

QQQ 9.  
· II. Financial Powers and Limitations (Cont'd) {
• A. Taxation and Assessments (Cont’d)
(5) Other Local Units (Cont'd) 1
(a) See page 5, par. (b).
• (b) The General Assembly shall provide for the )
organization of cities, and incorporated villages, by general laws;
and restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money,
, contracting debts and loaning their credit, so as to prevent the
abuse of such power. 1Q/
(c) Laws may be passed to limit the power of mu-
nicipalities to levy taxes and incur debts for local purposes . . . 12/
• (Footnote #17 - Continued)
There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the Legislature
from providing by general taxation for municipalities. The State
may levy a uniform tax all over the State and then distribute the
proceeds to municipalities according to classification, provided
all in the same class are treated alike. State vs. Cook, 185 N. E.
• (1952) and cases cited therein.
- It was held that to safeguard the health of the people, the
health of any municipality being of vital concern to the State, the
· State had the authority under its police power to enact legislation
providing that the State should be divided into health districts;
, that each city should constitute and be referred to as a "city
• health district"; that the townships and villages in each county
should be combined and should constitute and be known as a "general
health district".
Furthermore a city through taxation must pay its portion of
the cost of its health administration in the district which it
• Such an enactment does not violate section 5 of article XVIII
of the Constitution (relating to Home Rule) and to so hold would
nullify section 26 of article II (page 24, Dar. (6)). Board of
{ Health of City of Canton et al. vs. State ex rel. 0'Wesney, 40
O. App. 77, 178 N. E. 215 (1951); see also State ex rel. Village
of Cuyahoga Heights vs. Zangerle, 105 0. S. 566, 154 N. E. 686
• (1921); State Board of Health vs. City of Greenville, 86 0. S. 1,
98 N. E. 1019 (1912).
18. Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 6.
The words "general laws" used in this section refer to laws
passed by the Legislature which are of general application through-
out the State. Leis vs. Cleveland Railway Company, 101 0. S. 162,
• 128 N. E. 75 (1920). The power of municipalities may be limited or
restricted by general law and such general laws apply to all munici-
palities whether operating under charter or not. Phillips vs. Hume,
122 0. S. 11, 170 N. E. 458 (1950).
· See footnote 19 immediately below.
19. Constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 15.
‘ (Footnote forwarded)

10. Ohio
II. Financial Powers and Limitations (Cont'd) ·
A. Taxation and Assessments (Cont'd) •
(5) Other Local Units (Cont'd)
(d) See page 6, par. (e), and footnote 10.
(e) Any municipality appropriating private property •
for a public improvement may provide money therefor in part by assess-
ments upon benefited property not in excess of the special benefits
conferred upon such property by the improvements. Said assessments, •
however, upon all the abutting . . . property . . . benefited, shall
in no case be levied for more than fifty per centum of the cost of
such appropriation. 20/ ( ‘
(Footnote #19 - Continued)
Uhere there is a clear conflict between a city charter and •
State statutes relating to the same subjects, to wit, the levying of
assessments for the improvement of streets, the charter provisions
must yield to the statutes. State ex rel. Osborne vs. Williams,
lll 0. S. 400, 145 N. n. 542 (1924).
See page 6, footnote 10.
The municipalities derive their powers of local self-government ‘
from this and other sections. A municipality may enact all such
measures as pertain exclusively to it, in which the people of the ·
State at large have no interest, and which they have not expressly
withheld by constitutional provision. The limitations set forth in
this section and article XIII, section 6 (page 9, par. (b)), refer
to the Legis1ature's power to create limitations on tax levies and ' p
indebtedness and provide the manner of expenditure of public funds. 7
They were not intended to authorize the Legislature to control such
local functions as the salaries of municipal governing bodies.
City of Mansfield vs. Endly, 58 0. App. 528, 176 N. E. 462 (1951). ‘
Where however provisions of a city charter relating to the
advertising requirements for public contracts involving a consider- ’
ation in excess of $500, were in conflict with the State law, the
State law was held to supersede the charter. Phillips vs. hume,
122 0.   11, ivo N. E., 4ss (iszo). I
When the State has levied an excise tax upon the owners of
motor vehicles it is not competent for the municipalities to levy
such a tax in addition to that levied by the State. Firestone vs. °
City of Cambridge, 115 O. S. 57, 148 N. E. 470 (1925).
20. Constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 11.
Provisions of city ordinance providing for extension of munici-
pal waterworks, and pledging revenue to secure bonds, and authorizing
mortgage, which provided that in event of foreclosure, purchaser of
bonds would have exclusive right to operate waterworks, held invalid •
as against public policy. Ohio Power Company vs. Craig, 50 0. App.
259, 197 N. E. 820 (1955).

Ohio ll_
· II. Financial Powers and Limitations (Cont'd) (
• A. Taxation and Assessments (Cont'd)
(3) Other Local Units (Oont'd)
(f) The General Assembly shall provide by general )
law for the election of such township officers as may be necessary. {
• The trustees of townships shall have such powers of local taxation as
may be prescribed by law. No money shall be drawn from any township
treasury except by authority of law. 21/
B. Exemptions
(1) No poll tax shall ever be levied in this state, or
service required, which may be commuted in money or other thing of
value. Egf
• (2) . . . All bonds outstanding on the lst day of January,
1913, of the state of Ohio or of any city, village, hamlet, county, or
township in this state, or which have been issued in behalf of the public (
schools of Ohio . . ., which bonds were outstanding on the lst day of
January, 1913 and all bonds issued for the World War Compensation Fund,
l • shall be exempt from taxation, and without limiting the general power,
. . . to determine the subjects and methods of taxation or exemptions
therefrom, general laws may be passed to exempt burying grounds, public
· school houses, houses used exclusively for public worship, institutions
’ used exclusively for charitable purposes 23/, and public property used
exclusively for any public purpose, but all such laws shall be subject
• to alteration or repeal; and the value of all property so exempted shall,
from time to time, be ascertained and published as may be directed by
1BW • • • Qilf
· 21. Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 2.
22. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 1.
A poll tax is a uniform assessment levied against all persons
• without regard to their property, occupation or ability to pay, an
occupation tax is not violative of this section, being a tax upon
the privilege of engaging in business. Marion foundry Company vs.
A Landes, 112 O. S. 220, 124 N. E. 134 (1919).
23. Under a law exempting from taxation the property of an institution
of "purely public charity", if such property is rented for commer-
• cial purposes, it is not exempt even though the income arising
therefrom is devoted wholly to charity. State ex rel. Boss vs.
Hess, 113 O. S. 52, 148 N} E. 347 (1925).
Property used to dispense charity only to aged Master Masons,
their wives, widows, and dependent orphans, or superannuated clergy-
men, was held not to be property used for purely public charity
' since the class of donees was limited and hence it was not exempt
from an inheritance tax. Tax Commission vs. security Savingsbank
and Trust Company, 117 O. S. 443, 159 N. E. 570 (1927).
· 24. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 2.

 ` •
l2. Ohio ‘
II. Financial Powers and Limitations (Cont'd) ·
B. Exemptions (Cont'd) •
(5) Laws may be passed to encourage forestry, and to
that end areas devoted exclusively to f